Last season, Liverpool were defensively very impressive. They conceded 22 goals, the fewest
in the Premier League, and one less than Manchester City’s 23. Superficially, with the outstanding
Virgil van Dijk at its heart, Alisson at its base, and two rapidly improving full-backs
on the flanks, defence was an area in which Liverpool could claim to be City’s superior.
Expected goals tell a slightly different story, though. While Manchester City did concede
one more goal, their xGA figure was 25.9 compared to Liverpool’s 30.0.
In other words, Liverpool conceded fewer goals because their goalkeeping performance was
superior, or because the opposition’s shooting was wayward. But purely in terms of not conceding
chances, City were better. Their extraordinary run of just three goals conceded in their
final 13 games of last season essentially won them the league, a spell that included
five 1-0 victories. There are various reasons for City’s defensive
record. The most obvious component is their focus upon possession play – they averaged
64% of the ball last season, 4% more than any other side. The Spanish obsession with
possession is evidently a good defensive tactic. The performance of the national side during
their three international triumphs in 2008, 2010 and 2012 was exceptional – in 10 knockout
games, they kept 10 clean sheets. Guardiola’s coaching philosophy is different;
his sides are less cautious. City are excellent at preventing the opposition from passing
the ball into their third of the pitch. On average, their opponents played fewer than
50 passes per game that ended up in City’s third of the pitch, the lowest figure in the
top flight. How they rank compared to their top-flight
opponents is shown in the bar chart below:
That doesn’t quite tell the whole story, though, because Guardiola’s emphasis upon
possession play means City are, in theory, vulnerable to two types of attack.
First, counter-attacks: because City push so many players into attack, they leave space
behind them for opponents to exploit. Second, set-pieces: because the side is packed with
small, creative players, City can find themselves overpowered when defending dead ball situations.
But Guardiola has focused heavily upon making his side secure in these situations.
His experience in Germany altered his coaching philosophy significantly. During his year-long
sabbatical in New York before taking charge of Bayern, Guardiola spent his time watching
the Bundesliga, scouting future opponents and getting to grips with the nature of the
division. His main takeaway was simple: German sides, compared to Spanish sides, were lightning-quick
on the counter-attack. Almost every side could break from one end to the other within a few
seconds, and therefore Guardiola would have to format his side in a different manner to
Barcelona, where his full-backs would relentlessly scamper forward on the overlap.
In response, Guardiola developed his innovative system of bringing his full-backs inside into
narrow positions, becoming temporary central midfielders when Bayern had possession. It
helped, of course, that Philipp Lahm and David Alaba were technically excellent and had risen
through Bayern’s academy as midfielders. While initial analysis focused upon how their
positioning liberated other players – the midfielders could push higher up the pitch
– its greatest benefit was in terms of defensive transitions. When Bayern lost possession,
Guardiola’s back four were close together in a solid, narrow block, and could re-form
the defensive line quickly. In Manchester, Guardiola has attempted to
replicate that approach. Hampered in his first year by an imbalanced squad, he has now successfully
replicated the strategy - albeit with a subtle change. Benjamin Mendy has often been injured
and his most common deputies, Fabian Delph and Oleksandr Zinchenko, are both natural
central midfielders. On the other side, Kyle Walker lacks the ball-playing skills to play
that role. Therefore, whereas at Bayern the full-backs drifted inside, meaning the side
looked like 2-3-2-3, Walker has been used as a third centre-back rather than a third
central midfielder, and the system is 3-2-2-3: three defenders, and two players shielding
them. (Here’s an example from the 3-1 victory
at Southampton in December. This is the usual way City formed the 3-2 structure last season,
with Zinchenko drifting inside from left-back alongside Fernandinho. That leaves three defenders
– Danilo, who was deputising for Walker, plus Vincent Kompany and Aymeric Laporte.)
Because of that solid base, City didn’t concede a single goal in a counter-attacking
situation last season. If City’s defensive structure in possession
can be described as a way of guarding against opposition attacks, their pressing can be
considered an attempt to proactively stop them. Guardiola has made pressing a central
part of his philosophy since his Barcelona days, and while the identity of various managers
– particularly Jurgen Klopp and Mauricio Pochettino – is more entwined with the tactic,
Guardiola still remains the pre-eminent authority on retrieving the ball in advanced positions.
City won possession in the opposition third on 203 occasions last season, more than any
other Premier League side. Their opener against Fulham in March, scored by Bernardo Silva,
was a good example of their proactive pressing, and how players position themselves intelligently
to intercept passes. When centre-back Maxime Le Marchand passed
right to Timothy Fosu-Mensah, Fulham’s right-sided defender had two obvious passing options – to
the central midfielders, Andre-Frank Anguissa and Tom Cairney.
David Silva immediately pressured Fosu-Mensah, while also cutting off the passing angle into
Anguissa. With that option not available, Fosu-Mensah tried the more ambitious ball,
into Cairney. But De Bruyne had pushed up the pitch, racing to intercept. He found Sergio
Aguero, who played the ball onto Bernardo Silva, racing down the right, who scored.
It’s worth emphasising that the two players who applied pressure and forced the turnover,
Silva and De Bruyne, are City’s two creative midfielders, the type of players traditionally
allowed freedom from defensive tasks. Under Guardiola, however, they are among the hardest-working
players in the side. However, City’s pressing is different from
that of Liverpool. Klopp’s pressing is designed to ensure that the opposition concede possession
inside their own third, therefore creating goalscoring chances. Liverpool want to trick
the opposition into playing risky passes inside their own third.
Although City are happy enough to intercept the ball in advanced positions, they’re
more focused on pressing so intensely that the opposition don’t even try to play their
way out, and instead hoof hopeful passes downfield. For Klopp this isn’t useful, because it
denies Liverpool the chance to counter-press and create a chance. For Guardiola it’s
fine, because it allows City to build possession from deep again.
He expects intensity from his attackers. In the 3-1 victory over Manchester United last
August, Riyad Mahrez failed to make a recovery run after possession was lost and received
a prolonged telling-off from Fernandinho. Almost immediately, Guardiola substituted
the Algerian. An intriguing statistic from last season’s Premier League is that, while
City attempted the fewest tackles in the division, they had the highest tackle success rate.
It characterises a key distinction: City’s defensive patterns aren’t quite as demonstrative,
but their function is
more efficient.