This has been strange season in the Turkish Super League.
The Big Three clubs of Beşiktaş, Fenerbahçe, and Galatasaray—who between them have won
most Turkish titles and are supported by around 80% of Turkish fans—are all struggling.
Austerity has shaken up the sport. The normally big-spending Turkish transfer window was uncannily
quiet this summer as pressure from UEFA’s Financial Fair Play regulations have hobbled
the big teams, while a currency crisis and economic downturn has added to a wider sense
of malaise.
The Turkish game is now probably in its worst ever financial state.
The Turkish Super League boasts Europe's six largest broadcasting revenues, but soaring
capital from broadcasting rights, sponsorship, and government intervention has fuelled a
massive transfer spending spree over the past two decades and left spiralling debts.
In the year 2000, revenues in Turkish football were around €150 million and debts were
around €60 million; by 2015 revenues had risen to €700 million, far eclipsed by debts
of around €1bn.
In 2017 Andrea Traverso, UEFA’s head of club licensing and Financial Fair Play (FFP),
stated that Turkey is the only European country where club debts and liabilities are bigger
than club assets. “European clubs improved substantially overall while aggregated losses
of Turkish clubs quintupled,” he added.
The vast majority of Turkish clubs are member-based associations, who elect a club president for
a term of two or three years. Presidents are not personally liable for the club’s debts
and clubs are exempt from most commercial oversight. Successive governments failed to
bring in a law to reform the finances and structure of the clubs.
Football has become one of the most important networks of power in Turkey, and club presidents
and prominent members are often keen to use the clubs for their personal ambitions, prestige,
or popularity.
With an eye on regular elections and under pressure for quick success and exciting signings
by the fans, members, and a transfer-hungry media, club presidents are tempted to spend
on expensive, aging foreign stars over developing younger talent. The Turkish Super League now
has the one of oldest average player ages in Europe at 28.22 years old.
Several smaller clubs have gone bankrupt, and many others are in a financial and footballing
freefall; that’s why former Super League title contenders Gaziantepspor are now propping
up the third tier on minus points, and Mersin Idmanyurdu – with its new 25,000 capacity
stadium – has tumbled successively down from the Super League to the Amateur leagues.
But every club would likely have gone bankrupt without the support of the state.
The fanaticism for football in Turkey has meant that every government has intervened
in the sport, but the ambitious AKP, in power since 2002 and led by the ex-semi professional
footballer Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, have lavished unprecedented sums of money and attention
on football.
The government often defers or writes off the massive tax debts of the biggest clubs,
and it uses its influence to cajole and secure sponsorship and leverage credit to the clubs
from friendly banks.
Most economists agree that the value of the Super League broadcasting revenues has been
wildly inflated. The government pressured Turk Telekom to compete in the 2014 bid, forcing
Digiturk to increase its bid from $321 million/year in 2010 to $450 million/year. Digiturk – a
company which was linked to the Turkish state until Qatar’s beIN took it over in 2016
– had struggled to recoup its investment. In November 2016, Digiturk beat Turkcell to
win a new broadcasting tender for $500 million/ year ($600 million/year with tax) until 2022/23.
And at least 30 new stadium projects across 27 cities are being built as part of an astonishing
construction boom under the AKP.
But when revenues are boosted, clubs don’t tend to spend on unsexy accounting measures,
like repairing balance sheets or paying off debts, or on sensible longer-term development,
such as investing in youth academies. Increased revenues tend to go on acquiring more expensive
players and coaches on high salaries.
Now, while the state may be less able to support football amid an economic downturn and a currency
crisis, FFP is also starting to bite.
UEFA banned Galatasaray from European competitions for a year in 2016 for violating FFP rules,
and forced several clubs into strict austerity agreements.
Even so, Galatasaray spent £38.5m on transfers in the summer of 2017.
In June 2018, UEFA fined Galatasaray €6m for not complying with their break-even requirement.
UEFA said that Beşiktaş had fully complied with its targets, but that Fenerbahçe and
Trabzonspor had only partially fulfilled their respective agreements.
Terrified of being sanctioned by UEFA, the big clubs have been selling off their best
players and failing to adequately replace them. In the summer, Galatasaray offloaded
Bafetimbi Gomis, who scored 32 goals for them last season, and have only been left with
one out-and-out striker.
Even amid austerity, the big clubs are increasingly struggling to service the interest on their
debts. The Turkish lira lost about 40% of its value against the dollar earlier this
year. As most of the clubs’ expenses are in foreign currencies, the Turkish lira value
of their debt has grown even further over the past few months. Exchange rate fluctuation
between 30.06.2018 and 13.08.2018 meant that Fenerbahçe’s financial liabilities increased
by 650.2m TL, Galatasaray’s by 253.3m TL, and Beşiktaş’s by 160.9m TL. The total
debt of the the Big 3, plus Trabzonspor, is now thought to be over 10bn TL – more than
€1.7bn. Fenerbahçe’s total debt alone is now a whopping €621m.
Some believe this period of hardship could provide an opportunity to re-invent the troubled
Turkish game, forcing clubs to change their transfer policies.
The bigger clubs may become more inclined to scout and develop young Turkish players.
Fenerbahçe brought in several young Turkish players over the summer. The emergence of
Galatasaray’s promising 18-year-old centre back Ozan Kabak this season was probably made
possible by a lack of more experienced signings.
The league is also much more competitive this season.
But others believe that austerity points more strongly towards decline or even bust.
The overall standard could fall, with fewer quality players coming to play in Turkey and
the clubs becoming less competitive in Europe.
Ultimately the major Turkish clubs are probably too big to fail: unless a severe economic
crisis means the government can no longer bail them out.