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One of the best indicators of an effective military is good logistics. After all,
it does not matter how far a weapon can shoot, how fast it can go, or how many soldiers you can
put into the field if they cannot be supplied, rearmed, and taken care of properly. The US
military has mastered the art of logistics. With a huge domestic industrial base combined
with overseas basing, prepositioning, and forward-deployed replenishment capabilities,
the US can sustain combat operations anytime, anywhere. Such logistics prowess has been
shown by the US fighting a two-front war half the world away for almost 20 years. Russia,
on the other hand, has experienced logistics woes during its invasion of Ukraine. Media and military
pundits have frequently bashed the Russian army's poor logistics. But they have yet to really
explain why their logistics are so bad. Until now. Before we dive too deep into how Russian logistics
cannot compare to the US military, Russia has not done everything wrong. One forward-thinking
innovation the Russian military has made is choosing smaller vehicles. For example,
their primary main battle tanks, like the T-72, T-80, and T-90, are about ten feet shorter and
20 tons lighter than the M1 Abrams. Putting the effectiveness of each tank aside, purely from a
logistics perspective, this has an advantage. Shorter tanks take up less room inside
ships. Lighter tanks also use less fuel when shipping them, and they also make for speedier
transport. But Russia’s army is not the only branch to implement some forethought. The Russian
navy has also set itself up for sea access. At the end of World War Two, what was formerly
known as East Prussia got broken up and mostly absorbed into Poland. However, a tiny sliver
of it went to Russia. Known as the Kaliningrad enclave, this tiny portion of Russian territory
is crucial in giving Russia year-round access to a warm water port. This is because ports like St.
Petersburg or Archangel freeze over during winter, preventing the deployment of ships and submarines.
Because Russia desires more warm water ports, this was one of their primary motivations for
involvement in Syria. Due to their assistance, Russia obtained perpetual basing rights to Latakia
on Syria's Mediterranean coast. Capturing the port of Sevastopol was also a significant factor in
the 2014 invasion of Crimea. Because of Russia’s need for a more desirable port on the Black Sea,
Russia aimed to retake what used to be one of the Soviet Union's primary ports. Due to its
steep decline from the port to the sea floor, Sevastopol has been favored as a submarine base
for decades and serves as a major logistics hub. But of course, Russia had to violate international
law to get Sevastopol. Putting the benefits of their generally lighter combat vehicles
and aggressive stance at getting warm water ports aside, Russia’s military as a whole has
failed on the land, sea, and air to provide adequate support for forward deployed units.
The most obvious example of Russian failures has been its total lack of sea and airlift capacity.
In 1992, just after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Russian Air Force had about 500 planes
with a combined lift capacity of nearly 30,000 tons. Additionally, the Russian navy operated
about 80 amphibious and logistics ships with enough room to fit over 600 tanks. With fewer than
20 ships and around 100 airplanes left, Russia's forward-deployed combat capacity is just shy of
6,000 tons of gear and about 200 tanks. Such a dramatic decrease in lift capacity severely
limits combat operations beyond its borders. Another crucial factor that limits lift capacity
is the lack of support for ships and aircraft outside Russian borders. During the Russian
campaign in Syria, it was a known deficiency that Russian warships could not resupply their
troops in the theater. Unlike the US Navy, the Russian navy does not practice nor even have the
capability of regular underway replenishment. Underway replenishment is a method of refueling
and reequipping ships at sea, spearheaded by the US Navy during the First World War.
In underway replenishment operations, US Navy and NATO vessels come alongside at
distances of about 180 feet from the oiler. One vessel will shoot shot lines over to the other
and bring the spanwire and in haul out haul lines over. These then connect to the ship
to pump fuel and slide pallets of food, parts, supplies, and ammunition over between the ships.
Though the Soviet navy had limited capacity for refueling operations and no capacity for taking
stores during missions, the Russian navy has abandoned even trying anymore. Though
every US Navy ship regularly conducts underway replenishment, Russian ships do not. Instead,
they have to waste time and money pulling into ports to refuel, rearm, and reequip.
The Russian Air Force does not fare much better. Because Russia alienates most of the world,
few countries will afford them overflight rights. Overflight is the permission that military planes
have to obtain from any country they fly through. If a country says no,
that aircraft has to divert to a route that takes them through airspace they are allowed in.
Thanks to the NATO alliance and friendly relations the United States has with most of the world,
there are few air spaces that American aircraft are denied overflight. But for Russian planes,
their friends are few and far between. Because of this, Russian aircraft supporting combat
operations have to take longer routes that waste time, fuel, and money. But
even if more countries like Belarus permitted Russian planes to fly through their territory,
Russia lacks overseas bases to support aircraft. Unlike naval aviation, which can launch and
recover on aircraft carriers, ground-based planes have to have runways. The US has spent
the past few decades building relationships that have allowed American aircraft basing
rights around the world. The Russian air force does not have this luxury. Because of this,
with a few exceptions such as Syria and Belarus, Russian aircraft would have nowhere to land unless
Russian troops secured overseas bases by force. Another crucial factor to consider is the
overreliance of the Russian army on railways for transportation. Because Russia is so large,
with huge territories of virtual wasteland, their military relies more heavily on rail systems than
any other European country. The Russians adopted this strategy because during the Cold War they set
up most of the USSR and Warsaw Pact countries with a standard, wide gauge track. They did this so in
the event of a war they would always have plenty of rail heads to disembark supplies so that they
would not have to travel far to forward units. But this logic has a few major flaws. Firstly,
the Russians must assume that they will always control a large majority of their
vital rail hubs. Secondly, because of their overreliance on rail, the logistics units
meant to support forward-deployed units pale in comparison to US and NATO units. On average,
western militaries have three to four times the number of logistics personnel as Russia
does for servicing equivalent sized units. Because Russia has not been able to take many
population centers, they are stranded in a sort of logistical desert in Ukraine. With no rail
heads to draw supplies from, the few logistics troops left have to service forward-deployed units
in massive truck convoys that depart from the closest rail hubs Russia does control. Usually,
these convoys have to leave from Russian or Belarusian territory. Once on the road,
these convoys suffer constant attacks from Ukranian drones and artillery strikes.
Additionally, because of the Russian policy of treating its draftees, these often unmotivated,
poorly trained, and even more poorly led soldiers are left to service the trucks
and vehicles that keep the army supplied. Because of the backwardness, corruption,
and hazing in the conscript system, little to no maintenance gets done on these vehicles
which cause large numbers of them to be lost before Ukraine can even take a shot at them.
Just how bad Russian logistics are at supporting faraway campaigns was studied extensively
in a RAND corporation study in 2020. The RAND Corporation is one of America's oldest and largest
military think tanks, and both Congressional and military officials frequently cite their
reports. According to RAND's own wargames, the Russian military would have extreme difficulty
supporting formations of troops beyond a brigade level past the borders of Ukraine, Poland, and the
Baltics. For any campaigns past Eastern Europe, it has been estimated that Russia could not support
units larger than a battalion level. To put these numbers into perspective, a battalion, depending
on the military, has around a thousand soldiers, and a brigade usually has several thousand
soldiers. This means that for anything outside Russia's borders, their military can only ensure
brigade-sized units are fully manned, equipped, and supplied. Such a finding has come true in
Ukraine, where large Russian formations frequently ran out of fuel, food, water, and ammunition.
Why Russia has a hard time supporting its forces outside its borders is not only due to nations not
granting them basing rights or their inability to replenish at sea. Their own system works against
them. In the Russian military, conscripts have always made up most of the fighting
force. However, the disastrous wars in Chechnya turned public opinion against the government
for deploying conscript soldiers in front-line positions. During those wars, recently conscripted
men were rushed to the front, and thousands of Russian men died because their government did
not care enough to train them properly. Because of public outrage over conscript
casualties in Chechnya, the Duma also passed legislation that made sending conscripts
into combat outside Russian borders illegal. Because of this constraint,
Russian commanders have difficulty properly manning their Battalion Tactical Groups.
Legal constraints before the 2022 invasion saw commanders scrambling to properly man
units in time for out-of-area deployments. Oftentimes, soldiers from units in the Far
East would have to be brought in to man units in western or southern Russia,
preparing to deploy to the Donbas or Syria. Because of this dilemma, it’s now obvious that
part of the reason Putin rushed to annex parts of Ukraine he controlled was so he had the legal
basis for sending the hundreds of thousands of conscripts he planned to enlist to the front line.
Conscription also hurts Russian logistics because, before the invasion, the policy
was that conscripts had to primarily serve in support roles. Russian officials gave positions
like mechanics, supply clerks, and all the other support roles to conscripts. Taking
mechanics as an example, these troops serve a vital function not just in the serving military
but in maintaining stored equipment that, if not taken seriously, can have disastrous effects.
In the US military, planes, tanks, ships, and vehicles held in storage receive routine
maintenance. Whether provided by contractors or reserve personnel, the US military ensures that
equipment held in long-term storage is available for immediate use if the military ever needs it.
The Russian military doesn’t work the same way. In principle, Russia also maintains its vast Cold
War stockpile of equipment. However, the war in Ukraine has shown that old habits die hard. During
the Soviet era, it was common practice to make conscripts maintain and clean equipment. Volunteer
soldiers saw these kinds of jobs as beneath them and forced the men who did not want to be there to
do it. Of course, this led to work that was poorly done, if done at all. Another way that stored
vehicles were improperly maintained was greedy army officers looking to line their pockets.
Because Soviet equipment is among the most common gear in a lot of countries' militaries,
spare parts are in high demand. Enterprising Soviet officers used to sell parts and pieces
from vehicles to make extra money. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union,
the Russian military did its best to stamp out these practices. During the major Russian army
overhaul in the early 2000s, it was reported to Putin that the military had stopped these
practices. But it is clear now they had continued. After Russia started taking heavy losses in tanks
and armored vehicles, tons of Cold War equipment was dusted off to be brought to the fight. Only
there was just one problem: a lot of it didn't work. Broken equipment and tanks so gutted
from part theft as to be left inoperable have been so prevalent that some reserve tank units
reported 90% of their inventories as write-offs. Russian part woes also extend to the crushing
sanctions their country has faced since the invasion. Even though Russia boasts a
robust arms industry, they relied on abundant imports from western countries for advanced
parts. Everything from microchip processors to advanced optics had to be outsourced to foreign
countries. Even though western countries often import parts too, unlike Russia, it’s highly
unlikely US supply chains will be interrupted. Even if Russian industry could support its arms
needs, the government does not have the money. This is because Russian officials have poured
what few defense dollars they have left over into developing wonder weapon-type projects
like super quiet submarines and hypersonic missiles. Ordinary equipment like gun sights,
fire control computers, and communications equipment get left out. The budget constraints
even affect the lives of ordinary soldiers to the degree that it hurts combat effectiveness.
A hodgepodge of videos coming out of Russia shows that the military does not have the money for even
basic things like uniforms, bulletproof vests, and first aid kits. Often, enlistment officers
tell men to purchase their own gear if they want to survive. Additionally, the soldiers'
families are not taken care of. Conscripted men are taken off the street and put on the front
lines within weeks or days of their induction. These men leave behind jobs and families to
support. Russian military leadership has said they do not have money to care for soldiers and
their families. Putin directed local governments to work out whatever payments they could afford.
In some Russian districts, men are given a sheep, and others get several kilograms of fish or some
cabbage as payment for their service. Even when they are deployed, soldiers are told that they
are not being paid a salary, and they should just do their job. It is this fundamental
difference in how the Russian military pays its soldiers and cares for their families
that truly makes the US better than Russia. No matter what, US servicemembers get paid
twice a month and get a housing allowance if married or above a certain rank. They get free
healthcare for themselves and their families and a ton of other benefits like money for
tuition. The Russian government simply does not have the money nor desire to ensure their own
troops are properly fed, clothed, and paid. To show just how little Putin cares for his troops,
Russia has stopped listing soldiers as killed but instead as missing in action.
This distinction prevents families of Russian servicemembers that the government knows are
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