The First Soviet-Finnish War, better known as the Winter War,
cost the Soviets dearly. They had their victory, in the end, but it was not the walk in the park
they bargained for. In one of the coldest winters to ever sink its teeth into Finland,
the Soviets learned a whole lot about war and a whole lot more about Finnish grit,
taking as many as 380,000 casualties over a period of three and a half months. But
why was the Winter War such a slog? Why did the Soviets have such a terrible time? Let's find out.
As with most things war, the answer to our question is multifaceted. It wasn't
just the size of Finland's balls that made things difficult for the Soviets.
Firstly, when you're fighting for your home and loved ones,
there's a good chance you're gonna fight harder than you would for some dictator you've never met.
The effect this has on morale cannot be understated. As per Tomas Ries, a researcher
from the National Defence College in Finland, "Finland reacted with desperate determination. On
the one hand the country was determined to fight. On the other hand Finland also was grimly prepared
for the worst, and began sending her children to safety in Sweden, to cover the possibility
of Stalin's national extermination programmes." Winston Churchill echoed Ries, stating, "The Finns
rallied to a man against the aggressor and fought with absolute determination and the utmost skill."
Fighting on their home ground also gave the Finns a tactical advantage. As we discussed
in our first video on battlefield terrains, Arctic conditions favour the defending force.
Many of Finland's roads were made of gravel and were so narrow that the Soviets had to move in
100-kilometre-long columns flanked by impassable forests, marshes, and lakes. This was a bottleneck
the Finns exploited, staging ambushes out of the wilderness through which they could move with
instinctual ease. The Finns rotated out their men to give them some respite from the cold
and attacked Soviet field kitchens to deny them sustenance and warmth. They set mines in frozen
lakes. When the mines exploded, the Soviets fell through the broken ice into the cold dark depths.
If the Soviets tried to circumvent the lakes, the Finns picked them apart with well-placed
snipers and machine-gun nests. Trudging through the snow and fighting in blizzard conditions,
sickness and frostbite claimed Soviet lives and Soviet limbs, accounting for roughly a third of
their 207,000 sick or wounded casualties. In the words of war correspondent John Langdon-Davies,
"Every acre of Finland's surface was created to be the despair of an attacking military force."
Arctic equipment was something the Soviets were sorely lacking. The Finns had skis and knew
how to use them, executing ski infantry ambushes then french-frying to safety.
They travelled noiselessly over the land, using sleds and reindeer to move their heavier equipment
and supplies. They understood the effects of the cold on their weapons and knew the importance
of using antifreeze. For much of the conflict, the Soviets didn't even have winter camouflage.
This made them easy sniping targets. Even their tanks were painted olive green.
In April 1940, about a month after the Moscow Peace Treaty marked the end of the Winter War,
Stalin and some of his top dogs assessed the Red Army's performance.
The conversation was recorded and translated. In Stalin's words, "When war broke out we discovered
problems in all sectors. That happened because our troops and generals failed to adapt to the
condition of a war in the Finnish terrain." Churchill agreed, stating, "The cold was intense.
The Finns were well equipped with skis and warm clothing, of which the Russians had neither."
Returning to the topic of tanks, the Soviets had as many as 6,500 at their disposal,
whereas the Finns had, like, 30. The defenders also lacked dedicated anti-tank weapons.
They improvised, though, using ski infantry attacks to set satchel charges,
throw Molotov cocktails, and stick things like crowbars and logs in the tanks' wheels,
jamming them up. They also buried granite boulders in place of tank obstacles. For the Soviets, a big
part of the issue was that they didn't support their tanks with infantry, at least in the early
days of the conflict. This made their tanks even easier pickings for the nimble Finns. Despite the
fact that he did commit thousands of tanks to the conflict, Stalin made the following assessment:
"We need ... not hundreds but thousands [of] tanks. If tanks are thick skinned they would make
wonders covered by our artillery and infantry." He also discussed the need for more artillery pieces
and aircraft, as well as more ammunition for literally everything. In Stalin's words,
"Those who want to lead a modern war can not talk about sparing of bombs. This is rubbish ... More
bombs have to be dropped on the enemy in order to deafen him and turn upside down his cities.
The more shells the less of our people will be lost." Overconfidence would have been prevalent
throughout the Red Army's ranks, though much of the blame falls on the officers, who failed—at
least in the early stages of the conflict—to prepare their troops for the realities of a
drawn-out war against the Finns. Stalin chalked it up to the quality of his officers, too,
believing they were too caught up in the traditions of the Russian Civil War,
which was largely fought without tanks, artillery, and aircraft—all
critical components of modern war. To quote Stalin once again, "Worship ... of the traditions ... of
the Civil war hindered our generals and officers to rebuild to the conditions of
the modern war ... He does not understand that one can not lead an attack without artillery barrages.
He sometimes leads regiments with the Hurrah! ... Traditions and experience of the Civil War
are absolutely not sufficient. Those who find them sufficient will die for sure." What Stalin
seemed to have forgotten, though, was that he was responsible for crippling his command.
The Red Army might have had an easier time fighting the Finns if Stalin hadn't rid it of
many of its best commanders during the 1936 to 1938 Great Purge.With that said, it was the Finns,
not the Soviets, who were having ammo troubles, relying largely on captured arms and ammo.
Returning to the subject of overconfidence, or so-called "hurrah," the Red Army's frontline
political commissars were also to blame. Stalin concluded that they weren't politically
"resilient, educated, and cultured" enough, and weren't so well versed with military matters.
He said it wasn't enough that they were simply repeating "the party of Lenin-Stalin"
like "hallelujah-hallelujah." The commissars were essentially just geeing everybody up with
little consideration to the Red Army's current predicament: a real, gritty war against the Finns.
However, the Soviets did learn as the war went on and did achieve victory over the stalwart Finns,
absorbing 11% of Finland's territory. The Red Army that went into Finland was not the same
one that came out. Lessons learned in the Winter War proved critical to the rest of World War II,
which was really just getting started. On the other side of the coin,
the Red Army's performance in the Winter War made it seem weak in the eyes of Hitler,
who—while enjoying some early success Operation Barbarossa—definitely
underestimated how much the Soviets had adapted themselves to modern war since their slog through
Finland. Stalin commented on this directly: "Our people are new people and despite all deficiencies
they very rapidly ... and transformed. Our army exited Finland as a quite modern army."
We've only scratched the surface here, so we're interested to know your thoughts.
Can you think of any other reasons why the Soviets had such a tough time in Finland?
Can you expand on any of the factors we covered in this video?
Lastly, how different do you think things would have been if Stalin hadn't offed his generals
before World War II even started? Please feel free to share your thoughts in the comments below.