Let's just move on to some, some
more general kind of notions that these Republican administrations
kind of... that they held. First of all,
the cabinets of the various presidents Harding and Coolidge here
would work as much as possible for reductions in government.
They wanted to trim the federal budget. They wanted to
retire as much of the debt that remained from World War I as possible.
They wanted to reduce taxes and especially taxes on corporate profits,
personal incomes, and inheritances.
So having instituted the income tax and
used that during the First World War part of the return to normalcy entails
trying now not to get rid of the income tax but to reduce it
to very minimal levels. Congress
goes along. Much of the economic policy
though of both administrations would be driven by
a figure who's going to become very important a little bit down the road when we
reach the Great Depression, and that's Herbert Hoover.
Herbert Hoover would act as Secretary of Commerce
for these Republican administrations, and
in doing so he put forward an idea
of government's role that you might refer to as
associationalism. Associationalism. What that entails
is using government not to regulate but
using government in a voluntary and cooperative system
to help, to help bring
order to the economy. In other words,
to use government when
both sides wanted government's assistance to reach,
for instance, agreements between labor and employers
or among employers within various industries,
to try and rationalize the economy in a very progressive sort of way
here.
And I think it does sound progressive
that you want to remove risk.
You want to rationalize. You want to rely on
experts who know the statistics, and they know
the studies to help the American economy
be as productive as it can possibly be. So that,
and this is worth noting here, under Hoover's idea it's not
a sort... it's not a forced
legalistic approach to government
taking a role in society. It's a voluntary approach,
but it does reserve a role for government
in America's economy. Now it's a role,
because of deregulation and other things, it's a role that's probably going to help
some groups more than others, those groups that stand to benefit
most. But, nonetheless, I want to just
take a moment and note that you're still talking about a certain level of
activism here
in avoiding risk,
stabilizing the economy. Something that we saw even with the Federal Reserve.
Regulatory Commissions
would be used, often staffed by business people,
much as commissions and agencies were used to regulate the economy during the
First World War.
But again it's voluntary. It's not a mandate.
You also have a Supreme Court during the
early 1920's that's very much
about narrow definitions of government. William Howard Taft in
1921 becomes the Chief Justice,
and under his tenure we'll have legislation regarding
minimum wages for women workers rolled back declared unconstitutional.
We'll have legislation about child labor
rollback or struck down, and a ruling
that associations, okay these cooperative efforts by business to stabilize the
economy into
in some ways mark out their territories and establish price standards and those
kind of things,
the court declared that that was not a breach of
anti-trust legislation, that it wasn't something that,
you know, that was unconstitutional.
So again, you have this potential for deregulation
and a more voluntary approach and use of government
to keep business stable.
Still some progressive ideas there, but brought
out in a different way. More of going back perhaps even to
Roosevelt and beyond with some of these ideas.
We also see this seemingly hands-off approach
that hides a certain activism in foreign policy and I think foreign policy in
this case, in the 1920's,
reflects well sort of the domestic ideas at work in
Harding, but most importantly the Coolidge administration.
It's Coolidge who's working hardest probably for
like revenue reductions and those kinds of things and gets those
accomplished. But in terms of foreign policy I just want to mention a few
things and one of them
is a very early conference in 1921 the so-called
Washington conference.
Now 1921 is an important year because
it's during this year that Congress declares the First World War
over and the Secretary of State proceeds to negotiate treaties with the
combatants.
With the belligerents states. Remember that the Versailles effort had failed,
Wilson had failed to get approval from the Senate, so the result is
the US has to sign separate peace treaties with
all of the offending states.
It reflects this notion I think that
the United States wants the benefits, but not the responsibilities aof Versailles.
In other words, they want the peace, we want a peace that does certain things,
but
United States is not willing to enter in to an agreement that binds the United
States in terms of foreign policy
to act whenever called upon to act. We will make our own decisions.
And I think it's that spirit that the US is not...
that the US is not withdrawing from foreign issues
but it's saying we're going to encounter or we're gonna deal with these
foreign issues
on our own terms. That sort of gets into
a concept I guess is worth mentioning, a term that you might here in regard to
the 1920's
is isolation. But I think isolation is a bit too strong a term. The United States
during the 1920's
is not isolated or isolationist.
In fact the United States I would argue, you can disagree, you're welcome to
but I think the United States is active in foreign affairs,
active in World and International events, and active diplomatically.
But again it's an activity or activism
that is very subtle, very restrained,
and very limited. The US does not wish
to enter into any kind of agreements or take
any kind of action that will ultimately lead the United States to greater
responsibilities
that could potentially pull the United States for instance back into problems in
Europe
or problems in Asia or elsewhere that are beyond
the limited - that to go beyond the limited scope the US is willing
to accept. So we signed separate treaties
with the belligerent. But back to the Washington Conference in 1921,
in an attempt to avoid a costly armaments race
as nations around the globe begin rebuilding
or strengthening their own navies,
the United States,
seeks a 10 year moratorium on naval construction.
We don't want to put the money into building a huge Navy
while both Britain and Japan are actively engaged
in naval construction. This Washington conference in 1921 will lead to the
so-called five powers pact in
1922 and the five powers pact establishes ratios -
ratios for tonnage
for different nations. So for every five tons the United States will have
in its Navy, Britain will have five tons.
Japan will be allowed three tons
under this treaty and France and Italy each
will be allowed 1.75 tons. So that was kind of the ratios
or those were the ratios that were to govern
the construction
of naval armament
thereby allowing the United States to seek to control the size of the world's
navies,
but at the same time not entering into any sort of agreement that
would require the United States to actively stop or enforce or in any other
way become engaged.
All sides promise to respect territories in the Pacific
and to work together to prevent aggression
worldwide. And speaking of aggression;
this brings us to one of my personal favorite - personally favorite
treaties the so-called Kellogg-Briand Pact.
of 1928. The Kellogg-Briand
Pact of 1928.
In 1927 the United States was asked by France
to join an alliance against
a resurgent Germany. 1927.
Now remember for just a moment that
the Treaty of Versailles which the United States rejected, which we refused to sign
off on,
had included as part of its mechanisms the construction or creation of the
League of Nations, a body to deal with aggression,
but the US had said no.
Instead of engaging with the league, instead of committing ourselves
to any kind of, any kind of
world enforcement against aggression - United States
accepts France's request to consider an individual treaty.
US Secretary of State Frank Kellogg
proposes a treaty outlawing war as an instrument of national policy. Now
if you didn't hear what I just said let me repeat that;
Frank kellogg proposes a treaty outlying -
outlawing war as an instrument of national policy.
In August of 1928, fourteen...
that's a one and a four... 14 powers
sign the treaty.
Later some 48 other nations would sign
the Kellogg Briand Pact promising not to use war
as an instrument of national policy.
There was no enforcement power included in the treaty. In other words if someone
did choose
to use war,
there was no enforcement mechanism to stop them.
No enforcement sort of concert that the other nations will join together and beat the
pulp out of this other nation that used force.
Instead there was nothing. Instead
it was moral force, it was public opinion. If you break the treaty you're going to
look bad.
Again the United States wasn't without activity
in the international affairs of the world,
but the US refused to get involved
when it meant action. Is that
isolationism? Not quite.
Not quite. Pretty close.
But I think it suggests the larger tenor of
these Republican administrations of the 1920's both at home and
abroad.
Limited role for government. You don't want too much involvement,
but you're willing to work for positive results when involvement
is not involved. Positive results
through volunteer efforts. Association,
rather than the powers of regulation.
I'm going to leave it there and we'll pick up in the next segment
with a discussion of the economics of the 1920's
and then we'll move into the culture of the Jazz Age.