When Manchester United lifted the Champions League in 2008, it was the third time in their
history that they’d won the European Cup and their second under Sir Alex Ferguson.
United would go on to lose finals in the following season and 2010/11 to Barcelona, and Ferguson
would clinch three further league titles.
But the 2008 Champions League winning side was probably his last truly great side.
Manchester United strode through European competition in 2007/08. They did not lose
once, conceded only five goals on route to the final, and scored 19; the final, of course,
finished 1-1 after extra time, before Edwin van der Sar saved Nicolas Anelka’s penalty
to win the cup for United.
Ferguson’s side topped their group, featuring Roma, who they would meet again later in the
competition, Sporting, and Dynamo Kyiv. The round of 16 saw a 2-1 aggregate win over Lyon,
before Roma were dispatched a second time 3-0 on aggregate in the quarters.
That set up a semi-final clash with Barcelona with Paul Scholes’s goal settling the tie
in the second leg. Chelsea, who had seen off Liverpool in their own semi-final, then met
United in Moscow, where Ferguson’s side triumphed.
But how did they get there so emphatically?
The 2007/08 Champions League campaign was a vindication of Ferguson as a tactical manager.
He and Carlos Queiroz he took Europe by storm in 2007/08 with a fluid set-up that could
build possession through the lines or counter-attack with ferocious pace.
The team’s foundation was the extraordinary back five of Edwin van der Sar, Wes Brown,
Rio Ferdinand, Nemanja Vidic, and Patrice Evra.
This unit excelled, defending more narrowly than they did in the league to keep United
more compact against better opposition. Brown’s unusual height at right back, at 6ft1, gave
United solidity in the air and against set pieces, while van der Sar allowed them to
push higher, as did the pace and ball-carrying ability of Ferdinand.
Both full backs could get forwards, too, and while Evra was normally more aggressive, it
would be Brown, turning back inside and onto his left foot, who curled in the cross for
Ronaldo’s headed goal in the final.
The unit was brilliantly balanced. Vidic brought steel and aerial dominance, while Ferdinand
was an elegant and skilful ball-carrier, who read the game better than any other English
defender of that generation.
And, in goal, van der Sar was a genuine sweeper keeper who allowed United to build attacks
from the back.
Ahead of them, the midfield pivot of Paul Scholes and Michael Carrick screened and shuttled,
with the ageing Scholes deeper than he had once been.
Carrick was more a metronome, while Scholes could still carry the ball through midfield
and hit his trademark long passes. Both possessed an eclectic range of passing, though, with
Scholes in particular dropping off to create a diamond with the centre backs, or even to
Vidic’s left hand side to give United transition passing from deep.
If this sounds modern, that’s because it was: a number of the tactical facets of United
in 2007/08 are commonplace now. And while both Scholes and Carrick could pass long to
meet the runs of Ronaldo or Rooney, United would also happily play through the lines,
with strikers dropping off or wide players tucking inside. For every defensive system,
United had a passing solution in midfield, in part because Scholes had adapted to his
deeper role so well.
But it was ahead of this back seven where United truly came alive.
Ferguson and Queiroz created a flexible system that largely defended in a 4-4-2 or 4-4-1-1,
with Carlos Tevez and Wayne Rooney alternating – against Chelsea in the final, for example,
it was mostly Tevez who hassled and harried Claude Makelele at the base of Chelsea’s
midfield.
But this defensive shape exploded into a 4-5-1 or 4-3-3 when United attacked at pace, with
positional interchanges common between the front three of Tevez, Rooney, and Ronaldo.
Ferguson also used this front four to adapt to the opposition. His squad depth meant that
he could field genuine wingers like Ryan Giggs or Nani, or more disciplined wide-midfielders
like Ji-Sung Park. Owen Hargreaves played on the right in the final, showing his positional
versatility in a tucked-in, tracking back role which perfectly suited his abilities.
And, on several occasions, Hargreaves even pushed up into the box in a kind of centre
forward role, with Tevez dropping. This rotation of positions meant that United were impossible
to mark man-for-man, a constant blur of movement and energy that caused defences no end of
problems.
This versatility in selection makes it hard to digest United’s tactics into one simple
set of principles. Sometimes, Ronaldo would be up front alone, as he was against Roma,
with Rooney almost a defensive winger on one side. It’s worth noting here that this was
when Ronaldo begin his evolution into a genuine aerial presence; his ability to win the ball
either as a sole striker or targeting a full back from wide was key for United.
But in the final, Ronaldo instead occupied a wide left position, targeting Michael Essien
who was playing at right back.
Ronaldo would start very wide then accelerate up the touch line, with Evra under-lapping
like an inverted full back. Ronaldo would then either cross, or dart back inside, with
Evra effortlessly moving wider as the two switched. This kind of movement from a full-back
evokes the principles of positional play, and against Essien, it was remarkably effective.
But all three forwards roamed, and Rooney’s ability to hit long passes from deep was a
huge weapon. Several times in the final, he foraged for the ball deep in the midfield
third, before lashing it forwards. The finest example, where he picks the ball up in the
right back slot, glides past Carvalho, and hits a long Crossfield to diagonal to Ronaldo,
is counter-attacking at its finest.
Ronaldo’s cross was met by Tevez, who brought a fine stop from Petr Cech; Carrick’s follow
up is then saved by Cech as well.
But it’s made by Rooney, scampering back to help his defence, securing the ball, and
then having the vision and execution to turn defence into attack in seconds that really
sums up this team.
It was a team that won Ferguson his second European Cup, but it also showed how he could
adapt. The trademark 4-4-2 with quick wingers and alternating strikers of 1999 was echoed
in this side at times, but Ferguson was changing: the use of a more fluid front three, often
without someone in the designated striking role, was modern and innovative.
It’s one of the many things that made him great, an ability to move with, or even anticipate,
the times, and adjust his tactics and squads accordingly.