Recently we looked at the Handley Page Hampden, which was often called the flying suitcase
due to its slab-sided fuselage.
Today we’re looking at another aircraft whose nickname also came from its looks: the
Dornier Do 17, often called the flying pencil due to its slim fuselage and tail.
In some ways, its easy to draw comparisons between the two.
Both were light and agile for their class, both saw extensive use in the opening years
of the second world war, and both were replaced on the frontlines of the various air wars
rather quickly.
But these aircraft, though similar in many aspects, were operated in very different ways,
and the Do 17 would earn a reputation for being an excellent low-altitude, high-speed,
strike aircraft – not something that you’d immediately associate with a twin-engine bomber
of this period.
Now, usually I’d follow by saying something along the lines of “The origins of the Dornier
17 can be traced back to the early 1930s, blah, blah, blah – and then go on to explain
its development.
But the problem is that there are three different narratives for this development, depending
on what sources you’re looking at, and some of these vary rather considerably – something
that I learned to my pain.
The production of this video has been physically, emotionally, and spiritually draining – not
only have I had to cross-check more sources than I had ever anticipated, but to my abject
horror I learned along the way that half of what I assumed I knew turned out to be completely
wrong.
It is why this video is about a month late, I had planned to upload this in February,
and it’s now the end of March.
But with wounded pride, and a migraine strong enough to bring down medium-sized rhinoceros,
I carried on and got the job done.
Because of this I want to give a full disclaimer now that my interpretation of things is based
on conclusions I have drawn after reading through a vast number of different pieces
written on the aircraft, and this might conflict with the established narrative of things depending
on what an individual person has read on the matter.
As far as I am aware, based on the research that I have conducted, and with a silent prayer
to my patron saint (a bottle of pinot noir), I declare this video to be mostly accurate.
So, lets begin.
The three different narratives are as follows, and please bear in mind this is a condensed
version of events, as going over it in full detail would quite literally take me a couple
of hours.
So, version one: In the early 1930s, probably as early as 1932,
Dornier was approached by Deutch Lufthansa to build a high-speed transport aircraft.
Specifically, the company wanted a high-speed mail carrier, one that could also seat six
passengers, which it could operate on its European express routes.
Sometime later Dornier produced the first, second, and third prototypes of its new Do
17, which after successful testing the latter two were handed over to Deutch Lufthansa for
evaluation.
Though they were fast, the aircraft were subsequently rejected as transports because the passenger
cabins were considered far too cramped, and it would be uneconomical to run them purely
as mail planes.
And so, the aircraft seemed to be a failure, and the prototypes began collecting dust at
the Dornier factory.
Then, former Dornier Employee Captain Robert Untucht -who now worked as a liaison between
Deutch Luftahnsa and the Air Ministry – flew one of the prototypes.
He was very impressed with its performance, and suggested that with some modifications
the aircraft could become an ideal high-speed light bomber – and thus the story of the
Do 17s military career would begin.
The second narrative is a variation on the same theme.
In the early 1930s, Dornier was approached by Deutch Lufthansa (who I’ll refer to as
DLH to keep things simple) to build a high-speed transport aircraft…but at around the same
time as this, the Richswehrministerium – Soon to become the Reichslufthartministerium (or
the Ministry of Aviation, but for the purpose of simplicity lets refer to it as the RLM)
– contacted Dornier with an expression of interest.
They suggested the construction a new, high-speed cargo plane as well, but one that could also
be equipped with so-called “special equipment” – in other words, they wanted Dornier to
design them a bomber – but not in any official capacity.
Ostensibly the aircraft was to be built and operated as a commercial transport, but it
must be able to be quickly converted over to its military role as easily as possible.
This narrative argues that the considerations for military equipment negatively impacted
the design from the perspective of it being a passenger transport, and thus why it was
rejected.
Additionally, Dornier had not been outright commissioned to build a bomber either, it
had just been strongly suggested that the need for a high-speed bomber may arise, and
that any transport aircraft they build should have to bear that consideration in mind.
The third narrative approaches things completely differently, and argues that from the outset
the Dornier 17 was a military design, rather than a civil one.
The use of the aircraft as a transport for DLH was merely a cover for its true purpose,
and if the aircraft did prove useful in this civil role it would just be a delightful bonus.
The company had been approached about producing a military design as early as 1932, with meetings
in 1933 eventually settling on the production of two initial prototypes: the first being
military and the second civilian.
During the design and construction period, the wishes of the RLM were given absolute
priority over DLH (for obvious reasons), and the expected rejection of the aircraft as
a commercial transport would give the opportunity for it to be “rescued” by the military
instead…now that is of course a heavily, heavily condensed explanation.
Now I’m inclined to agree with this third narrative for a number of reasons.
It’s well known that attempts to circumvent the restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles
had begun well before 1933, and the concept of the Dornier 17 being built as a clandestine
bomber fits perfectly with this.
There is also written evidence to support this version of events.
Records of meetings at Dornier’s headquarters in the mid-1930s show that the meetings focused
heavily on the version of the aircraft that was to be equipped with so-called “special
equipment”, in comparison little attention was given to the demands of representatives
of DLH, and in fact in some later meetings the section of document that would have been
signed by said representatives was crossed out – indicating they probably didn’t
even attend.
There is also the point of plain old fashioned common sense.
Between the drafting of the initial design and the time when DLH received the prototypes
for testing, surely they would have noticed that the aircraft was unsuitable and would
have requested modifications?
Surely Dornier would not have risked so much money and materials, only to be rejected.
When the prototypes were first ordered the projected total cost was already over 700,000
marks, and this ballooned to over a million by the time they were delivered.
In the early 1930s, with the current economic climate, that represented an almost untenable
loss of money…unless the project was in fact being bankrolled by the RLM from the
outset.
This is further supported by the fact that the prototypes were only given over to DLH
for a few weeks for testing, something that in reality would have taken much longer- this
indicates that the company already knew the aircraft was unsuitable, and that the so-called
testing was merely a formality.
Though this third narrative makes the most sense, its actually the least common of the
three when it comes to Dornier 17 literature.
But if you want to learn more of what I think to be the more logical version of events (though,
again, this video is based on my interpretation of things), I recommend a piece written by
German Aviation Historian Karl Kossler, who is a member of the German Aviation History
Working group.
He wrote quite extensively on this topic in the 1980s, and a revised copy is available
on their website – which I’ve linked below.
I have attempted to reach out to them via email to let them know how much I value their
work, but I never got a reply, so if anyone out there knows the fine people running ADL
– please, please pass on my deepest thanks for all the research they have done, as it
cleared up quite a few things for me.
Now, with that massive tangent cloudiness the cloudiness of the Do 17s history out of
the way, lets focus on how we went from three basic prototypes to the fast bomber that rumbled
over the skies of Poland, France, and Britain.
Unfortunately, not a huge amount is known about the exact construction details of these
early prototypes, so I’m going to restrict myself to covering this stage of its development
in a more general manner as I’d rather not make any false assumptions.
The first of these, the Dornier 17 C, later known as the V1 (which was the prototype intended
for the military), was remarkably different to the aircraft that most of us would recognise.
It was an incredibly sleek design with a sharp-pointed nose, liquid-cooled BMW VI engines, and a
long, thin tail that tapered down to a single fin and rudder.
This aircraft was also unique in that it had eight portholes cut into the fuselage behind
the wing trailing edge; these were not viewing windows for a planned passenger cabin, as
was often claimed, but they were instead meant to provide rear visibility for the radio operator,
who would serve as a rear gunner, and to also make the tight confines of his station slightly
less depressing and claustrophobic.
There was one aspect of the prototype that easily links its with the later models of
the Dornier 17, and that was the thick-chord shoulder-mounted wing – possibly the only
major aspect of the design that would remain mostly unchanged.
Along with the second prototype, the Dornier 17 A, or V2, the V1 was ordered in spring
1933, with the main body to be at least complete by the end of the year.
The production schedule proved to be too ambitious, mostly because almost all of the equipment
that was to be installed on the prototype was new and untested, and this delayed the
completion date by well over a year.
During this time, it was realised that the single fin and rudder would not provide adequate
stability, and this was apparently confirmed by wind tunnel tests; because of this a third
prototype was ordered to come with a twin-fin tail, and in the end the second prototype
would also be modified to this arrangement before completion.
This meant that the V1 was the only Dornier 17 to ever be built with the single tailfin.
The first flight of the V1, on November 23rd 1934, confirmed this prediction of instability,
and approximately a year later it too would be converted over to the twin-fin and rudder
configuration.
The V2 prototype, which was intended as the civil model for DLH, handled much better thanks
to its modified tail unit, as did the V3, which at the time was known as the Dornier
17 D.
The fact that the first, second, and third prototypes were named out of alphabetical
order is most likely explained by the idea that the letter represented an engine type,
rather than the airframe as a whole.
Indeed, the entire run of Dornier 17 prototypes is rather confusing as there were no less
than 21 of them.
Initially, when the airframe at least began to look promising, 14 had been ordered: 5
for the military, and 9 for DLH.
This situation was then changed by DLH’s rejection of the aircraft, which left the
RLM scratching its head on what to do with an abundance of prototypes.
The rejection of the Do 17 was partly due to the cramped quarters, which would have
required passengers to perform feats of dexterity to get in comfortably, but also partly due
to a string of mechanical failures that plagued the first prototype.
The chief culprit was the undercarriage, which decided on multiple occasions to simply cease
being an undercarriage, either during landing or taxi operations.
This led to numerous delays as the aircraft had to make repeated trips back to the workshop
for repairs.
Now, to avoid this dragging on for about five hours, I’m only going to mention the prototypes
that are relevant to today’s video.
If you want to learn more about them I recommend the piece written by Karl Kossler, or, alternatively,
I may end up doing a special video on the prototype Do 17s later on.
Ironically, it would be the V2 prototype, the one that was originally meant to go to
DLH, that would become the prototype for the first production series of the bomber: the
Dornier Do 17 E. Some sources state that it was the V7 prototype that was the precursor
for this, but the V7 was in-fact used as the prototype for the updated Do 17 E-2.
Following a long series of flights and evaluations of the first, second, and third prototypes,
the initial design of the bomber had been settled upon and production had been ordered.
At the same time as this a reconnaissance version, the Do 17 F series, had also been
ordered.
This may have been the result of Captain Robert Untucht -who we mentioned earlier- and who
was claimed to be the supposed “saviour” of the type.
The use of the Do 17 as a reconnaissance aircraft is never mentioned at all until after he had
flown one of the first three prototypes.
Again, this goes against the established narrative of him dragging the Do 17 out of a dusty hangar
and proclaiming it to be an excellent candidate for a bomber, but when you consider Untucht’s
comments about the aircraft’s speed and manoeuvrability, and then look at the timeline
of its development, it seems far more likely that the reconnaissance version of the aircraft
owes its existence to his influence.
After a small pre-production batch of E-0 models, the Do 17 E-1 entered production in
1936.
This variant still retained much of the sleek heritage of the prototypes, compared to the
more bulbous appearance of later do 17 variants.
The E-1 was powered by a pair of 750HP BMW VI engines, which allowed for a top speed
of 330kmh at 3,000 meters.
The aircraft was fairly compact, with a wingspan of 18 meters, a length of 16.2 meters, and
a heigh of 4.3 meters.
Empty it weighed a mere 4,500 kilograms, and fully loaded it was barely over 7,000 kilograms.
The standard bombload was just 500kg, though this could go up to 750 in exchange for reduced
range.
This puts it well and truly in the category of a light bomber, though many Germany documents
optimistically listed it as a medium bomber, a reflection on the preferred doctrine of
lighter and faster attack units.
Due to its small size, it only had a crew of three, and initially there was just one
rear-facing MG-15 machine gun for the defensive armament.
This was quickly increased to two, and maybe even three machine guns, though sources seem
to wildly vary on their number and placement, mostly because a lot of these came in the
form of field modifications.
For the most part it seems that the most common addition was to mount a gun in the area of
the bomb bay to provide defence for the aircraft’s vulnerable underbelly.
The F-1 shared the same dimensions, and roughly the same defensive armament as the E variant,
but being a reconnaissance aircraft it exchanged its bombs for camera equipment.
This came in the form of two vertical cameras mounted in the bomb bay, along with an allotment
of illumination flares.
The F-1 also had additional fuel tanks installed to increase its range to approximately 2050
km.
The first of these Do 17s were delivered to Luftwaffe units in 1937.
Dornier was among the first in Germany to make use of split-assembly with its aircraft,
and because of this the bombers could be rapidly produced as the workload was not only split
between Dornier’s factories, but also those of other manufacturers such as Blohm & Voss,
Henschell, and Siebel.
The first unit to receive the Do 17 was Kamphgeschwader 153, who received the E-1 variant; they were
soon followed by KG 155 and KG 255, meanwhile Aufklärungsgruppe 122 began to receive the
Do 17 F-1 reconnaissance variant.
As with most of the Luftwaffe’s newest aircraft, the Dornier 17 did not wait long before its
combat debut, as by March of 1937 the first aircraft were already being sent over to take
part in the Spanish Civil War.
Three Do 17 E-1s arrived to form part of VB/88; this was an experimental unit that operated
a variety of aircraft to test their capabilities in real wartime scenarios.
Soon, this number was expanded to 12 aircraft, and eventually somewhere between 27 and 31
Do 17s would be operated in the Spanish theatre – almost every source seems to conflict
on the exact number.
The Do 17s early missions above Spain confirmed two things: it was indeed both fast and manoeuvrable,
but it was also most pitifully armed.
In the early months of its involvement in Spain, the Do 17 was pretty much uncatchable
as the most commonly fielded aircraft by republican forces appeared to the I-15 biplane.
Because of this, the decision was made to bring in the F-1 variant of the Do 17 to replace
the Heinke He-70 in the reconnaissance role.
This also had an impact back in Germany, with production increased on the F-1 variant which
were now to replace most aircraft in the medium and long-range reconnaissance role.
For the bomber variant things were less rosy.
The use of the Heinkel He-111B highlighted the problem of the Do 17s small bombload – in
effect a single He-111 could do the bombing work of four Do 17s.
The deficiencies of the E-1 variant were further highlighted by the arrival of more modern
Soviet aircraft, specifically the Polikarpov I-16.
Not only could these catch the Do 17, but their agile handling made them almost impossible
to take down with the bomber’s weak defensive armament.
In response to this, taking into account feedback from Do 17 air crews, as well as some subtle
and not so subtle hints for improvement from the RLM, Dornier made steps to improve the
design.
In fact, this work had begun before the first aircraft had even joined Luftwaffe units,
let alone arrived in Spain.
The V7 prototype had served as the template for the improved Do 17 E-2, but the improvements
were not enough to distinguish it as a significant upgrade, and work had begun on a more powerful
design in late 1936/early 1937 that would eventually take the form of the Do-17 M and
P series.
This resulted in a confusing trio of prototypes known as the MV1, MV2, and MV3.
I say confusing because much debate surrounds the initial MV1’s purpose.
This was the prototype that shocked observers when it attended the 1937 International Military
Aircraft competition held in Zurich.
Powered by a pair of 1,000hp Daimler-Benz 601 engines, it blew away the competition
and proved to be even faster than the competing fighter aircraft.
Though it is sometimes said that this was the prototype for the subsequent M-series,
in reality the MV1 was almost completely unrelated.
It was modified for improved aerodynamics, and its engines had been secretly upgraded
to produce more power than officially stated, which came at the cost of significantly reduced
service life, which for an actual production aircraft would have been completely ludicrous
to use.
The performance of the MV1 attracted the interest of the Yugoslavian government, who would go
on to place an export order for the type and they would also go on to produce the Do 17
under licence.
But to keep things simple, we will cover the domestic history of the aircraft for now,
and loot at the export models later.
The MV2, and more importantly the MV3, would be the real shape of things to come.
Early on in their development it became apparent to Dornier that the DB 600 engines, and others
of their class, would not be available in the numbers required – they being used for
the Messerschmitt Bf 109 and 110 fighter aircraft as well.
Because of this, and in lieu of their higher reliability and survivability, the decision
was made to switch to over radial engines.
The mv2 was completed with a pair of Bramo Fafnir 323s, after which it spent the rest
of its life as a testing aircraft, and the MV3 was equipped with a pair of 900HP 323
Ds.
It was in this guise that the first record of the aircraft being referred to as a Schnellbomber
or ‘Fast Bomer’ could be found, and the MV3 was used as the template aircraft for
the Do 17 M-1.
As a result of the Spanish ‘proving ground’, and after much Grumbling from Luftwaffe pilots
and Grumbler-In-Chief Herman Goering, armament was increased by a forward-mounted MG15 machine
gun, which could be operated by the pilot or observer, whilst the bomb-bay of the 17
M was lengthened, increasing the bombload to 1,000kg.
This did not mean that the Do 17 could always carry 1,000 kg of bombs, as it depended on
the type of bomb used.
It could carry 20 of the 50kg SC50 bombs, but due to the dimensions of the bomb bay
the Do 17M -even extended0 would be limited to just two of the SC250 bombs.
Because of this, the lighter bombs were preferred, which meant that bomb-for-bomb the Do 17 ran
at a disadvantage against the He-111, which eventually could carry much larger bombs as
the years progressed.
The reconnaissance variant, the Do 17 P, also received new radial engines, but they were
850hp BMW 132Ns – these allowed for an increased range, whereas the Do 17 M actually had a
slightly reduced range, though the improvements in speed and firepower was considered an acceptable
trade-off.
As it would travel further, the P had more advanced radio equipment installed when compared
to its counterpart, this included radio direction finders as well as equipment to assist with
blind landing at night or in very poor weather.
Only five Do 17-Ps would see service in Spain, and none of the M variant.
These arrived in December of 1938 and thus didn’t get a great deal of flying time before
the war’s conclusion in April.
By this point, just over 500 Do 17s appeared to have been in service with the Luftwaffe.
Its effectiveness as a reconnaissance aircraft had pleased both Luftwaffe and Nationalist
aircrews, with the four remaining airworthy Do 17 Ps taking part in the victory flyover
at the end of the civil war, but the Do 17s performance as a bomber left much to be desired.
Even though production of the M and P variants had only just begun, It was now clear that
as a pure bomber it was outmatched by other types which could carry more bombs -and carry
them further; there were also concerns that the speed and range of the reconnaissance
aircraft would soon be eclipsed by other emerging design.
This resulted in a short-lived attempt to switch back to liquid-cooled V engines, as
Daimler Benz were producing more powerful variants.
This would result in the Do 17R, S, and U variants.
Before we continue, this is future Rex coming back with a warning, as I had grossly underestimated
the difficulty of completing this part of the video…until we get to the part where
I talk about the Do 17 Z, I must advise that there are little or no photographs, drawings,
or sketches that I could find on the R, S, and U models… so please bear with me as
we go through what is essentially a slideshow.
A collection of just four Do 17R’s were built, powered by the DB 601.
There are some claims that these were supposedly prototypes for a new series of long-range
reconnaissance aircraft, and while this wasn’t the case, as no serial production was ever
intended, they were built with special reconnaissance missions in mind.
Like the R, the Do 17S did not enter production either, but it did represent the shape of
things to come.
As a direct result of the experiences in Spain, which led to calls for greater defence and
thus greater space, Dornier completely redesigned the forward section of the fuselage.
The cockpit roof was raised and fully glazed, as was the nose, and the lower section of
the cockpit was expanded and also extended, going back towards the wing leading edge.
This allowed for the addition of a fourth crew member as a dedicated gunner, and for
the increase of the defensive armament in general.
The aircraft was now protected by four MG-15 machine guns: two forward facing in the upper
and lower part of the nose, a dorsal gun, and ventral gun.
As all of these were situated within the main cabin, along with the crew and all the other
equipment, things inside were somewhat cramped.
Using the same new fuselage design, the Do 17U was intended as a pathfinding aircraft.
Powered by the DB 600-A engine, it managed a top speed in excess of 425 kmh.
As they were intended to fly ahead and guide in larger formations of bombers, the U featured
an extra crew member- who would operate the signal flares- as well as extra radio equipment.
As it turned out, the U would be a short-lived experiment.
Just 15 were produced, as the decision was taken to make use of the DB 6 engines for
fighter aircraft exclusively.
Dornier appeared to have anticipated this, as no production of the S variant had ever
been proposed, with just three examples built as prototype models, and work had already
begun on equipping the updated airframe with Bramo 323 A radial engines: the result being
the penultimate version of the aircraft: the Do 17 Z.
The Z began as something of a disappointment.
A small pre-production batch of Z-0 aircraft were built for testing, mostly to evaluate
the performance of the engines, and to evaluate the new aerodynamics of the airframe.
Despite looking like a potato masher with a couple of wings bolted onto it, the wind
tunnel tests had apparently been promising.
This quickly changed with the Z-1, the first production model.
Either through optimism, or human error, the effects of adding a fourth crew member, additional
guns, their required ammunition, and the expansion of the crew cabin, had not been fully factored
into the considerations of power, weight, and range.
This was revealed during the Z-1s service trials, where it was found to be so underpowered
that the bombload had to be halved to just 500kg.
Understandably, the prospect of a supposedly modern, twin-engine bomber being unable to
carry even 10% of its own weight in ordnance rather annoyed Luftwaffe officials.
The severity of words exchanged in meetings between them and Dornier is evidenced by the
rapid arrival of the Do 17 Z-2, which would become the main production version.
The Z-2 mounted the new 323P-1 version of the Bramo Fafnir, rated at 1,000hp.
This engine was specially tuned to the performance needs of the Do 17 insofar as to actually
get it off the ground with a full bombload of 1,000kg.
Modifications to the configuration of the supercharger resulted in a slight decrease
in high altitude performance, but a massive increase in low altitude performance, particularly
acceleration.
In testing the, aircraft proved to be remarkably manoeuvrable at altitudes below 2000 meters,
being able to quickly regain speed after going through sharp turns and climbs.
The increased power also allowed a further increase of the defensive armament to address
complaints about gunnery blind spots.
Two more machine guns were added to the upper fuselage, one on the port and starboard side
respectively.
Unfortunately, these, along with the ventral gun, would have to be operated by a single
person, and you would not credit the extra hassle this was for the poor men that had
to use them.
Not only did you have to manage the ammunition for three different positions at once, but
each gun represented another thing to bash your head against in severe turbulence, and
the conditions of the cabin had departed the realms of cramped and were currently applying
for visas to enter the domain of claustrophobia.
Aside from the ever-shrinking space for the crew, there was one other drawback to the
Z-2s design.
Installing a more powerful engine, fettling with the supercharger, and bringing the bombload
back up to 1000kg was all well and good…but this had a catastrophic effect on the aircraft’s
range.
Fully loaded the Do 17 Z-2 had a operational radius of just 320km, which was only 20km
more than the Bf 109E (without drop tanks).
This would have a profound impact on where the Do 17 Z-2 could be deployed, and what
missions it could carry out, and it was these missions in the second world war that would
give it a unique reputation among Luftwaffe bombers.
The Do 17 was not a distant spectre that loomed high in the clouds, it was instead something
that lurked behind hillsides and hedgerows, often flying low enough to qualify itself
as a flying arborist.
Was that perhaps the worst metaphor I have yet to subject your poor, battered ears to
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Possibly.
Am I going to continue?
Probably.
Am I using this as an excuse to demonstrate the beautiful Do 17 models produced by the
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and lets get stuck into the Dorniers War Time service.
By the 1st of September 1939, the Luftwaffe had approximately 370 and 262 Do 17 bomber
and reconnaissance aircraft on strength respectively.
The most numerous in operation were now the Do 17 Z and P variants, though just over a
hundred of the older E bombers were fielded as well.
The main bomber units that fielded the Do 17 were Kamphgeschwaders 2, 3, 76, and 77;
included with them, but also separately, were numerous staffelns of reconnaissance aircraft,
mainly the Do 17 P; and separately some nine Stukagruppen also had the Do 17, again mostly
for reconnaissance.
Along with the Do 17 Z-2, some units were also now equipped with the Z-3.
This variant was used for both bombing and reconnaissance duties, and although it technically
formed part of the bomber line its use in both roles was about a 50/50 split.
The main difference between the two was a slight reduction in bomb and ammunition capacity
to accommodate the camera equipment, and because of this the two cannot easily be told apart
– the only real giveaway was the addition of a modified crew hatch.
This would allow a crew member to use a handheld camera to validate the accuracy of previous
bombing missions – a particularly important task as determining the accuracy of your bombs
was sometimes impossible owing to smoke, cloud, turbulence, flak, or a not-so-fun combination
of the lot.
This assembled mix of Do 17s would see action from the very first moments of war with Poland,
with bombers from KG 3 performing the types first wartime mission: a bridge strike at
Dirschau.
Though all but one of the bomber Geschwaders would take causalities during the Polish campaign,
their losses were relatively light.
Unsurprisingly the ones that fared the worst were the units operating the older E variant.
KG 77 -operating the E 1- lost six aircraft and suffered damage to another fifteen on
the first day.
For the most part the bomber was used in low-level attacks, its speed, manoeuvrability, and relatively
light bombload making it a good candidate for close air support.
Because of this, all of the Do 17s losses over Poland were due to Flak or ground-fire;
the Do 17 was still faster than the Polish fighters sent to intercept it, and although
its defences weren’t hugely potent, it was enough to ward off anything that got too close.
Because of this, the Do 17 earned something of a false reputation for being immune to
interceptors among its crews, and some of them would receive a rude shock when they
made their ways into the skies above France and Britain.
The last reported combat loss of a Do 17 in Poland was that of a 17P reconnaissance aircraft
which was downed over Modlin on the 27th of September 1939.
Though the aircraft had acquitted itself well during the brief, one-sided air war, its short
range and limited bombload had drawn wide criticism.
Because of this, some of the units were already transitioning to the newer Junkers Ju 88 by
December of 1939, and production of the Do 17 would only last for another six months.
Though on paper its days were already numbered, the Do 17 was yet to take its largest parts
in the air war over Europe, and indeed, while many were flying with near impunity over the
skies of Poland, others were also over the skies of Britain and France.
From the moment France and Britain had declared war on Germany, the Do 17s had begun to carry
out reconnaissance over France, Belgium, Britain, and Holland – and they were in general very
effective in this role.
At the beginning, they operated with almost complete freedom.
This was a combination of their advanced state of readiness, and the fact that the Luftwaffe
knew exactly what it wanted to do, while the allied powers were still figuring out what
their air strategy was now that they were actually at war.
Because of this, only two Do 17s appeared to have been lost in its first two months
of operation in the skies of western Europe.
The first Do 17 P to be lost was actually brought down by friendly fire, which occurred
on the 24th of September 1939.
The first operational loss occurred on the 26th of October, when another Do 17 P suffered
an engine failure above the east coast of England and was forced to land in Holland.
The 30th of October would see the first combat loss of a Do 17 over France, with Pilot Officer
Peter Mould bringing down a Do 17 P over Toul.
Encounters with British and French fighters quickly revealed that the Do 17s supposed
advantages in speed and altitude were in-fact completely non-existent, a point of some embarrassment
as various senior officers had been assured of its superiority in the reconnaissance role.
Adding salt to the wound was the capture of Do 17 F6+FM, which was brought down by No.1
Squadron in good enough condition that it was able to be examined in depth, along with
the camera equipment that had also survived the impact.
The analysis of this aircraft allowed RAF pilots to get a detailed understanding of
the Do 17s defences, which further aided in the aerial beatdown of reconnaissance units
that gradually picked up pace.
Still, despite a worrying weakness to enemy fighter activity, losses of Do 17s were relatively
light for the remainder of 1939 as things settled down into the Sitzkried, or “Phoney
War” – this was not helped by the particularly poor winter weather that set in for most of
the continent, and the aircraft would not see much action until the Spring.
Norway saw minimal involvement when it came to the Dornier 17 due to the long distance
the aircraft would have to fly.
Because of this, only one unit containing five Do 17Ps took part in the land operations
of April and May 1940.
Of those five, two were seriously damaged on the ground on April 11th in bombing raids,
one was damaged on the ground at Oslo on the 1st of May, and the other two were damaged
and burned out respectively at Stravanger-Sola…which meant that all five were either damaged or
destroyed.
There was another unit that operated Do 17s in the Norwegian theatre, but their focus
was more maritime in nature.
Gruppe 606 of the Kustenfliger -the little spoken of German Naval Air Service, also known
as Herman Goering personal punching bag- would operate the Do 17 Z-5.
This was a modified version of the Z-3, with a focus on maritime operations, in particular
reconnaissance and air-sea-rescue, though anti-shipping duties were also possible.
Along with the camera equipment that came with the Z-3, the Z-5 included rapidly inflatable
floatation bags, life rafts, emergency radio equipment, and a kite antenna – which served
as an easy way of identifying the type.
Most of Gruppe 606s operations involved maritime reconnaissance in the seas between Germany,
Denmark, and Norway.
During the Norwegian campaign the unit would only lose a single Do 17, which for the number
of reconnaissance missions flown made it among the most efficient of any unit to operate
the aircraft in the first 12 months of the war; their life was mostly uneventful, with
perhaps the most exciting event being a quick encounter between a Do 17 and a Short Sunderland
flown by 204 Squadron.
The encounter was essentially a draw, with the Do 17 unable to bring down its much larger
opponent, and the Sunderland being too slow to peruse it for very long – but as the
observer in the Do 17 was killed in the engagement it could be said that the Sunderland technically
came off better.
As the Norwegian campaign carried on, the Battle of France got underway, and this is
where the Do 17 would receive its true baptism of fire.
On the 10th of May, Do 17s from KGs 2, 3, 76 and 77 (all veterans of Poland) were immediately
thrust into action, along with the various reconnaissance units that had already been
operating since September ‘39.
Unlike other operations up until this point, the Dorniers took significant losses from
the opening day, KG 2 alone would lose 5 aircraft in its first operational mission with another
six taking moderate to serious damage.
But they would also inflict heavy losses upon their opponents.
In particular the Do 17 was used for low altitude strike missions against French airfields,
a task in which it was remarkably effective, and they proved decisive in denying the Luftwaffe’s
opponents easy access to the air.
One of the best examples of this can be taken from the Operations record book of number
114 Squadron, which was based at the airfield of Vraux – it recounts an attack by KG 2
on the 11th of May, the second day of the campaign against France.
‘At 0540 hrs a high flying German aircraft, acting presumably as a decoy, was observed
flying in a south-west direction and being attacked by fighter aircraft.
A few moments later, the 12 Dorniers were seen flying up the Marne over Juvigny at a
very low altitude.
The enemy aircraft passed low over Vraux and then did a right-hand turn coming into attack
over B flight.
One of the first sticks of bombs set fire to A flight’s petrol dump and two adjacent
Blenheims.
The attack lasted for about 10 minutes, during which time about 150 bombs of 50-kg size were
dropped, resulting in the complete destruction of five aircraft.
Another aircraft was written off having its port wing shattered by a near miss.
Having dropped all of their bombs, the Germans machine-gunned all the remaining aircraft,
the Flight Offices, the Red House, the transport and shelter trenches.
All our aircraft were rendered unserviceable.
Subsequent investigation showed that there were 30 unexploded bombs lying on, or near
the aerodrome.
These, owing to the fact that the enemy is using bombs with delay fuses up to 168 hours
were treated with extreme caution.
The only injuries sustained were two ground defence personnel hit by machine gun bullets,
the wounds were not fatal.
The thoroughness of the enemy planning is shown by the fact that one aircraft flew to
and fro and machine gunned the aerodrome AA defence battery repeatedly.’
This attack, and others like it, are what gave the Do 17 a reputation as a low-flying
menace, but not everything went smoothly.
The pace of operations meant that there was very little down time for both aircrews and
ground crews to properly rest, in fact the best chance they had of rest was when fuel
supply shortages temporarily grounded aircraft for a day or two.
Because of this, attrition from both enemy action and accidents began to be felt; of
particular risk were the missions where Do 17s were sent after motorised columns.
These were particularly challenging to strike as they required the aircraft to attack at
altitude and approach angles that often favoured the anti-air defences of the vehicles, few
though they may be.
The fortunes of the Do 17 rose and fell with each passing day during the Battle of France,
some days had comparatively few casualties, others were especially painful.
But As many photos available of their operations during this period are photos of wrecked Do
17s that have been brought down in the French countryside, an incorrect image is often painted
of their effectiveness.
In reality they were doing rather well.
As the situation became more desperate for the French, Do 17 losses began to ease, however
an exception was the airspace around Dunkirk.
On one particular day, the 27th of May, KG 3 alone lost 12 aircraft over Dunkirk and
another five were temporarily grounded due to damage.
Though on the whole, the loss of Do 17 airframes could have been considerably worse, the campaign
in France had been particularly costly for the senior officers of various units.
In a 9 day period between the 19th and 28th of May, Kampgeschwader 76 lost two Staffelkapitans
killed in action, and Gruppenkommandeur Major Walter Hill of Gruppen II/76 was wounded.
KG 77 also lost two Staffelkapitans, who, too, were killed in action, and a Staffelkapitan
from KG 2 was captured.
This level of officer attrition continued into June, with the most senior officer lost
being Generalmajor Wolf von Stutterheim, who was shot down on the 15th of June; he survived
the initial event, but eventually succumbed to his wounds several months later at the
end of the year.
How much of an impact these losses had is difficult to say, but despite the toll on
individual units, the operations in France can easily be considered the high point of
the Do 17s military career.
Things would be gradually reversed as the air war transitioned into the Battle of Britain.
For the most part, the Do 17 had encountered the lesser part of the RAF during the battle
of France, with the bulk of Britain’s fighter force being conserved at home for the battle
that everyone knew was coming.
This was going to change things considerably.
In the small pause between the end of the Battle of France and the official beginning
of the Battle of Britain, July 10th, the Do 17 was primarily involved with either reconnaissance
missions or convoy attacks.
During this time, some Do 17 aircrews continued to transition to the Junkers Ju 88.
By now production of the Dornier 17 had officially ceased, and as if to signal the beginning
of the end, the final day of Do 17 operations for Kamphgeschwader 77 resulted in no less
than five aircraft losses.
By July 10th, Only two full Geschwaders were still operating the Do 17 as a bomber: KG2
and KG3.
In the first month of the campaign, the bulk of their work was made up of attacks on various
British convoys, meanwhile the remaining Do 17 Ps carried out armed reconnaissance missions,
though they were being rapidly replaced in this role by the Junkers Ju 88 as well.
Though the Do 17 was mostly effective at attacking convoys, its success in this role was often
over-exaggerated.
For example, on the first day of the Battle of Britain, 52 Do 17s from KG 2 attacked a
British convoy and claimed to have sunk three freighters, totalling 21,000 tons, and damaging
a further three more.
In reality, just one ship was actually sunk as a result of the attack, and it weighed
a mere 466 tons.
In exchange for this single, small ship, three Do 17s were destroyed, four more were damaged,
and eight escort fighters were also lost.
Despite the poor start, and although it was noticeably outclassed by the time of the Battle
of Britain, particularly if it came up against patrolling fighters, the Do 17 would become
-at least according to most writers on the subject- the most feared of the Luftwaffe’s
twin-engine aircraft.
Throughout the remainder of the summer of 1940 the Luftwaffe did its best to exploit
the biggest strength of the Dornier’s design: its low altitude performance.
When the Battle of Britain transitioned from channel raids to strikes on British airfields
and radar installations in August, the Do 17s were sent across at remarkably low altitudes.
Hugging the sea, and then the terrain, they were able to avoid radar detection, and if
they were lucky they also avoided visual detection up until the critical moment.
The Do 17s apparent trick of being able to pop up out of nowhere quickly made it a fearsome
opponent for ground-based air defences, who often had minimal time to react.
A very famous example of the Do 17 being used in this way occurred on the 18th of August
when aircraft from KG 76 (who now operated a mix of Do 17s and Ju 88s) attacked Kenley
airfield.
Three hangars and numerous other buildings were destroyed, along with at least two aircraft
on the ground.
The tactic of coming in low and fast was effective, but it was a case of high-risk and high-reward.
If the formation was spotted at any great distance from their target, they were at an
extreme disadvantage if fighters were sent to intercept them.
This was further compounded by the increasing effectiveness of British anti-aircraft batteries,
who soon learned the tactics of the Do 17 and adapted to match them – an indication
of their effectiveness can be seen in the increasing number of night attacks that began
to appear on the logbooks of the Do 17s by the end of the month.
It was then that the Luftwaffe made the colossal error of throwing away the main advantage
of the Do 17 -its low altitude performance- and committing it to medium-altitude bombing
missions from the start of September as the Blitz began.
The worst day for the Do 17 was the 15th of September, which of course became known as
Battle of Britain day.
This day was materially and symbolically significant for the aircraft as it dramatically highlighted
its obsolescence when compared to the Junkers Ju 88 and the Heinkel He-111.
From a manpower and machine standpoint, the losses on that day were incredibly severe
considering the limited number of Do 17s that were actually deployed.
KG 2 lost seven aircraft, and almost all the remaining were damaged to some degree; KG
3 lost six aircraft, again with many also being damaged; and KG 76 also lost six aircraft
when it was intercepted by a large number of fighters en route to London.
It was the misfortune of this group of Do 17s that gives us the famous photograph of
the tail-less, partly de-winged bomber plunging towards Victoria Station.
This was the Do 17 of Oberleutnant Robert Zehbe (apologies if I pronounced that wrong,
but that’s how I’ve always known it), who was forced to bail out with his crew after
suffering extensive damage by fighters from no less than three different RAF squadrons.
He had switched the autopilot on before escaping, and the unmanned bomber flew on for a short
time before being brought down by Sgt Ray Holmes - flying a Hawker Hurricane of No 504
Squadron.
He was unaware that the bomber was unmanned, and, having run out of ammunition, decided
to ram it with his aircraft to bring it down.
Holmes survived this incident, but Zehbe would be less lucky, succumbing to wounds sustained
on the ground later on.
Following this day, the Do 17s role as a frontline bomber rapidly diminished.
From the start of October the majority of missions flown in the Do 17 were now done
at night, and often in support of larger formations of more capable aircraft.
But some other raids were also done at dawn or dusk, often in poor weather, with the express
purpose of disrupting enemy airfields.
These were often done by very small groups of aircraft, sometimes even flying solo, and
they were primarily targeted against airfields in East Anglia.
Many of these missions involved dropping quantities of SD 2 anti-personnel bombs, more commonly
known as butterfly bombs.
These proved to be more effective at shutting down an airfield than the larger bombs that
the Do 17 would otherwise have carried, as several hours had to be spent clearing the
mines – meaning that just a couple of outdated German bombers could effectively silence an
entire airfield for the better part of a day.
By early 1941 the Do 17 was now only operated partly by KG 2, KG3, and Gruppe 606 of the
Kustenfliger – who had done a mixture of anti-shipping and airfield raids throughout
the summer and winter of 1940/41.
They suffered their last Do 17 loss on the night of the 17th of February, with Leutnant
Gunther Hubner’s Do 17 being brought down by a Bristol Beaufighter of 219 Squadron.
Apparently the Do 17 was so slow compared to the heavy fighter that its pilot, Sqd Leader
James Little, had to do a series of S-turns to stay behind the German bomber during the
chase – and it was a stark metaphor for the aircraft’s obsolescence.
The next month Gruppe 606 began to transition to the Ju 88, as did KG 3, and KG 2 began
to re-equip with the Dornier 217, the larger spiritual successor to the Do 17.
Although its time as a frontline bomber had come to an end at last, the Do 17s wartime
service was far from over.
Not only was it still a suitable platform as a reconnaissance aircraft, but there were
other theatres of the war where its age was not as much of a disadvantage, and there were
of course other versions of the Do 17 operated by Germany and her allies.
One version that still saw action in British skies for a while longer was the little known
night-fighter version- little known because it was operated in relatively small numbers,
and because it only had modest success.
When production of the Do 17 ceased in mid-1940, opportunities were taken to find new ways
of extending the usefulness of the surviving airframes once they were inevitably pulled
from use as frontline bombers.
To this end, five Do 17 Z-3s were eventually converted into the Z-7 Kauz, or ‘Screech-Owl’.
This involved removing the Do 17s glazed nose, replacing it with the one found on a Ju 88
C series, and stuffing it full of weapons and infrared searchlights.
The armament was three 7.9mm machine guns and a single 20mm cannon.
Testing of the Z-7 soon revealed deficiencies in the design, mainly weapon serviceability
and poor gun accuracy, and it was further refined.
This time it was given an entirely new nose, with proper reinforcements for gun mounts,
and the armament was increased to four machine guns and two cannons.
In the tip of the nose was an infrared spotlight, which made the aircraft easy to recognise,
and later on this was changed to the FuG 202 Lichtenstein radar system.
This redesigned version became known as the Do 17 Z-10.
The exact number of these night-fighting aircraft built is difficult to pinpoint, but it appears
that approximately five of the Z-7s were produced, and some of them were converted over to the
Z-10 variant, with approximately 14 of them being built.
These aircraft first entered service near the end of June 1940 and were used on so-called
‘intruder’ missions, where they would be sent over enemy territory at night.
Due to their small numbers, and due to the difficulty of accurately recording events
during night-time operations, it is unclear on how effective the Kauz actually was.
According to records, the first confirmed kill for a Z-10 was a Czech-operated Vickers
Wellington that was brought down on the 16th of October, and, as fate would have it, the
last confirmed kill for a Z-10 would also be a Wellington- but this one was from the
Operational Training Unit- that was shot down on the 24th of April 1941…which meant that
the Kauz was not in service for particularly long, and it was soon replaced by more suitable
night fighter variants of the Bf 110 and the Ju 88.
1941 was the last year of major operations for the Do 17, not only because it was being
superseded, but due to the wide range of its use that year many airframes would be lost,
and each loss could of course not be replaced as production had ceased almost a year previously.
Besides flying above the skies of Britain in the early months of the year, the ageing
bomber would find itself in two other major theatres: The Balkans, and of course Russia.
The Balkan campaign, specifically the invasion of Yugoslavia, would see the aircraft used
on both sides of the conflict, and this allows us to quickly touch on the export models of
the Dornier 17.
The first export model of the aircraft was the Dornier 17K, which was produced for the
Yugoslavian air force.
Yugoslavia would order approximately 36 Do 17Ks, and they would go on to produce around
another 70 under licence.
This aircraft was something of a halfway house between the E and M variant of the bomber
in terms of airframe design, but when it came to the equipment it was completely different.
All but one of the aircraft exported from Germany would be sent without German equipment;
that meant no radios, no guns, and of course no engines.
After reviewing various options, the Yugoslavian air force went with a multinational approach.
The engines would be the French Gnome Rhone Mistral Major, the radio and camera equipment
would be Czech-built, and the 7.9mm machine guns would be Belgian-made FNs.
Unfortunately, the Yugoslavian Do 17K got something of a raw deal from beginning to
end.
In the first place, it was found to be woefully underpowered, as Gnome-Rhone had exaggerated
the power output of the engines they had sold, and in the second place many of the Yugoslav
Do 17s were destroyed on the ground in the first days of the German invasion.
They did play one key role in events, though.
Seven Do 17Ks would assist in the evacuation of King Petar II, taking him to Greece along
with the remaining gold reserves that had not been evacuated before the invasion had
begun.
Most of these aircraft would not survive the month, and by the end of April 1941 less than
a quarter of Yugoslavia’s Do 17s were still operational.
Many of these were subsequently captured and handed over to the Bulgarian Air Force, who
received approximately 15.
Before the Balkan invasion, Yugoslavia and several other countries had also expressed
interest in the updated Z variant of the Do 17, and this led to the development of the
other export model.
As Dornier had exhausted their alphabetical designations, the decision was made to produce
this export model as the Dornier 215.
The 215, or 215 whichever you prefer, is easily identified by its powerplant, for unlike the
Z variant, it was equipped with liquid-cooled V engines rather than air-cooled radials.
Initially, the plan had been to equip it with a 1,000 Gnome-Rhone radial, but this version
attracted little attention, so instead the 1,100 hp Daimler-Benz DB-601Aa was selected
instead.
The timing of this decision is difficult to pinpoint, but Dornier must have committed
itself before these engines were officially reserved for use in fighter aircraft, otherwise
work could not have proceeded.
Aside from the engine, the aircraft was virtually identical to the Z series.
Being equipped with between 4-6 machine guns for defence, and being capable of carrying
1,000kg of bombs.
Ironically, for an export model, a majority of the 215s were operated by the Luftwaffe.
An export order for 18 aircraft had been planned for Sweden, but following embargos they were
retained for German use, and the eruption of war between Germany and Poland led to the
Luftwaffe seizing an unspecified number of aircraft that were being built for Yugoslavia.
Because of this only 105 examples of the Do 215 were built, as once Germany was at war
they of course were busy focusing on their own needs.
Some of the completed aircraft would be operated by their neighbours, such as Royal Hungarian
Air Force, but for the most part the 215 became a Luftwaffe asset.
It was alongside regular Do 17s that they would see action above the skies of Greece,
and then later in the year during the invasion of the Soviet Union.
Their service in the Greek theatre was relatively easy.
KG 2 and KG 3 were the primary operators, with KG 2 as the main unit.
Combat losses were relatively light, owing to the lack of concentrated enemy air power,
and the majority of causalities either came from enemy ground fire or non-combat attrition:
accidents or mechanical failure.
In fact, this latter problem was really making itself known by this time in the war.
The biggest concern, and one that traces its way all the way back to the start of the Do
17s development, was the tendency for the landing gear to fail during landing.
The wearing out of the airframes became so problematic that some air units were forced
to exchange their aircraft for Bf 110s by the time of Operation Barbarossa.
Despite the logistical challenge, the Do 17s reputation as a low-altitude menace for its
enemies lived on during the fighting in Yugoslavia, and particularly Greece.
The hilly and often mountainous terrain was perfectly suited to low altitude strike missions.
Pilots from KG2 in particular wrote that it was an uplifting experience to fly first over
the Agean, then the Greek foothills, and then past the flanks of mount Olympus itself all
the span of a single morning.
Their experience over the Soviet Union was far less romantic, and it was short lived.
The Do 17 only played a minor part in the air war in this theatre, with KG 2 being the
only unit that still wholly operated the type, but like other Luftwaffe units it enjoyed
early successes in the first startling weeks of the campaign.
Their use was mostly split into three categories: reconnaissance, massed assault, or solo extreme
low-level attacks.
The last of these became increasingly unpopular when the German aircrews realised how dangerous
it was to bail out over enemy territory, as captured German airmen did not have a long
life-expectancy, especially if they had just spend the morning strafing Soviet armoured
columns.
Though many Soviet fighters were sent to intercept them, the biggest threat to the Do 17 was
once again ground fire, but even this inflicted minimal casualties at first – for example,
the 8th Staffel of KG 2 only lost one aircraft during its entire time flying Do 17s on the
Russian front.
The thing that ultimately curtailed the Dornier 17s use in this theatre was, unsurprisingly,
its short range.
The light bombload was also a problem, of course, but the vastness of the Russian landscape
presented migraine-inducing fuel problems for the officers in charge of KG logistics.
Because of this, the aircraft that found the most use during this time was the reconnaissance
variant, as it had better range, and was usually operated at a lower risk.
A special night-time reconnaissance unit made excellent use of the Do 17P during this time,
but there unfortunately seems to be little record of what they actually did, and in particular
what equipment they carried.
So far as I can tell they may have carried some early radar equipment to check for enemy
intruder aircraft, but I have not found enough on this for me to say it with any degree of
certainty – so we’ll just leave it at that.
The Do 17s time on the Russian front drew to an early close at the end of 1941.
KG 2 returned to Germany in November to convert to the Do 217, and the elements of KG 3 that
had been involved returned to convert to the Ju 88 – by the end of the year this process
was complete, and with a few individual exceptions the Do 17 was no longer considered a frontline
unit.
They would, however, remain in use in one form or another right up until the end of
the war.
Many were employed as glider tugs to assist in the transport of supplies to encircled
or retreating Wehrmacht forces, particularly in the Kuban region.
Others continued to be used in the night-time reconnaissance role, considered a less risky,
secondary occupation, up until late 1942.
Further south, some Do 17s were used as transports or couriers in the African and Mediterranean
theatres, but this was a role they were not well suited, both due to their short range,
and, by 1942, their inferior speed, and only a handful appeared to have been used in this
way.
The Do 17 would make a brief return as a frontline bomber during the Baedeker Blitz, a series
of German air raids that selected its targets from the Baedeker Guide, a popular travel
book that was published in the 1850s.
But as I am working on a special video for this topic, I’ll leave that aside for the
time being.
The last major operators of the Do 17 in numbers were the various training and communications
units that did their best to keep up with the needs of a war machine that was very quickly
seeing the odds turn against it.
Luftlandegeschwader 1 gives a good example of the variety of tasks demanded during the
final two years of the war.
In 1943 their Do 17s supported and helped with the training of paratroopers; they also
assisted in the supply and evacuation of the 17th Army at Kuban; they acted as both transports
for gliders, towing them between various airfields, and as official glider tugs, mostly for supply.
Most of these responsibilities were put upon them almost simultaneously and the unit was
kept exceedingly busy throughout 1943.
In 1944 they were reformed into a dedicated glider towing unit, and even by February of
1945 they still had several Do 17s on strength as towing aircraft.
All of their late war losses were either due to accidents or mechanical failure, and the
last Do 17 to be actually lost in combat was shot down over Croatia back on the 10th of
October 1944.
When the war was over, a few hundred supposedly remained, sitting quietly aerodromes, or in
fields, or hidden away in forests.
In total over 2,100 Dornier 17s were built, plus the 100 or so of the Do 215.
Despite this, and despite the fact that hundreds still littered airfields by war’s end, no
intact examples can be found today.
One aircraft is currently undergoing a long-term and extensive restoration program.
A Henschel-built Do 17 Z-2 was recovered from Goodwin Sands on the 10th of June 2013, having
been discovered there five years earlier, but apart from a few other known wreckage
sites – many of which have been plundered, that is all that remains.
Though on paper the Do 17 looked to be a fairly successful aircraft for the Luftwaffe in the
early years of the second world war, in reality it had left much to be desired.
The earlier models were poorly defended, all of them had a lacklustre bombload, and the
aircraft’s range was often smaller than that of the fighter aircraft sent along to
escort it.
All of these problems were recognised early in the Do 17s development, and while its production
as a light bomber continued, Dornier worked on a new design derived from the Do 17 but
on a larger scale.
This new design, the Do 217, would go on to rival and even exceed the capabilities of
the Heinkel He -111 and the Junker Ju 88, and despite being built in much smaller numbers
it was considered equally as successful.
But the story of the Do 217 is one we will cover another day.
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