An army’s logistics system has always been crucial to its success and Alexander’s army
was no different. His great conquests would never have been possible without the skilful
organisation of his forces throughout his campaigns. So, in this episode we shall cover
the logistics of the Macedonian army.
Our story starts with the logistics of the Greek armies of the Classical period. When
fighting fellow city-states, the armies usually followed certain conventions. They would leave
their home city and travel to an agreed battleground suitable for phalanx warfare. They would then
engage their enemy in battle, before returning home.
The armies were not intended to stay out in the field for long durations. Thousands of
non-combatants – attendants, women and slaves – travelled with them, sometimes outnumbering
the soldiers. That dramatically reduced the speed and mobility, and every follower meant
an extra mouth to feed. Furthermore, the Greek armies used oxcarts
and wagons and this inevitably impeded an army’s speed and mobility further. The throat
and girth harnesses severely damaged the animals and rough terrain easily hindered the carts.
This system was therefore designed only for the short distances and slow movement.
Philip realised that things needed to change and made sweeping reforms to the Macedonian
logistics system. He aimed to create a system that prioritised his army’s sustainability,
mobility and speed. Fortunately for him, Philip had a suitable precedent in the Greek commander
Xenophon, who decided to burn his wagons to lighten the load of his army during the march
of the 10,000 out of Asia some 50 years before. This greatly increased the speed and mobility
of his force and was critical to the success of his march.
Likely using Xenophon’s success as a precedent, Philip forbade the use of ox-carts and wagons
in his army. Instead, he used horses as the prominent pack animal – the first time a
western commander had done this. It soon provided dividends as it gave his army more mobility.
Philip also increased the amount of supplies carried by his men on campaign. This included
arms and armour – possibly even the sarissa, which could be detached into two sections
to ease its portability. Each soldier would also have to carry rations, utensils, blankets,
road-building tools, medical supplies, a thirty-day supply of flour and any personal possessions
in a pack. All-together this would have weighed around eighty pounds.
To further lighten his baggage train, the Macedonian king drastically reduced the number
of non-combatants accompanying the army. Women were forbidden while the number of servants
was drastically reduced. Each cavalryman would have one servant, while for the infantry there
would be one servant for every ten Macedonians. These attendants would carry hand mills that
were used for grinding grain as well as guy ropes for both bridge building and rock climbing
and their own bedding and rations. Not only was Philip’s army now able to move
quicker and inflict ‘lightning strikes’ on opposing forces, but he could sustain his
army in the field significantly longer than his mainland Greek counterparts.
And so, just as with his infantry, cavalry and siege craft, Alexander inherited and made
use of a logistics system that had been radically transformed into the most efficient of its
time. In 335 BC for instance, to crush a Theban revolt, his army marched from lake Lychnitis
to Boeotia – some 500 miles – in thirteen days catching the Theban rebels completely
off-guard. With this newly-reformed logistics system
supporting and supplying his army, in 334 BC Alexander set forth for Asia. Yet fighting
in Asia would prove very different from fighting in Europe. Alexander therefore soon adapted
the logistics system he had inherited to suit his new theatres of war.
One such area that gradually experienced improvement and alteration was the baggage train. Traversing
the Persian Empire meant that Alexander needed to ensure his baggage train was well-organised.
Therefore, a transport officer – a skoidos - was placed in overall charge of the baggage
train. The skoidos would look after the baggage train’s defences, marching order, the welfare
of the pack animals and distributing supplies. Parmenion likely filled such this role until
his execution in 330 BC. A critical factor for a successful baggage
train was the welfare of the animals, and although troops or servants carried many items
in Alexander’s army, they could not carry critical equipment such as tents, firewood,
loot, and perhaps each man’s sarissa when they did not expect to be fighting. This made
the beasts of burden essential. Horses and mules remained the predominant pack animals
within Alexander’s army. Yet he would also incorporate another animal to carry supplies:
the camel. Introduced into Alexander’s army in either
Syria or Egypt, the camel played a critical role in Alexander’s conquests. While the
horse or a mule carried 200 lb of supplies over a long distance, camels were able to
transport 300 lb. They were also well-suited for traversing arid terrain, having barely
any limitations on what they could eat and drink if necessary. All that made them the
ideal baggage animals for Alexander’s marches into the Persian heartlands and beyond – lands
where the need for speed across harsh deserts was critical.
Throughout his campaigns, horses, mules and camels remained the engine of Alexander’s
Macedonian baggage train. Their speed and endurance were much greater than oxen and
this suited his desire for light, fast marches across harsh terrain. He would recruit these
animals throughout his campaign; they were then spread throughout his army to supply
the men – animals being attached to every dekas units.
Yet Alexander could not maintain this highly-mobile baggage train during the entirety of his campaign.
At times, we hear of carts temporarily being reintroduced into Alexander’s army, most
notably in Iran. However, just as Xenophon had before him, he soon had most of them burned
to avoid them hindering his army in harsh terrain. A few carts inevitably remained and
were tasked with transporting certain heavier, essential items – most notably siege machinery
and the wounded. Alexander would make one other critical change
to the Macedonian baggage train. As he and his army marched further and further away
from the Mediterranean, it became clear to Alexander’s soldiers that it would be many
years before they could see their wives and children again in Macedonia. Alexander therefore
permitted women to travel with the baggage train again. Alexander even allowed his soldiers
to marry captive women. Children soon followed, and the baggage train swelled in size. Although
a radical change from his father’s logistics system and one that undoubtedly slowed down
Alexander’s army, it was necessary. Philip’s ban had worked because his men had been able
to return home after each campaigning season to see their loved ones. Alexander’s men
could not. Nevertheless, even with this change, Alexander always prioritised having his army
as light as possible throughout his campaigns. For him, speed and mobility were key.
Another equally-important task of the skoidos was distributing rations to the troops – most
notably food and water. Grain products were the major staples of a
Macedonian soldier’s diet. Wheat, barley and millet - all were available throughout
Asia and India. Not only were they easily portable, but once these products were dried,
they could be stored indefinitely. From their ration, each soldier would use the grinding
mills carried by the servants to create flour and, after that, make bread. It is also possible
the Macedonians consumed grains in the form of biscuits and porridge.
Yet the Macedonian soldiery did not live solely off grain products. Whenever possible, they
would also eat dried meat, salted fish and shellfish to supplement their diet. Meat however,
was rare and more often the soldiers turned to various kinds of dried fruit such as figs
and dates – both readily available throughout much of Asia.
Each Macedonian soldier would carry his food rations. While he was on campaign, these rations
would usually be enough for ten days. If Alexander wanted his troops to conduct a swift march,
then the food each soldier would take with him was usually pre-cooked – mostly biscuits,
fruit and if possible, salted meat. This lightened the soldier’s pack as cooking utensils were
thus not required. Marching through Asia was undoubtedly hard
work for a Macedonian soldier: Its consistently hot climate, countless deserts and extensive
barren lands would have been extremely taxing for any Macedonian, burdened with arms, armour
and a heavy pack. Indeed, it appears armour was sometimes even discarded during these
marches. Consequently, the requirement for sufficient calories and water was critical.
Scholars assume that a minimum of 3 lb. of grain products – the equivalent of nearly
1 ½ kilograms of bread - as well as half a gallon of water would be needed to supply
the troops in these conditions daily – some 3,600 calories.
Meanwhile, horses and mules needed eight gallons of water and ten pounds of both grain and
straw a day if they were to be kept in good condition. As for a camel, although the animal
could survive multiple days with barely any water, the animal was most efficient if the
Macedonians gave it ten gallons of water a day. It would also require ten pounds of grain
and twenty-five pounds of straw. Yet acquiring supplies would prove anything
but easy. For most of his campaigning life, Alexander and his army traversed the various
terrains of inland Asia – lands on many occasions hostile to him and far away from
seas and navigable rivers. This forced Alexander to acquire supplies via land. Transporting
supplies overland was fraught with difficulty: there were few carts and pack-animals available
in many of these regions and there was also the constant threat of banditry. Furthermore,
most agricultural societies in the East did not have a surplus of food from which they
could help supply Alexander’s passing army. But Alexander evidently found a solution.
Recently, a ground-breaking study by Donald Engels concluded how the Macedonian king most
likely achieved this. Upon his arrival in Mesopotamia after victory at Gaugamela, Alexander’s
power and military prestige in the east became phenomenal and soon many of the remaining
Persian officials surrendered. Alexander realised he could use this to solve his supply problem.
He sent messengers ahead of his army to meet the officials to secure arrangements for the
army’s supply through their territory – sometimes taking hostages to ensure the officials kept
their word. Thus, Alexander secured his supply lines far in advance.
When the officials did not surrender to Alexander, he took a different approach. He would acquire
intelligence about the region – information such as its topography, routes, climate and
resources, and he would then either launch a lightning campaign against the region with
a small elite force, keeping the main army back; or he would split his forces into smaller
units that would gain supplies by either sacking settlements or foraging. These more destructive
methods regularly occurred in the Persian heartlands.
During the winter months, Alexander ensured his forces remained in a heavily settled,
fertile area – usually adjacent to either navigable rivers or ports from where supplies
could be more easily obtained. Thanks to his forward planning and charisma, Alexander was
able to find solutions to the lingering threat of supply problems throughout his conquests.
He had a plan for every scenario. There was however, one occasion when this
forward planning of provisions failed the Macedonian king. In 325 BC Alexander marched
his army across the Gedrosian desert. It proved the greatest logistical error of his life,
costing thousands of lives. Some argue this devastating crossing occurred because of the
man’s pothos, his desire to outdo all before him, or out of revenge for his troops’ earlier
mutiny in India. Yet others believe Alexander simply made a mistake in his logistical planning.
Alexander had expected his army to be supplied by the navy, commanded by Nearchus, as it
made its way along the coast. Yet monsoon winds delayed the fleet from leaving the harbour
in India for months. The result proved devastating for Alexander’s men. Alexander and his army
slowly withered as they crossed the desert. By the end, 75% of his force – mostly those
in the baggage train - had perished. This was the exception in a campaign epitomised
by many episodes of logistical brilliance. Alexander’s campaign in both Asia and India
required precise and advanced logistical planning unlike any yet-seen in antiquity. Its success
was crucial to the survival of his campaign – a factor that is so often overlooked.
We will cover other critical parts of Alexander’s army in the next episode, so make sure that
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