- After the Yom Kippur War broke out on October 6, 1973,
Israel quickly felt a noose tighten around its neck.
(somber music) Outnumbered and unprepared,
Israel incurred unexpected, heavy losses
in the first three days.
The Egyptians pushed into the Sinai,
and the Syrians conquered the Golan Heights,
closing in on Israel's population centers.
Make no mistake;
the possibility of Israel losing the war
was becoming increasingly real by the hour,
and losing the war would likely spell the end of Israel.
So, how did Israel (energetic music)
turn the tide
and stave off the greatest existential threat
it had faced since its War of Independence?
In choosing not to strike first,
like Israel had done successfully in 1967,
an uncertain Golda had relied on the advice
of Defense Minister Moshe Dayan
and many of her high-ranking military advisors.
(somber music) But when the fighting began,
it was they who turned to Golda.
After the initial shock of the Egyptian-Syrian onslaught,
Golda became a rock. Despite Israeli losses,
and before Golda really had gathered her own strength,
she still put on a strong appearance
for the worried Israeli public.
She delivered a calm, measured radio address
to the citizens of Israel
at the end of the first day of fighting,
affirming her confidence in the IDF.
Golda not only reassured the public,
but galvanized the leadership into action.
She was called upon to make key strategic military decisions
which she had never thought to be her strength,
but her spur-of-the-moment decisions
would lead to some of Israel's
greatest achievements in the war.
Still, some in her cabinet, like Dayan,
were shrouded in despair,
believing defeat was imminent.
Golda also maintained dialogue
with an important frenemy in the region, the Jordanians.
Now, Jordan's King Hussein was wary of getting involved
in the Yom Kippur War from the get-go,
even warning the Israelis
ahead of the coordinated Egyptian-Syrian surprise attack,
in the hopes that Israel could take preemptive action
and end the war before it ever began, a la 1967.
King Hussein didn't want Jordan to suffer losses
like it did in the Six-Day War.
On the other hand, he couldn't afford to be viewed
by the other Arab nations as disloyal
or unwilling to take up arms against Israel
which would make Jordan into a pariah.
So, through back channels, Golda and King Hussein
came to an understanding of sorts
that neither side would do much damage to the other.
But, let's get back to the key players, Egypt and Syria.
With the two Arab countries
receiving arms from the Soviet Union,
Golda turns to Israel's superpower friend,
the United States,
in hopes of resupplying the staggering losses
the IDF had suffered.
Now, why didn't the U.S. have Israel's back right away?
Well, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
had his own diplomatic agenda.
In his words, "The best result would be if Israel
"came out a little ahead but bloodied in the process,
"and the U.S. stayed clean."
He felt secure that Israel
could turn things around on their own
and wanted to avoid triggering
a Soviet resupply effort of the Arabs.
At the same time, by delaying U.S. aid
and allowing the Israelis to suffer losses
on their way to eventual victory,
the U.S. would avoid totally alienating the Arabs.
This, Kissinger hoped, could ultimately help him
catch the great white whale,
a permanent Middle East peace plan,
negotiated by Kissinger himself,
in which both Israel and the Arab states
would land on America's side of the Cold War.
But, once the Soviets began resupplying the Arabs
with planes, tanks, and weapons by sea
to make up for early Arab losses,
Kissinger and President Nixon's calculations changed.
The U.S. wasn't going to sit idly by
and watch Soviet allies, who were making surprising headway,
take control of the Middle East by pushing out Israel,
America's key strategic ally in the region.
Nixon, sensing Israel was really up against a wall,
also feared what might happen
if Golda turned to her last resort.
What if, seeing all hope lost, the Israelis went nuclear?
The morning of October 9th,
Nixon and Kissinger learned that Israel had begun
to prepare its nuclear weapons for action.
Golda knew that if she made Israel's
preparations easily detectable,
the U.S. would get the message, and they did.
With nuclear tensions between the U.S. and the Soviets
already at an all-time high,
the U.S. wasn't crazy about the idea
of starting World War III in the Middle East.
So, on October 12th, nearly a week into the war,
Nixon ordered the military to prepare a massive shipment
of arms and supplies to Israel.
This would come to be known as Operation Nickel Grass.
Getting wind of the plan,
Arab nations quickly threatened oil embargoes
on any European countries willing to allow American aircraft
to land for refueling or fly over their territory.
Most of them caved to the oil-rich Arab countries
and banned American planes from their airspace.
Portugal was the lone exception.
Within a few days, 22,000 tons of weapons and supplies
began pouring into Israel with stopovers in Portugal.
American planes flew round-the-clock,
completing over 500 flights.
They brought over tanks, helicopters, fighter jets,
replacing early Israeli losses and then some.
Now, days before Operation Nickel Grass began,
Israeli tanks in the north
had largely pushed out the Syrians,
recapturing the rocky Golan Heights.
On October 14th, with new supplies now flowing in,
Israeli tanks pushed back against Egypt
on the sands of the Sinai.
By the late afternoon, that same day,
Israel had routed the Egyptians.
By the next night, Israel crossed the Suez Canal
and soon encircled Egypt's Third Army.
The Israelis then set their sights
on the Egyptian capital of Cairo,
roughly 60 miles away.
By October 22nd, two weeks into the war,
Israel's reversal of fortune was pretty much complete.
Israeli forces had recaptured Mount Hermon in the north
and pushed on until they were only 25 miles from Damascus,
the Syrian capital.
That same day, the United Nations called
for an immediate ceasefire,
but the fighting didn't stop
as both sides refused to let down their guard.
The Soviets threatened to send in their own troops
to defend the Egyptian Third Army,
which was still encircled by the Israelis.
The Soviets also put their warplanes on high alert
to defend the Egyptian and Syrian capitals
in the event of attack.
In response, Kissinger warned that
if the Soviets sent forces to the Middle East,
the United States would as well.
This was the closest the Soviets and the Americans
had come to direct military confrontation
since the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962.
Soviets backed down, and Moscow asked Washington
to make sure the Israelis eased up on Egypt's Third Army
so as not to humiliate Egyptian President Anwar Sadat.
The Americans also made sure
Israel stopped its advance on Cairo
to preserve the possibility of peace with Egypt.
Remember, Sadat came into this war
hoping to regain Egypt's national dignity and honor
that took such a hit after the 1967 Six-Day War.
Only then would Sadat enter peace negotiations.
On October 28th, the fighting officially ended,
when the first direct talks between Egypt and Israel began.
Israeli Major General Aharon Yariv
and Egyptian Major General Mohamed El-Gamasy
shook hands and began negotiating.
During the talks, some Egyptian and Israeli soldiers
actually emerged from their camps
and began meeting daily to brew coffee,
play backgammon and soccer,
and show off photos of wives and girlfriends.
These relations were pretty astounding,
not just because of the bloody war that preceded them
but because despite the ceasefire,
some of these soldiers were still periodically
shooting at each other in the evening.
Now, it would appear Israel won the war,
especially considering the numbers, right?
In total, Arab casualties have been estimated
at over 8,000 dead and over 19,000 wounded,
though some estimate twice that;
the Egyptians took the worst of it.
The Israelis, on the other hand, lost 2,656 soldiers
with another 7,250 wounded.
Yes, that's far fewer than the Arabs,
but that's also triple the casualties Israel saw
in the 1967 Six-Day War,
and in that war, Israel secured a lightning-quick victory,
tripling its land mass,
while in this war, the Israelis were run ragged.
Still, Israel's military showed outstanding resiliency
in staging an epic comeback
after such a disastrous start to the war.
The IDF excelled in some of the biggest tank battles
the world had ever seen.
Israel also learned just how important its friendship
with the U.S. was.
Ultimately, the U.S. was the only ally
that really showed up for the Jewish state
in its hour of need.
Now, even though it's pretty clear Israel won militarily,
that's not the whole story.
Politically, Egypt also secured a huge win,
putting Israel on the brink of collapse,
forcing them to call upon the United States
to come to their rescue,
and uniting Arab nations throughout the region
to join the fight was a major win for Sadat.
Egyptians no longer felt the humiliation of 1967
and proved the IDF wasn't invincible.
And in the post-war negotiations a few years later,
Israel began the process of handing the Sinai
back over to Egypt.
So basically, Egypt scored a huge victory
in terms of morale and territory,
and in Israel, it certainly didn't feel like a victory.
Remember, Israel lost nearly 3,000 soldiers
with more than 7,000 wounded.
For a tiny country of only three million,
well, think of it like this.
Pretty much everyone in Israel
either lost someone close to them or knew someone who did.
But seeing Israel's democracy on display after the war
was truly inspiring.
By definition, a democracy is predicated
on holding those in power accountable,
and that's exactly what happened in Israel
following the Yom Kippur War.
Many Israelis didn't see Golda as a strong leader
who showed resolve.
They saw a deer in headlights and viewed her and Dayan
as responsible for Israel's lack of preparedness.
Motti Ashkenazi, an IDF reserve captain,
held up a sign in front of Golda's residence that read,
"Grandma, your Defense Minister is a failure
"and 3,000 of your grandchildren are dead."
A government inquiry know as the Agranat Commission
found that Golda and Dayan weren't directly responsible
for any wrongdoing.
Most of the blame was placed
on senior IDF intelligence officers.
But still, in the face of growing national frustration,
the ruling Labor Party fractured,
and Golda eventually resigned.
In the end, Israel withstood the attack,
but the Arabs proved the IDF wasn't an indestructible force.
While still an icon, much of Golda's legacy
is now defined by the failures surrounding the war.
The period also showed that even military heroes like Dayan
aren't immune from the stresses and devastation of war.
Still, ironically enough, the war sparked peace negotiations
between Israel and Egypt,
leading to one of the strongest
and longest-standing peace treaties
in an unstable region like the Middle East.
Thanks for watching.
See you guys next week.
(moves into energetic music)