Most social scientists, particularly psychologists,
and so these would be research oriented scientists,
who are dealing with data and who have to use statistical techniques.
Now, you know, when you first encounter
statistics, you sort of think about it as a magic device to extract truth from data.
And it's not, it's more like a surgical tool.
Some scientists will take their data
and then they'll farm it out to someone to analyze this.
It's like, just find the truth in this.
That never works or rarely,
because that isn't how the statistical analysis of data works, partly because
every data set is subject to a multiplicity of interpretations.
And so when you're doing statistical analysis, you're doing...
It's a constant sequence of micro-battles with temptation,
and you think about it... So for example, if you're a master student
in the Psych program, you might have spent a year and a half
finishing your study, especially if you have to get it through
an intransigent and bureaucrat written ethics clearance committee.
And so...
And then if you don't find something
of note, well, this is worse at the PhD level.
It's like you don't graduate.
And so the temptation to perform your statistical operations in at least
a willfully blind manner is extremely powerful.
And that's part of the reason why there's a replication crisis in social science.
It's not the only reason.
Part of the reason is it's really actually difficult to discover something.
And the fact that so much
of the scientific literature, especially in the social sciences,
is they are written, it's like, well, what do you expect?
Like if 30% of published papers are
actually true, given the volume of scientific publication?
Man, we are cruising along at such a rate we could barely stand it.
So I think 30% hit rate is pretty damn good myself.
But most people aren't as cynical as me. But, maybe...
So, you know, you say, well...
Is the scientific enterprise going to win out over the religious enterprise?
No.
Because all of those decisions about how
to handle your data, those are religious decisions.
It's like, are you going to let your venal
ambition and your malevolent competition and your desire to dominate be
the determining factor in your application of statistical processes?
Or are you going to be imbued with the spirit of truth?
And then I would say that's a benevolent spirit in the scientific enterprise when
it's conducted ethically, because the reason scientists are doing
what they're doing, if they're genuine scientists,
and then I would say, which means they're religious scientists,
even if they don't know it,
is because they want things to be better.
Not worse.
And so, it's not possible for science in some deep sense to triumph over
religion unless you define religion a priori as the foolish belief in outdated
propositional, quasi-scientific hypotheses,
in which case, well, we will move beyond that, hopefully.
But that's not...
It doesn't wrestle with the fundamental issue, as far as I'm concerned.
The fundamental issue seems to be that
we cannot frame our perceptions outside a narrative structure.
And there are no narrative structures without value...
And a hierarchy of value,
even determining an ethical hierarchy of value is... That's an ethical enterprise.
It's mediated by consciousness, and something has to be at the top.
And you might say, well, why does something have to be at the top?
Well, something has to unite the ethical structure.
And you might say, well, why?
And the answer to that is because otherwise you're confused.
And you might say, well, who cares if you're confused?
And the answer is, you do.
And then the question might be, why do you care?
Because it makes you anxious.
Because that's what anxiety indexes.
And you might say, well, why is that a problem?
And the answer is, well, it's psychophysiologically costly.
And if you're anxious long enough,
not only will you be miserable, you'll die sooner.
And we don't have to pursue it any further
than that because, well, for obvious reasons.
These things are tied to the body.
They're tied to the real world.
You pay a price for internal ethical disunity, and no one likes that.
And partly that's because if you're not
unified in your orientation, you don't know what to do.
And you might say, well, that's not a problem.
Just do nothing. It's like, well, no, because you can't.
And second, it's very
disorienting in the most fundamental sense not to know what to do.
If you meet someone and you don't know
what to do around them, that's not nothing.
That's extremely uncomfortable.
This is partly why people don't like to have their beliefs challenged.
If you challenge a belief successfully,
especially a deep belief, and we could define deep:
a deep belief is a belief upon which many other beliefs depend.
So if you're in a marriage, for example,
generally, the belief in your partner's fidelity is an axiom of all
the memory structures, hopes, and dreams that you have riding on the marriage.
And so if you have evidence that your partner has engaged in infidelity,
especially in the past, let's say, when you thought that you were the one,
so to speak, then that's going to disrupt you at a deep and profound level.
I would say at a religious level,
but I would also say that's the definition of religious: deep and profound.
Now what that has to do specifically with the propositional statement "God exists"
that is a whole different issue.
And I think in some sense it's beside the point.
I mean, we're so propositional in our
thinking that we tend to think that the only form of experience is propositional.
And the only, what would you call it...
Valid statements are propositional when we think about it, but we don't act that way.
How many of you don't go see movies?
How many of you don't go see...
You don't have to go to the theater.
This includes watching them on television or on your computer.
Is there anybody here who hasn't watched a movie this week?
Okay, well, fair enough.
How many have watched the movie this week?
All right, you know that's false.
That's all fiction. Just in case you didn't know...
It's like well what the hell are you doing then?
Well you can't propositionalize it because
you don't know what you're doing but that doesn't matter.
You don't care. And if someone comes along and says:
"You know that's fictional", you think...
Shut up. I'm watching the movie. Right?
But that is what you think.
You don't think well, isn't it observed that I'm sitting here watching this
fictional...
Myth?
What in the world am I doing?
You think I'm really enjoying this movie
and isn't it something that you "enjoy it",
what in the world does that mean?
Well, you don't think that's the action of an instinct? That enjoyment of narrative?
I mean, if you want to teach a child something what do you use?
You're going to read them the periodic table of the elements?
You know... Some children, not many.
You can get away with that.
They're very thing oriented children. Right?
They have a brain that's sort of wired up for that sort of thing.
But most of them it's like... They're not going to listen they're not
going to remember they're not going to attend.
But man, if you tell them a story even if you tell them a story about the person
who invented the or discovered the periodic table of the elements,
if it's a well spun story they will listen to that and they will remember that.
And so we basically communicate and the fact that we communicate in narratives,
well shouldn't that be just some evidence that we think in narratives?
What do you think? It's just enjoyment? I mean, I've read some rationalist thinkers
who they push all the arts, the humanities, all of that, the religion,
all of that into kind of a spandrel category and say,
well that's just a byproduct of the cognitive operations that actually
have something like functional utilities like...
No, that's just...No. Sorry, that's just not the case.