Marc: Before September 11, 2001, we faced primarily a danger from one terrorist network,
which had safe haven in one country.
Today, we face danger from multiple terrorist networks.
You have Al Qaeda, ISIS, and then all the Al Qaeda affiliates.
AQIM, the Islamic Maghreb, Al Shabaab, Boko Haram, multiple networks with safe haven in
more than a half dozen countries.
Are we in a greater threat environment today than we were before 9/11?
Hayden: I don't say that.
And here's how I draw the graph and the ether between us Marc, is if this is where we were
on September 10, and unfortunately we weren't quite aware we were there, all right, the
actions of two administrations has pushed that threat level down.
It was getting better and better and better, till about 2011, and then that line nosed
up again and is starting to increase.
I do not think it has yet gotten back to the level of September 10.
But we are unarguably less safe than we were one, two, three, or four years ago.
Marc: But the threat has also metastasized.
So it's like you were dealing with a cancer in a specific location and trying to stop
it from coming back.
Now we have metastasized cancers all over the place that are causing it.
Hayden: I would agree and to extend the analogy, just one more revolution and you know all
analogies break down eventually...
Marc: Of course.
Hayden: ...that one more revolution is that was a life-threatening cancer right next to
a vital organ.
Now it's metastasized, as you've said.
But individually, even collectively, it is not yet quite as life threatening as that
September 10 one was.
Marc: And we have though, a unique situation in the history of Islamic radicalism, short
as it is, modern Islamic radicalism, which is that you have free market competition between
two competing entities.
It's like you have Apple and Microsoft competing...
Hayden: No.
Actually what you've got is Apple and Xerox.
You've got that mature, somewhat bureaucratic, fairly slow moving Al Qaeda, and now you got
this damn startup over here that's acting like a Silicon Valley startup.
Marc: That's a really interesting analogy.
But you have this competition going on and so there with the coin of the realm, they're
fighting for the hearts and minds of the Jihadi faithful, they're fighting for the money from
the Jihadi fundraiser around the world at that.
So how do you win that competition for who signs up with you, who gives you money, you
attack us right?
Hayden: No.
And Marc, your question also reveals another great truth.
You know, we argue with ourselves about if we do x or y or z, we're just feeding the
narrative.
Guantanamo, it's a recruitment poster.
Targeted killings, you're filling in the b roll for the recruitment video and so on.
You want to pump up terrorist recruiting?
You want people flocking to the black banners?
You have one big deal successful terrorist attack against the United States.
All right.
So that truth you just pointed out applies not just to the competition between groups.
They want to score, but it also applies to the logic of why we need to do some of the
things we do.
And the argument that some of the things we do helps recruitment, may or may not be true.
But if you really want to help recruitment, fail.
Marc: So aren't we in this terrible, vicious cycle where the intelligence committee before
9-11 was criticized for not doing enough to stop 9-11.
So they turn around and they start the CIA interrogation program.
We have the NSA's activities.
We do all these things and at the time, in the wake of 9-11 they were incredibly popular
among those who know them.
And then, they're so successful, that they prevent another attack, people start feeling
complacent again and they start criticizing the NSA and so now, we have to scale back
some of these programs and then, what's going to happen?
We're going to get hit again and the cycle starts again?
Hayden: You're right.
There's a natural, predictable rhythm we all knew this.
When we're doing Plane to the Edge, as the title of my book suggests, when we're doing
that, '01, '02, '03, '04, we knew the pendulum would come swinging back.
The existential whine that we have in the intelligence community is that politically,
it's not most Americans, but political elites feel free to criticize us for not doing enough
when they feel in danger.
And then immediately criticize us for doing too much once we have made them feel safe
again.