In philosophy, events are objects in time or instantiations of properties in
objects. However, a universal definition has not been reached, as multiple
theories exist concerning events. Kim’s property-exemplification
Jaegwon Kim theorized that events are structured.
They are composed of three things: Object(s) [x],
a property [P] and time or a temporal interval [t].
Events are defined using the operation [x, P, t].
A unique event is defined by two principles:
a) the existence condition and b) the identity condition.
The existence condition states “[x, P, t] exists if and only if object x
exemplifies the n-adic P at time t”. This means a unique event exists if the
above is met. The identity condition states “[x, P, t] is [y, Q, t`] if and
only if x=y, P=Q and t=t`]. Kim uses these to define events under
five conditions: One, they are unrepeatable, unchangeable
particulars that include changes and the states and conditions of that event.
Two, they have a semi-temporal location. Three, only their constructive property
creates distinct events. Four, holding a constructive property as
a generic event creates a type-token relationship between events, and events
are not limited to their three requirements. Critics of this theory
such as Myles Brand have suggested that the theory be modified so that an event
had a spatiotemporal region; consider the event of a flash of lightning. The
idea is that an event must include both the span of time of the flash of
lightning and the area in which it occurred.
Other problems exist within Kim’s theory, as he never specified what
properties were. In addition, it is not specified if properties are few or
abundant. The following is Kim’s response to the above.
There is also a major debate about the essentiality of a constitutive object.
There are two major questions involved in this: If one event occurs, could it
have occurred in the same manner if it were another person, and could it occur
in the same manner if it would have occurred at a different time? Kim holds
that neither are true and that different conditions would lead to a separate
event. However, some consider it natural to assume the opposite.
Davidson Donald Davidson and John Lemmon proposed
a theory of events that had two major conditions, respectively: a causal
criterion and a spatiotemporal criterion.
The causal criterion defines an event as two events being the same if and only if
they have the same cause and effect. The spatiotemporal criterion defines an
event as two events being the same if and only if they occur in the same space
at the same time. Davidson however provided this scenario; if a metal ball
becomes warmer during a certain minute, and during the same minute rotates
through 35 degrees, must we say that these are the same event? However, one
can argue that the warming of the ball and the rotation are possibly temporally
separated and are therefore separate events.
Lewis David Lewis theorized that events are
merely spatiotemporal regions and properties. It defines an event as “e is
an event only if it is a class of spatiotemporal regions, both thisworldly
and otherworldly.” The only problem with this definition is it only tells us what
an event could be, but does not define a unique event. This theory entails modal
realism, which assumes possible worlds exist; worlds are defined as sets
containing all objects that exist as a part of that set. However, this theory
is controversial. Some philosophers have attempted to remove possible worlds, and
reduce them to other entities. They hold that the world we exist in is the only
world that actually exists, and that possible worlds are only possibilities.
Lewis’ theory is composed of four key points. Firstly, the non-duplication
principle; it states that x and y are separate events if and only if there is
one member of x that is not a member of y. Secondly, there exist regions that
are subsets of possible worlds and thirdly, events are not structured by an
essential time. Badiou
In Being and Event, Alain Badiou writes that the event is a multiple which
basically does not make sense according to the rules of the "situation," in
other words existence. Hence, the event "is not," and therefore, in order for
there to be an event, there must be an "intervention" which changes the rules
of the situation in order to allow that particular event to be. In his view,
there is no "one," and everything that is is a "multiple." "One" happens when
the situation "counts," or accounts for, acknowledges, or defines something: it
"counts it as one." For the event to be counted as one by the situation, or
counted in the one of the situation, an intervention needs to decide its
belonging to the situation. This is because his definition of the event
violates the prohibition against self-belonging, thus does not count as
extant on its own. Deleuze
Gilles Deleuze lectured on the concept of event on March 10, 1987. A sense of
the lecture is described by James Williams. Williams also wrote, "From the
point of view of the difference between two possible worlds, the event is all
important". He also stated, "Every event is revolutionary due to an integration
of signs, acts and structures through the whole event. Events are
distinguished by the intensity of this revolution, rather than the types of
freedom or chance." In 1988 Deleuze published a magazine article "Signes et
événements" In his book Nietszche and Philosophy, he
addresses the question "Which one is beautiful?" In the preface to the
English translation he wrote: The one that ... does not refer to an
individual, to a person,but rather to an event, that is, to the forces in their
various relationships to a proposition or phenomenon, and the genetic
relationship that determines these forces.
See also Event
Random event References
External links Roberto Casati & Achille Varzi, Events,
from Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Susan Schneider, Events, from The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Byron Kaldis, Events, from Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences.