- [Narrator] Battles over the level
of government involvement in religion
have a special place in constitutional law.
In 2002, the United States Supreme Court
decided Zelman versus Simmons-Harris,
a case that shows how the line between church and state
is far harder to draw than it appears.
In the 1990s, the Cleveland City School District
suffered from widespread poverty
and abysmal educational performance.
Cleveland public schools were some of the worst
in the country.
Desperate to improve its situation,
Ohio instituted a scholarship program
to provide vouchers to students
whose families met certain low-income requirements.
The parents of eligible students could then decide
which school their child would attend.
Including, both, religious and secular private schools.
At the time, 82% of the private schools
that participated in the program
had a religious affiliation,
and 96% of students using the aid program
attended religiously affiliated schools.
Cumulatively, this created the appearance
that the government was disproportionately funding
religious education at the expense of secular schools.
Simmons-Harris and other taxpayers objected
to the use of their money
to fund religiously affiliated schools.
They brought suit in Federal District Court,
asserting that the program effectively advanced
the religious missions of the schools
in violation of the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment.
The District Court agreed with the taxpayers
and granted summary judgment in their favor.
The Court of Appeals affirmed.
The Supreme Court granted cert to determine whether a state
can constitutionally provide financial assistance
to low-income students when a large percentage of students
choose to attend religious schools.
In a five to four decision, the court held
that the government can constitutionally fund
educational programs based on financial need,
even where most participating students
choose to attend religious schools
as long as there are legitimate, non-religious alternatives
available for students.
Chief Justice Rehnquist determined that the voucher program
was permissible under the lemon test
for Establishment Clause analysis.
The lemon test asks, first,
whether there is a secular purpose
for the government program.
Second, whether the primary effect of the program
is to advance or inhibit religion.
And third, whether the program creates
excessive entanglement between the government and religion.
First, the court concluded the program had a secular purpose
because it was designed to assist low-income children
in obtaining quality education.
The aid didn't have the primary effect of advancing religion
because it was distributed on the basis of financial need
and without reference to religion.
All private and public schools in the area
could participate in the program.
Lastly, the court found no excessive entanglement
with religion because the high percentage
of religious schools affiliated with the program
resulted from choices made by private individuals.
It was the parents, not the government,
that determined where the scholarship money went.
What's more, the parents of eligible students
had meaningful, non-religious options available to them
and could freely choose between
religious and secular schools.
Therefor, the court upheld the constitutionality
of the program and reversed the judgment
of the Court of Appeals.
In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor
evaluated the actual proportions
of state scholarship funding provided to religious schools
compared to the funding provided
to non-religious public schools.
In comparison, the scholarship program
was insubstantial and the amounts were consistent
with other federal aid already provided
to religious institutions.
Justice Thomas, also concurring, emphasized
the policy objective of helping bring poor children
out of poverty and the importance of parental choice
in educating children.
Justice Breyer dissented, he advocated
for a stricter separation of religion and state
and the governmental funding of primary education.
He pointed out the risk of religious conflict
because the program prohibited religious schools
from denying enrollment based on religion.
Because the Establishment Clause
was designed to prevent religious conflict,
he argued that the program was unconstitutional.
Justice Stevens also dissented.
He argued that the availability of private choice
had little to do with the permissibility
of state funding for religious education.
He viewed these as separate issues
and agreed that the program was unconstitutional.
Zelman was a major win for the proponents of school choice,
but the debate was far from over.
In the 2017 case of Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia
versus Comer, the court held that it was unconstitutional
for states to exclude religious options
from otherwise neutral and secular public aid programs.
(whooshing) (dinging)
(scribbling)