Today we’re going to take a look at the state of Soviet Artillery, Mortars and Anti-Tank
guns on the Axis-Soviet Front on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. This is the new and
improved version of this video - since I did this a couple of days ago, and messed up with
one of the charts. The link to the old video will be in the description for those of you
who really want to go see where I went wrong.
Anyway, Soviet artillery was split into two forces. The first being the regular force
artillery, which was the organic regiments and battalions that are within rifle divisions
and corps. Then we have artillery from the Reserve of the High Command (shortened to
RGK, later RVGK). This reserve force was a centralized pool of units that could be attached
(where needed) to Soviet armies and corps during the war.
At the outbreak of war in 1941, 92% of all Soviet artillery was in the regular force
artillery. This was the 94 corps artillery regiments, which were supporting armies, corps
and divisions at the front. Therefore barely 8% of Soviet artillery was in the RGK, the
centralized reserve artillery force. And when we look at the total amount of Soviet artillery
on the 22nd of June 1941, we find that they had 117,600 guns and mortars. But 37,500 guns
and mortars were located in the western border military districts - with the rest nowhere
near the front. This is going to be bad, as you’ll see.
In June of 1941, a typical Rifle Division would have a light artillery regiment of two
battalions (with eight 76mm field artillery guns and four 122mm howitzers each), totalling
24 artillery pieces. They also had a howitzer artillery regiment of two light battalions
(with twelve 122mm howitzers each), plus a medium battalion (with twelve 152mm howitzers),
bringing the total to 36 howitzers. And there was an anti-tank battalion with eighteen 45mm
guns, plus an anti-aircraft battalion with twelve 37mm anti-aircraft guns. This means,
a division had 294 guns and mortars (at 50mm size or greater).
But, is this really the case? Well, no, because this is actually the paper strength. The reality
was significantly different. Now, this is where I went wrong last time - I used the
wrong chart (because I’m a moron). Anyway, here is a chart showing the Southwestern Front’s
Artillery Weapons on the 22nd of June 1941. I don’t have the numbers for all of the
Western Military Districts, so this will have to do. But it’s not unreasonable to imagine
that if the Southwestern Front are down in guns of certain calibres, then the rest of
the army was also going to be short of these guns as well because they were. Blue is the
number of artillery guns that they required, and Red is the number of guns that they actually
had.
If we look at the first part, we see the numbers for the 45mm Anti-Tank guns. We’ve got 2,134
required, and they actually had 1,912 on had, with 62 in repair, therefore 1850 in working
order. That’s about 87% of their requirements, which isn’t too bad. Obviously, being 13%
down in your anti-tank guns on the eve of a panzer Blitzkrieg attack is definitely not
good, but it’s also not as bad as some of the other weapons.
Such as the 76mm guns. Now, there is a problem with the original chart where I pulled these
numbers from. So, to be completely transparent, I’m going to have to give a explanation
here as to how I’ve come to the numbers shown. Table 6.3 in Stumbling Colossus lists
the required number of certain 76mm guns as 1037. However, it then lists the shortage
of guns as 1301. That’s impossible. If I require 5 apples, I can’t be short 7 - that’s
breaking the laws of physics. But there is a clue in the numbers. If you add up the On
Hand weapons together, you get 1301. So I don’t think that 1301 figure is the shortage,
I think that’s the total on hand. And I think that the requirement number of 1037
is actually the shortage number. If we’re short 1037 guns, we require 1037 guns. So
I think someone’s put it in the wrong box. Therefore, if you add 1037 and 1301 together,
you’ll get 2338, which is the number I’ve used to add together with the other 76mm guns,
and this totals 3244 - shown in this chart. Obviously, this is a bit of a guess, but it’s
an educated one. It also makes sense because we know they required more 76mm guns than
122mm guns, which wouldn’t be the case if we left the 76mm gun numbers as they are.
So, this absolutely could be wrong, and if I’m wrong, fine. But I’ve shown my workings
out, and if you disagree, all you have to do is ignore the 76mm gun numbers.
But if we accept the numbers, the Southwestern Front was down by roughly 37% of their 76mm
guns. This is a significant amount. And, considering the Soviets were down 25% in their 122mm guns,
and 35% in their 152mm guns and howitzers, and that these are the guns found in Rifle
Divisions - this means that the Rifle Divisions were missing roughly 66% of their artillery
pieces. What we have to consider as well is that the Germans alone outnumbered the Soviets
on the first day of the war, and most of the German divisions are infantry divisions. Plus
there were infantry in the panzer formations as well. Therefore the Soviets were severely
lacking in the tools required to fight back against them.
In terms of Anti-Aircraft guns, the Soviets are missing 75% of their 37mm guns, and 31.5%
of their 76mm Anti-Aircraft guns. Sure, they’ve got 90% of their 85mm Anti-Aircraft guns,
but it’s clear that they’re lacking a lot of air defenses on the eve of war. We
will come back to discussing the Soviet anti-aircraft arm later in the video (which is very interesting
in itself) but for now, let’s look at this other chart.
This is a chart showing the fulfilment of artillery and mortar ammunition for units
in the Western Military Districts on the 22nd of June 1941. And yes, if you watch the previous
edition of this video, you’ll see I’ve used different numbers to those used in that.
The explanation will be in the Pinned Comment in the comment section below. Anyway, to explain
this chart - if the blue bar is at 100%, then the units have enough ammunition for that
weapon. Clearly, they didn’t have enough ammunition. They’re down by nearly 60% of
their their Anti-Tank gun ammunition - on the eve of a war where panzer divisions are going
to be knocking on their door, they’re lacking 60% of their anti-tank gun ammunition. And,
as we said, lots of German divisions were infantry divisions, and all of the divisions
had infantry in them. So to be down by 67% of your 76mm gun ammunition (which is the
most-used artillery gun) is also clearly bad. Then to have only about 55% of the ammunition
for your 122mm and 152mm guns basically means your Rifle Divisions aren’t going to have
enough ammunition to tackle the German infantry they’re about to go up against.
And yes, they have just 7.5% of their 37mm anti-tank guns ammunition. 7.5%. It’s terrible,
and, while the 85mm ammunition isn’t shown, Glantz makes it clear that they were lacking
in that ammunition as well. So they’re relying entirely on their 76mm anti-aircraft guns.
And if we pull up this new chart. This is a mix of the ammunition chart we’ve just seen
and the percentages of the weapons needed for the Southwestern Front. Yes, it’s not
ideal because we’re comparing the ammunition requirement of the whole of the Western Military
Districts to the number of artillery pieces in just the Southwestern Front, but it should
give an indication of the problem. Blue is ammunition fulfilment, and Red is the weapons
fulfilment. So being at 100% is good.
And as we can see, they’re down by over 30% of their 76mm aircraft guns anyway, even
if they have more ammunition. And the 37mm anti-aircraft gun may as well not even have
bothered! They have 7.5% of the ammunition for them, and only have 24% of the guns to
fire that ammunition. It’s a dual problem. This chart alone explains why the Soviet anti-aircraft
defenses are completely inadequate during Barbarossa since they’re missing more than
half their guns, and lacking in ammunition on top of that. Then when you consider that
they don’t have enough anti-tank gun ammunition, and that the Soviets are forced to use their
anti-aircraft guns as anti-tank guns to stop the waves of enemy panzers, you then realise that
their anti-air defenses are even more crippled. Yep, they’re lacking over 60% of the anti-tank
ammunition required to take out the panzers. And coupled with the fact that they’re down
over 60% of their 76mm Field Artillery guns and ammunition for them, and the fact that
they’ve only got about 57% of the ammunition required for their 122mm and 152mm guns, which
they’re also lacking in guns as well, we can confidently conclude that the Soviet artillery
was not in a position to fight infantry or tanks. And in terms of mortars, they’re
also lacking in ammunition, especially for the 120mm mortars, but all of them are suffering.
So, to summarise, Soviet Artillery was significantly handicapped prior to Barbarossa. Sure, maybe
overall you could argue they had more guns than the Germans, but the ammunition for them
wasn’t sufficient.
And if you think the material requirement and fulfilment is bad, it gets worse. Artillery
doesn’t have an infinite range, and needs to move. But in the Red Army there was a massive
shortage of trucks and tractors to tow the guns and carry ammunition. Only 37.8% of Soviet
combat formations had their required tractors when the war began. The RGK lacked up to 85%
of their required tractor systems for movement. And on the 22nd of June 1941, most of the
vehicles that they did have required repair.
And the problems continue to mount. Half of the RGK artillery had no repair, reconstruction,
or other logistical support. And all artillery units were supposed to have artillery-correction
aircraft to help aim the artillery. But few of the units actually had them. The Soviets
themselves noted that junior and mid-range artillery commanders were poorly trained and
unable to lead their artillery effectively in combat. Target acquisition was poor, and
commanders were unable to coordinate fire with cooperating units. But, according to
a report prepared by Lieutenant General Parserov, Southwestern Front’s chief of artillery,
which was written on the 14th of July 1941, the worst problem was that of transport for
ammunition resupply. The report states that the majority of units had to leave more than
half their ammunition at their base when the war began, most of which was subsequently
blown up or fell to the enemy. So, that chart we showed before - let’s half the values
and go with that. Wow, suddenly things are a lot worse. And as we said earlier, the Soviets
had 117,600 guns and mortars, and only 37,500 of these were at the front. Because of the
lack of transport, Soviet artillery could not be deployed en-masse, and had to be
deployed piece-meal. So just looking at the sheer number of artillery does not tell the
full story.
There was also the issue of anti-tank units. The Soviets had neglected anti-tank warfare
until after they saw the Fall of France in 1940. They then suddenly realized that anti-tank
warfare was essential - which was far too late. As a result, an anti-tank artillery
brigade was created in each army. An anti-tank brigade in June of 1941 had 5,309 men, with
120 guns, mostly of the 76mm category. But the Soviets didn’t have the weapons to create
these new units. So, on the eve of war, most of the divisional and corps anti-tank guns
were taken away to form the new anti-tank brigades. This meant that divisions didn’t
have enough anti-tank guns, and had to rely on anti-tank rifles - which weren’t going
to be effective. Now someone pointed out that the Soviets didn’t have anti-tank rifles
at the beginning of the war. I don’t know if this is true or not, but Glantz makes it
clear that they did -
“This [the creation of anti-tank brigades] left most Soviet forces deficient in antitank
capability, and once war began, these forces had to make do with the cheaper and more easily
produced, but markedly less effective, antitank rifles.” - Glantz, Stumbing Colossus, P163.
This is why the Red Army soldiers ended up using many of their anti-aircraft guns as
anti-tank guns, rather than as anti-aircraft guns. And, since there was already shortages
of basically everything, the anti-tank brigades themselves were also lacking in trucks, tractors
and had trouble conducting reconnaissance and acquiring targets.
On top of all of this, the NKO (which is short for Ministry of Defence, or “People's Commissariat
for Defence”) decided to abolish the post of chief of Red Army Artillery. The result,
to quote Glantz, left the Red Army’s artillery -
“...decentralized, poorly controlled, relatively immobile, without adequate logistical support,
and largely ineffective when war began.” Glantz, Colossus Reborn, P285
The Germans then exploited these flaws. When Operation Barbarossa opened up, Soviet artillery
forces had been out-maneuvered and destroyed. Four of the ten anti-tank brigades were completely
wiped out in the initial battles, with many of the others reduced in the fighting as well.
And because the Red Army was forced to deploy their anti-aircraft guns as anti-tank guns
to stop the waves of panzers, this crippled their air-defenses at a time when their own
air-force had been crushed. The Germans then proceeded to annihilate the Red Army’s anti-aircraft
forces, and air force as well, leaving the Soviets without any air-defences and completely
vulnerable to Stuka attacks.
Some have claimed that the Soviet Union was going to attack Germany in the July of 1941,
which is why the Germans had to invade in the June of 1941. Given the state of Soviet
forces on the eve of war, we can confidently conclude that this wasn’t the case. They
were outnumbered, didn’t have anywhere near enough equipment, had massive logistical and
supply issues, didn’t have enough trucks, their tanks were out of date, their air force
was basically useless, and they were forced to use their anti-aircraft guns as anti-tank
guns and thus had no air-defense. To attack would have been suicidal. In fact, to defend
was suicidal, and it’s no wonder that many chose to surrender.
And this is why, when people claim that the Red Army soldier was cowardly or inferior
to the amazing German Aryan, they’ve missed the other side of the equation. If you’re
getting attacked by tanks, artillery, infantry, dive-bombers, and so on, and all you and you
and some out-numbered friends, a couple of rifles and an anti-tank gun, total defeat
is your only option. If you had the equipment and weren’t overwhelmed by sheer weight
of numbers, yeah you’d fight back.
And this is the point to take away. Looking at the total number of artillery guns alone
does not tell the full story. There was a massive shortage of weapons and ammunition
for the Soviets, but even with the weapons they did have, because of the lack of trucks
and tractors, the Soviets deployed their forces in penny-packets. So, if you imagine 100 Germans
going up against 500 Soviets - yes, they’re outnumbered. But not if the Soviets send in
50 men at a time. Obviously this is an extreme example, but you get the point. The same applies
with Soviet artillery and tanks. They’re actually outnumbered at the tactical level,
and even in those scenarios where they’re not, they’re missing the other arms, which
means - as I’ve said before - they’re playing rock paper scissors, but only allowed
to pick rock.
I will come back to look at the evolution of Soviet Artillery over the course of the
war, but I wanted to set the scene today. Many people still think that the Soviets were
gearing up for war. Even when I showed that not to be the case in my Keitel and Viktor
Suvorov video, many still claim to this day that just exposing how Viktor Suvorov was
willing to manipulate the evidence to support his conclusions didn’t make his views invalid.
Well, this video has shown that the Soviets weren’t in a position to defend, let alone
attack. If you’re of the opinion that the Soviets were planning to attacking the Germans
and that the Germans had to do something about it, well you might be interested in my Suvorov
video. Thank you to my Patreons for your continuing support, you make these videos possible, because
you’re awesome. And to everyone, thanks for watching, bye for now.