On January 1, 1760, King Frederick the Great of Prussia sent a letter to his brother,
Henry. After years of bloody warfare and constant setbacks,
the letter provides a candid look at the hopeless situation his Kingdom found itself in.
Our situation is abominable. My heart is eaten away by sorrow, and what depresses me most of
all is the knowledge that I have come to the end of my resources - we have nothing left. I
do not wish to plunge you into gloom on this New Year's Day, but I have to speak frankly,
and this terrible prospect is evident to all who do not shut their eyes to it."
The disastrous Battle of Maxen, ending the 1759 campaign, severely weakened the Prussian position.
It revived Austrian, Russian and French motivation to deal with the Kingdom once and for all.
Prussia’s position was not lost on its adversaries.
Count Kaunitz, the foremost proponent of war at the Austrian court, wrote to the Russians:
“The King of Prussia is as good as destroyed.
Frederick's bouts with his health had been rather prevalent ever since the onset of the
1758 campaign. Now, after a total of four years of war, with tens of thousands of dead, stress,
losses, setbacks, reverses and twists, his health wasn't getting any better.
By the winter of 59-60, it appeared Frederick's morale was at an all-time low. He did not see
any prospect of establishing peace, and if he lost one more battle,
he felt it would collapse his entire Kingdom. Two years of continuous severe
defeats took its toll - and the 1759 campaign had been exceptionally bloody and disastrous.
Moreover, his finances, something he took pride in always having in order, were in an abysmal state.
He debased the currency, and inflation spurred, helping his short-term budgetary problem.
The Austrians had scored an alarming number of victories,
the Russians would undoubtedly return, and even Ferdinand on the western front had a
difficult time against the French and their new energetic commander, the Duc de Broglie.
A personal note written during this time reads: "I do not know whether I shall survive this war;
but I am firmly resolved in case this happens to spend the rest of my days in seclusion,
in the bosom of philosophy and friendship."
The victory against the French at Minden was among the brightest points of the year.
And, additionally, the British victories against the French in Canada. But their defeat meant the
French had to look for a new area to secure a good position when peace negotiations inevitably
started. Prussia became their prime target. Frederick embarked on an ambitious diplomatic
winter campaign to establish peace with whichever adversary would listen. Informants at Versailles
assured him Louis the 15th desperately wanted peace, but the only way to achieve it was through
negotiations between France and Britain. And Britain made it explicitly clear they would
not start negotiations if Frederick had to give up Silesia - a dealbreaker for Austria. He also
tried to seduce the Ottoman Empire to join a war against Austria. He sent lavish gifts
to the Sultan and Grand Vizier. These did not result in anything. But the actions underscored
the dire situation Prussia found itself in. His strategy regarding the war was the same as
the previous years, although he seemingly had to do much more with much less. He wanted to maintain
control over Saxony and Silesia. The Austrians still held control of Saxony’s capital, Dresden.
Frederick planned to recapture it. Historians conflict about how many
troops were at Prussia's disposal. At the onset of the '59 campaign, Frederick commanded one
hundred sixty thousand. It is necessary to highlight that quantity did not mean
quality. Many of his troops were freshly levied recruits, freebooters and rogues. At
the onset of the 1760 campaign, the most generous estimate was that the Prussian army numbered one
hundred ten thousand. And the quality was undoubtedly even worse than the year before.
At the Battle of Maxen, fifteen thousand veterans, nine generals and 500 officers
were captured. Not to mention all those who were lost at the Battle of Kunersdorf.
The shortages led to Frederick enlisting Austrian and Saxon prisoners.
And very young cadets. Correspondence with his Minister survives in which Frederick laments he
longed for the day when he would not send children into battle. He scraped the bottom of the barrel.
By April 1760 the spring campaign came to life. Frederick and 55000 troops stood ready
at Meissen. Henry, commanding 35000, stood at Sagan to keep an eye on the Russians.
Lieutenant-General Henri-Auguste de la Motte Fouque protected Landshut with 12000.
He secured an important road junction to provide easy access to Silesia. Blood had
been shed three years before as the Austrians and Prussians clashed at the same stronghold.
It is safe to assume Prussia's enemies outnumbered them well over 2 to 1. The
Russians loomed behind the Polish border. The Duchy of Prussia had been under Russian
occupation for so long that some reports hinted at the Duchy becoming Russian one day. A disaster.
By spring, the Allies were converging against the Prussian positions. Loudon, commanding 40000
soldiers camped in Upper Silesia. Daun, commanding at least 80000, camped at Dresden. General Lacy
camped to the city's north. Rumours of an Imperial Army marching to reinforce Daun reached Frederick.
He figured there was no time to waste. For weeks Frederick manoeuvred, attempting to
seduce Lacy to battle, to no avail. His main army could not leave Saxony, while Loudon's
army clearly wanted to capture Breslau. The Austrians definitely held the upper hand.
A stalemate developed around Dresden. News reached Frederick that a Russian army
numbering around 20000 crossed the Vistula and again marched against his capital.
Time was running out. He prolifically wrote Henry, who often chose to ignore his messages.
Frederick wanted him to engage in battle, whereas Henry preferred
cautious campaigning, destroying supply depots. It would be the Austrians who launched the first
serious combat in this campaign. General Loudon considered his superior, Daun,
too slow and too cautious. Loudon's goal was to confuse the King, rather than be patient,
and strike so violently that Frederick would have no other option but to respond. With success:
letters survive where Frederick refers to Loudon's movements as "incomprehensible."
All Prussian commanders understood the danger of Loudon in Upper Silesia. They were
heavily outnumbered, barely able to garrison the strongholds of Breslau, Schweidnitz and Neisse. At
Landshut, Fouque felt a battle was imminent, and he wrote to the King he was stationed
there "without much of an army." His direct orders were to hold Landshut to the last man.
On June 23, General Loudon put his military doctrine about violent attacks
into practice and attacked General de la Motte-Fouque at Landeshut.
[Battle of Landeshut Sequence]
Despite his army numbering 11500 soldiers at best, Fouque's position was relatively secure.
He commanded 9500 infantry, nearly 2000 cavalry and 69 guns. Landshut was a strategic stronghold
for a reason. The Prussian army was positioned on most elevations around it, holding the strategic
high ground. If need be, there were several passes across the Bober river they could use to escape.
But Loudon was resolved to overwhelming the Prussian positions. He deployed his army,
numbering up to 30000, in several columns. Two columns of infantry were tasked to charge
against the northeast- and east rises, through Vogelsdorf. Once these engaged in combat,
another part of his army would charge against the Mummelberg and Buchberg. To the south,
some irregular contingents stood at the ready to divert Fouque's attention. All the way to
the south, a column was to attack the Prussian far-right at Reichhennersdorf. Loudon ordered
his cavalry to hold back and reinforce parts of the line which would need it during combat.
Just before 2 AM on the morning of June 23, the Austrian columns moved into action.
Thick woods, fog and darkness hid their movements. The road to Vogelsdorf was uneventful,
and soon the first Austrian columns engaged in combat against the Prussians at its outskirts.
Surprised and unprepared, these were driven away. The Austrians launched a fierce follow-up
charge against the second Prussian line to the west. These were annihilated. Within an hour,
Vogelsdorf was seized. It gave the Austrians an ideal strategic position to launch their main
assault. With the Mummel- and Buchberg exposed, the Prussian left flank was in full retreat.
Meanwhile, the other northern column advanced relatively rapidly. Any scattered
Prussian contingents were easily beaten back. The Austrian vanguard reached the lines of Landeshut,
where Fouque decided to make a stand and fight tooth and nail. Fighting
around Landshut continued for several hours. To the south, the advance was much more difficult.
The first two Austrian attacks were beaten back by the Prussians around the Blasdorferberg.
After several charges, the Prussians were briefly beaten back. But reinforcements
allowed them to counter-attack and recapture their original positions.
But to their rear, the enemy made inroads against Landeshut. Before too long,
the Austrians scaled the barricades and the Prussians were driven from the stronghold.
Fouque's escape route was blocked, and he collected his scattered troops in a clearing.
Fouque acted with commendable initiative. He ordered his remaining infantry to form a square
and withdraw towards crossings in the Bober, despite being cut off. His remaining cavalry
advanced and had to clear the passes. As they prepared their retreat,
freshly arrived howitzers opened fire. Under heavy artillery fire, the outnumbered Prussian
infantry fought off several charges against them. Often at bayonet distance.
The Prussians on the southern hills held out stubbornly as well. Loudon ordered
his artillery to focus on them, but the outnumbered Prussians held out until Fouque
ordered them to join his remnants of the army. Unbeknownst to him, the cavalry had successfully
cleared the crosses. Then, across the Bober, they ran into Austrian infantry and dragoons
who approached from the far south. Despite being outnumbered, the Prussian cavalry commander
charged at them resolutely. Some of his cavalry broke through, but many were beaten and taken
prisoner after bitter hand-to-hand fighting. Loudon's infantry had taken a brief respite in
Landeshut as the artillery mauled Fouque's men, who entrenched themselves as well as they could.
But now, the Austrian infantry advanced through Landeshut. The Prussians were
threatened on both flanks and their front. They could do nothing but retreat.
A battered, scarcely operable force tried to reach the clearings. Loudon ordered Fouque to
surrender several times, but he refused these summons. They beat back repeated
charges against their positions, as they tried to make their way to the Bober's crossings.
Once the vanguard reached them, it became clear the Austrians controlled all crossings.
As artillery mauled their positions, Austrian cavalry charged against the Prussians from
every side. The vanguard tried to clear the crossings but to no avail. Finally,
the Prussian army was overwhelmed, and its soldiers either surrendered or were killed. It
was a massacre, and another unmitigated disaster. By the end of the day, Prussia lost almost 2000
soldiers on the battlefield. Another 8315 were captured, including Fouque himself.
They lost 67 artillery pieces, 34 colours and two standards. Less than 1000 survivors escaped to
Breslau. Fouque himself suffered three sabre cuts. The Austrians lost a bit under 3000 men.
[After Landeshut]
["He furnished an example of what courage and strength of will can do against superior numbers.
His action that day can be compared to that of Leonidas
at Thermopylae." - Frederick about General de la Motte-Fouque's conduct]
The disaster at Landeshut was similar to the previous one at Maxen. Again, a Prussian general
obeyed the King's orders against better judgment. And again, the unwavering loyalty backfired.
In contrast to Frederick's irrational anger after Maxen, he openly second-guessed himself
and his decision to hold Landeshut. He certainly was milder in judging Fouque.
In the battle's aftermath, Loudon pillaged Landshut. The strong Austrian position in
the province was a breaking point for Frederick. He decided he valued Silesia more than anything.
One week after the battle, he collected his army and marched to the east,
knowing the dangers of his risky mission very well.
Thank you for watching this video.