In the Napoleonic Wars, infantry fought in ‘close order’ – packed together, standing
shoulder to shoulder.
But why present such an easy target for the enemy?
First, command and control.
Before radios, orders had to be relayed by shouted commands, drums or bugles - difficult
enough in the smoke and din of battle, almost impossible if troops were scattered.
Second, firepower.
Smoothbore muskets were inaccurate beyond about 80 yards, so volley fire, firing en
masse, was the best way to inflict physical and psychological damage on the enemy.
Third, morale.
Soldiers were much more willing to advance into danger or hold the line if they did so
together as a unit, urging each other on.
Fourth, defence against cavalry.
Scattered infantry were easy targets for horsemen – only by sticking together could they fight
them off.
The basic tactical unit of infantry was the battalion.
A French line battalion had, in theory, 840 men, but in practice, nearer five to six hundred.
Our example here has 605 men, a typical strength for a battalion on campaign.
The men were divided into six companies:
Four fusilier companies, and two flank companies – on the right, the grenadiers, made up
of the tallest, strongest men, often detached to form elite all-grenadier units… and on
the left the voltigeurs, specialist light infantry used for skirmishing in front of
the battalion.
Skirmishers moved independently, used cover and fired at will to harass and unsettle the
enemy, while preventing enemy skirmishers carrying out the same task.
Most armies also had specialist light infantry units for this role, such as the British 95th
Rifles, French chasseurs à pied, and Austrian and Prussian jäger battalions.
The traditional battlefield formation was the line: all companies formed up alongside
each other, three ranks deep.
Line formation maximised the number of men who could fire their muskets at the enemy,
and limited casualties from artillery fire.
But it was extremely vulnerable to cavalry if it could be outflanked… and even for
well-drilled troops, it was difficult to keep the line straight while advancing across broken
ground.
So for manoeuvre and attack, battalions usually formed a ‘column of divisions’.
This was a more flexible formation that allowed the battalion to advance quickly, though it
presented a larger target to enemy guns, firing solid roundshot that would tear through several
ranks… and far fewer men could fire their muskets at the enemy.
Theoretically, therefore, the battalion would deploy into line before reaching the enemy
– but carrying out this slow manoeuvre under fire wasn’t always possible or sensible,
so some commanders kept their men in column, relying on momentum to break the enemy line.
This was a risky tactic that often worked against raw troops, but led to high casualties
when facing better-trained infantry, like British redcoats.
A column could be closed up quickly to provide protection from cavalry, or if there was time,
could form a square –
With bayonets fixed, the battalion formed an all-round defence, that often resembled
more of a rectangle.
Enemy cavalry could surround the battalion, but not break in, as horses won’t charge
a solid wall of men and steel.
But an infantry square was extremely vulnerable to artillery fire, and could only move very
slowly.
Changing quickly and smoothly from one formation to another, especially under fire, required
training, practise and experience.
In 1809, the Austrian army began to use the ‘battalion mass’ formation, crude but
more suited to hastily-trained conscripts.
This was a dense column, with limited firepower, and huge vulnerability to enemy cannon.
But it could quickly close up to repel cavalry, using the same principle as the square, but
without the complex drill; and was much more manoeuvrable.