On 1 July 2020, Somaliland and Taiwan caught international attention when they announced that
they had signed an agreement to set up representative offices in one another's capitals.
But what does this mean in real terms?
Do Somaliland and Taiwan now recognize each other, as some have suggested.
In this video, I'm going to take a look at the announcement and what lies behind it.
As I'll show, it raises some interesting questions about the exact relationship
that now exists between Taiwan and Somaliland.
But as I'll also explain, the precise nature of their new ties is rather less important
than the tangible benefits they can potentially deliver to each other.
[MUSIC]
Hello. My name is James Ker-Lindsay.
Welcome to 'Independent Thinking'.
A channel dedicated to international relations, independence, statehood and the origins of countries.
The subject of how unrecognized or partially recognized countries - often call de facto states -
interact with each other is not a topic that tends to generate a lot of international interest.
However, just occasionally it will spark wider attention.
The announcement that the Republic of Somaliland and the Republic of China, better known as Taiwan,
two of the most prominent de facto states, had signed a diplomatic agreement that included the establishment
of representative offices in one another's capitals was just one such occasion.
It received considerable international coverage.
But for all the attention it was given,
what was perhaps less clear was what the agreement actually meant in real terms.
By way of a brief background,
the Republic of Somaliland emerged from what was formally British Somaliland.
This became an independent state on the 26 June 1960
and was promptly recognized by over 30 countries.
However, a mere five days later, on 1 July 1960, it united with Italian Somaliland to create the Somali Republic.
While the relationship soon broke down, for the next 30 years Somaliland remained within the union.
However, in 1991 as Somalia descended into civil war, Somaliland reclaimed its independence.
Since then, it has not been recognized by any UN members,
despite a 2005 African Union report recommending that it be accepted as a sovereign and independent state.
Nevertheless, Somaliland maintains strong relations with a number of countries,
including the United Kingdom,
and has established a series of liaison offices in over a dozen capitals.
For it's part, the Republic of China governed mainland China until it was overthrown by Communist forces
at the end of the 1940s - at which point, it relocated to the island of Taiwan.
In the years that followed, countries began to switch their support to the People's Republic of China
and in 1971 Taiwan lost its place as the Chinese representative at the United Nations.
Today, just 14 of the UN's 193 members continue to recognize Taiwan
as the legitimate government of China.
However, many countries - including the United States, Britain, Japan and many EU members -
still maintain extensive economic and political links with Taiwan
and have diplomatic offices in Taipei, the capital of Taiwan.
Notwithstanding their very different histories, and their rather different status in international politics,
Somaliland and Taiwan are nevertheless now widely regarded as two of the most prominent de facto states.
This largely explains the interest in the story of what seems to be their new relationship.
But it is important to note that, despite this latest announcement, Taiwan and Somaliland
have in fact had relations of one sort or another for over a decade now,
covering areas such as maritime security, education and healthcare.
To this extent, the announcement is certainly not something that came entirely out of the blue.
Instead, what made it so newsworthy was the way in which it appeared to substantially upgrade
the relationship between the two.
The announcement itself came in a series of tweets from the two ministries of foreign affairs.
Meanwhile, the Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs also posted a press release
giving more details about the agreement.
Interestingly the agreement was in fact signed on the 26 February 2020,
when the Foreign Minister of Somaliland visited Taipei.
Whatever the reason for the four-month delay before the announcements of the agreement,
the symbolism of making the formal statement on 1 July
wasn't lost on anyone with more than a passing familiarity of Somaliland.
It marked the 60th anniversary of when Somaliland had originally relinquished its independent
sovereign statehood and joined the Somali Republic.
Leaving aside the symbolism, what was actually agreed?
Here things become particularly interesting.
Unfortunately, a copy of the agreement isn't available.
Instead, we have to go with what the two sides have formally announced.
The first thing to note is that it isn't really clear if the agreement amounts to recognition.
For example, it's very telling that the term "recognition" is not used in any of the statements.
On top of this, it's noticeable that the word "country" is used, rather than "state".
While "country" is usually used interchangeably with "state" in common speech,
this isn't the case in formal legal settings.
That said, recognition appears to be heavily implied.
For example, one of the tweets from the Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that:
"a Taiwan representative office will be set up in this independent country on the Horn of Africa."
Likewise, the press statement put out by the Taiwanese MFA specifically refers to the Republic of Somaliland.
On the face of it, the announcement therefore seems to be carefully crafted to be ambiguous.
While recognition is certainly suggested, the fact that it isn't directly stated is interesting and worth noting.
Related to this, the decision to establish representative offices also raises questions.
If they had recognized each other, then one might expect them to have established embassies.
After all, this is what currently happens in countries that recognize Taiwan.
But, again, this isn't necessarily the case.
They may have simply decided to develop their relationship in a more incremental manner.
Rather than rush to set up embassies, they've decided to start with a less structured relationship.
This would make sense in many ways given the obvious political sensitivities of the situation.
By taking a slower approach, they may be deliberately avoiding steps that could antagonize mainland China.
Related to this, another option is that, while they may have decided to recognise each other,
they haven't in fact established formal diplomatic relations at this stage.
Again, this is perfectly possible.
While we often think of recognition and diplomatic relations as running hand in hand,
historically they haven't.
They are in fact separate processes.
Even now, countries may choose to recognize each other, but not go so far as to establish
diplomatic relations in cases where there may be certain political sensitivities that make recognition important
but where a country might not want to take the relations any further for the meanwhile.
For example, there are a number of countries that recognize Israel,
but don't have diplomatic relations with it.
This would seem unlikely, though.
Recognition but no diplomatic relations is usually a sign of bad relations, not good ones.
Then again, the decision to establish representative offices may also be further evidence
that the two countries have not gone as far as to recognize each other.
Under established diplomatic practice, the creation of an embassy is seen as proof of diplomatic relations,
and diplomatic relations necessarily presupposes recognition.
In contrast, it's perfectly possible for countries that don't recognize each other
to have liaison or representative offices in one another's capitals.
For example, several countries that don't recognize Kosovo have a representative office in Pristina,
including Russia and Romania.
More to the point, the establishment of representative offices fits in with Taiwan's established practice
in countries that don't recognize it.
Likewise, Somaliland also has representative offices elsewhere.
For all these reasons, the exact nature of the relationship that exists between Taiwan and Somaliland
is perhaps not as clear as it might first appear.
While it seems to have elements of recognition,
on balance it seems that the two countries have in fact stopped just short of this.
Of course, none of this will be accidental.
There's no doubt that both sides will have thought long and hard about what they wanted,
and shaped a relationship that best suits their mutual needs.
In doing so, one thing would have been clear to them both:
recognition in this case is not actually that important.
To be sure, Taiwan has clearly been stung by the gradual decline in international recognition as more and more
UN members have finally shifted their recognition from Taipei to Beijing.
However, few if any in Taipei will see this agreement as compensation for this.
The same applies to Somaliland.
Taiwan is not a member of the United Nations.
And, again, if stopping just short of recognition means that Somaliland avoids antagonizing
the People's Republic of China, which it will eventually need to join the United Nations,
then that will also have been a consideration in Hargeisa.
Both Taiwan and Somaliland would certainly welcome greater international recognition.
But, frankly speaking, neither is really in a position to deliver the recognition that the other really wants.
Nor they in a position to shape wider international views of the other.
It's not worth creating unnecessary tensions over recognition.
So, if the agreement doesn't amount to recognition, why is it so significant?
Without a doubt, the main benefits the agreement offers are economic.
For Somaliland, the benefits of cooperating with Taiwan are potentially enormous.
While, it may not be widely recognized, Taiwan remains a major economic actor on the world stage.
According to the release from the Taiwanese Foreign Ministry, this agreement we focused on a range of areas,
including fisheries, agriculture, energy, mining, public health, education and information technology.
This is a major step towards further developing the Somaliland economy.
But it's certainly not one-sided.
This agreement will also work well for Taiwan.
Somaliland holds a strategic location on the Red Sea.
It also has mineral resources, including oil and natural gas, as well as agriculture and fisheries.
The announcement by Somaliland and Taiwan that they've agreed to set up representative offices
in one another's capitals is a fascinating and rather unexpected development.
But, as I've shown, it's not quite as novel or as groundbreaking as it may seem.
For a start, the two countries actually have relations stretching back over a decade.
Moreover, while it might at first appear to be mutual recognition,
on closer inspection there are good reasons to suggest that it isn't in fact recognition.
In truth, though, it doesn't seem vastly different from the relationship that Taiwan has already developed
with other countries.
And all things considered, this would actually be for the best for both Taiwan and Somaliland.
While the idea of recognition is alluring,
especially for those living in territories that are unrecognized or partially recognized,
it's not quite as important as many believe.
Ultimately, in situations like this,
the exact nature of the relationship is more significant than the formal terms used to describe it.
What really matters is the spirit of cooperation that underpins the relationship
and the tangible steps they will take to cooperate in the future.
It's Taiwan's investment in Somaliland, and Somaliland's ability to give Taiwan an economic foothold in Africa,
that makes this agreement really interesting and potentially beneficial for both of them.
At this stage, this is far more important than formal mutual recognition.
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