The Compromise of 1877 was a purported informal, unwritten deal that settled
the intensely disputed 1876 U.S. presidential election, pulled federal
troops out of state politics in the South, and ended the Reconstruction Era.
Through the Compromise, Republican Rutherford B. Hayes was awarded the
White House over Democrat Samuel J. Tilden on the understanding that Hayes
would remove the federal troops whose support was essential for the survival
of Republican state governments in South Carolina, Florida and Louisiana. The
compromise involved Democrats who controlled the House of Representatives
allowing the decision of the Electoral Commission to take effect. The outgoing
president, Republican Ulysses S. Grant, removed the soldiers from Florida. As
president, Hayes removed the remaining troops in South Carolina and Louisiana.
As soon as the troops left, many white Republicans also left and the "Redeemer"
Democrats took control. What exactly happened is somewhat contested as the
documentation is scanty. Black Republicans felt betrayed as they lost
power and were disenfranchised in the coming decades.
Terms of compromise Democrats complained loudly that Tilden
had been cheated. There was talk of forming armed units that would march on
Washington. President Grant beefed up military security in response, and no
one marched on Washington. The compromise essentially stated that
Southern Democrats would acknowledge Hayes as president, but only on the
understanding that Republicans would meet certain demands. The following
elements are generally said to be the points of the compromise:
The removal of all U.S. military forces from the former Confederate states. U.S.
troops remained in only Louisiana, South Carolina, and Florida, but the
Compromise finalized the process. The appointment of at least one Southern
Democrat to Hayes's cabinet. The construction of another
transcontinental railroad using the Texas and Pacific in the South.
Legislation to help industrialize the South and get them back on their feet
after the loss during the Civil War. In exchange, Democrats would peacefully
accept Hayes's presidency. Results
Hayes was peacefully inaugurated; points 1 and 2 did take effect. As regards the
first and most important point, Hayes had already announced his support for
the restoration of "home rule", which would involve troop removal, before the
election. It was also not unusual, nor unexpected, for a president, especially
one so narrowly elected, to select a cabinet member favored by the other
party. As for #3 and #4, if indeed there was any such firm agreement, they were
never acted on. In any case, whether by an informal deal
or simply reassurances already in line with Hayes's announced plans, talks with
Southern Democrats satisfied the worries of many and so prevented a Congressional
filibuster that had threatened to extend resolution of the election dispute
beyond Inauguration Day 1877. Woodward argues for an economic
interpretation, whereby railroad interest meeting secretly at the Wormley
Hotel in Washington forged a compromise with aid to Southern railroads as the
sweetener. However, no serious effort was made to fund a railroad or provide
other federal aid. An opposing interest group representing the Southern Pacific
successfully thwarted Scott's Texas and Pacific scheme and ultimately ran its
own line to New Orleans. Interpretations
Some historians argue that the assurances offered to some Southern
Democrats to prevent a filibuster were not a "compromise" but a foregone
conclusion. Peskin admits that Woodward's interpretation is almost
universally accepted but since not all terms were met it should not be called a
compromise. Other historians argue that the Republican Party abandoned Southern
blacks to the rule of the racist Democratic Party in order to gain the
support of Democrats. In any case, Reconstruction ended, and the supremacy
of the Democratic Party in the South was cemented with the ascent of the
"Redeemer" governments that displaced the Republican governments. After 1877,
support for white supremacy generally caused the South to vote for Democrats
in elections for U.S. federal office until 1966, becoming known as the "Solid
South". In The Mexicanization of American
Politics: The United States' Transnational Path from Civil War to
Stabilization, Downs rejects the idea that it was an era of easy
reconciliation and political stability. Instead he shows many Americans feared
"Mexicanization" of politics, whereby force would be used to settle a
presidential election, as force was used to settle state elections in the South.
Downs explores how Mexicanization was roundly rejected and stability was
achieved. Whatever "deals" may or may not have
taken place, in formal legal terms, the election of 1876 was not decided by such
acts, but by the official vote of Congress to accept the recommendations
of the Electoral Commission they themselves had set up as a way out of
the election impasse. The expectation in setting up the committee had been that
its decisions would be accepted by Congress. It was only when certain
Democrats disagreed with the commission's decisions in favor of Hayes
that this arrangement was jeopardized. This group threatened a filibuster that
would prevent the agreed upon vote from even taking place. Discussions of the
points in the alleged "compromise" only concerned convincing key Democrats not
to acquiesce in a filibuster. The very threat of a filibuster—a measure used by
a minority to prevent a vote—indicates that there were already sufficient votes
for accepting the commission's recommendations.
References Further reading
Clendenen, Clarence C.. "President Hayes' "Withdrawal" of the Troops: An
Enduring Myth". The South Carolina Historical Magazine 70: 240–250.
DeSantis, Vincent P. "Rutherford B. Hayes and the Removal of the Troops and
the End of Reconstruction" in Region, Race and Reconstruction edited by Morgan
Kousser and James McPherson. pp. 417-50. Downs, Gregory P. "The Mexicanization of
American Politics: The United States' Transnational Path from Civil War to
Stabilization," American Historical Review Vol. 117, No. 2, pp 387-409 in
JSTOR Frantz, Edward O. The Door of Hope:
Republican Presidents and the First Southern Strategy, 1877–1933
Peskin, Allan. "Was There a Compromise of 1877?," Journal of American History
60#1 pp. 63-75 in JSTOR Polakoff, Keith Ian. The Politics of
Inertia: The Election of 1876 and the End of Reconstruction
Riddleberger Patrick W. "The Radicals' Abandonment of the Negro During
Reconstruction," Journal of Negro History 45#2 pp. 88-102 in JSTOR
Simpson, Brooks D. "Ulysses S. Grant and the Electoral Crisis of 1876-1877,"
Hayes Historical Journal 11#2 pp 5-22. Woodward, C. Vann. Reunion and Reaction:
The Compromise of 1877 and the End of Reconstruction. Oxford University Press.
External links Samueltilden.com: History of Samuel J.
Tilden website Rbhayes.org: R. B. Hayes Presidential
Library Southernspaces.org: "Corporations,
Corruption, and the Modern Lobby: A Gilded Age Story of the West and the
South in Washington, D.C." — by Richard White in Southern Spaces.