In the public mind, the First World War is often seen as narrow-minded or stubborn officers
sending wave after wave of men to die going over the top from the trenches.
In reality, the war saw the nations fighting it undergo the most profound and radical military
revolution I their histories.
We’ve looked at several of these so far, and today I’m to look at France.
I’m Indy Neidell; welcome to a Great War special episode about the evolution of French
infantry doctrine during the First World War.
To look at that, though, you really have to go back to France’s defeat in the Franco-Prussian
War in 1871.
French leadership saw the defeat as an intellectual one.
The Prussian High Command had given its officers a greater sense of purpose and tactical flexibility,
and that army overwhelmed a French one that was not only underprepared, but had no clarity
of objectives or united leadership.
The Third French Republic completely overhauled the military, and after 9 years of reforms
the French War Academy was founded.
Garrison libraries were instituted in 1871 to promote intellectualism and initiative;
there would be 200 by 1914.
Soon, each branch of service had a monthly magazine.
Officers of all ranks were expected to hold conferences and write essays.
The mobilization that had been chaotic became thoroughly planned and the railway networks
that had been poorly exploited were expanded and fully integrated.
But the French leadership overemphasized what it saw as its flaws or the enemy’s virtues.
The defensive stance, the passivity, and the belief in superior equipment of 1870 became anathema.
Even the adoption of the Lebel smokeless rifle in 1886 that guaranteed accurate and lethal
fire on an individual level did not shake off the anti-materialism of the new generation
of graduated officers.
The concept of leadership capable of leading the troops to victory by superior morale became
widespread, and the solution to the lethality of the modern battlefield was simply French
élan.
Now, the German military did not share this anti-materialism, having drawn the correct
lessons from 1870-71.
The British and the Russians had, by 1914, benefitted from the lessons of the Boer Wars
the Russo-Japanese War.
France of course took away lessons as well, particular those of artillery and concealment,
but the lack of practical experience and centralized leadership delayed implementation.
By 1914, Germany had a huge advantage over France in artillery and machine guns, and
also in manpower, having outgrown France enormously over the past three decades.
To French Commander Joseph Joffre, training always toward offense was the answer, which
is sort of the opposite of the trench war that was coming.
“It is not in the excess of cautiousness that we must search safety; but rather in
the disposition of our troops in a way that always guarantee our combat readiness.
The real defense of a marching column lies in its ability to launch an immediate counter
attack...”
While this understanding of modern war is erroneous, it does contradict the idea that
France entered the war without a doctrine that was- in its context- coherent.
The first hostilities of 1914 quickly revealed the flaws of the system.
On August 14th for example, near Plaine, repeated bayonet frontal assaults were shattered by
German machine guns and artillery, while the same day, two batteries of 75mm field guns
disregarded the rules and made a joint action with the infantry- a fixation barrage with
outflanking movements- that forced a German withdrawal.
For the rest of 1914, the French Army was forced to hugely adapt and evolve.
Over 40% of the commanders of large units were removed for incompetence or insufficiency
during this time, and already in August, GHQ issued notes based on battle reports:
Conquered territory must be manned and defended with artillery to prevent counter attacks
The enemy must first be engaged with skirmishers and artillery before the main assault
The infantry must wait for artillery support, do not let the troops needlessly expose themselves
There were more, and in early September new instructions were issued about building trenches.
However, even though French leadership had now realized that firepower kills, assimilating
this was a work-in-progress and it was tough to overcome the damage done by prewar military
education.
General Fayolle wrote in January 1915, “I’m having a lot of difficulties trying to organize
the construction of trenches by the troops... my men are more interested in dying than working.”
He wrote in December that year, “The truth is that nobody was prepared for this war of
positions... we all had the greatest disdain for fortifications and entrenching works.
Our whole education has to be reworked...
War cannot be improvised.”
The Northeastern part of the country was occupied, and France had lost 60% of its coal and iron
mines, so 1915 was a year of frantic reforms aimed at replenishing worn out artillery,
depleted ammunitions stores, and the nation’s crippled heavy industry.
Still, Joffre launched two major offensives to draw German divisions away from Russia
and to experiment with new ways of using artillery.
They really also tried to teach the lessons of 1914- wounded veterans replaced military
instructors and dedicated instruction centers were created.
The offensives were really the swan song- with a few exceptions- of the old style of
leadership since the expected breakthroughs never came.
Fayolle again, “Our magnificent infantry was broken by barbed wires and entrenched
artillery.
Our soldiers demand new combat methods and more combat weaponry.”
But new armament programs, organizational reforms, and troop instruction took time,
and it was only in late 1915 and 1916 that the French army was again really innovating.
That period saw all sorts of material upgrades, from the Adrian Helmet to the Chauchat light
machine gun, grenade launchers, and even the wheeled field kitchen.
The French leadership devised new doctrines for methodical battle, with cooperation between
infantry and artillery, and the primacy of material over men.
The shackles of 1871 had finally been broken, and the dramatic increase of firepower at
the divisional level and enthusiasm for experimentation would be instrumental in turning the tide
at the Battle of Verdun.
Local superiority in material, a rolling artillery barrage, and a thoroughly trained and equipped
infantry would propel Robert Nivelle from success at Verdun all the way to Chief of
Staff, replacing Joffre in December 1916.
He began the modernization process that would ultimately lead to the creation of the modern
French army, but though the men were trained to fight within a system, and the branches
coordinated actions, his strategy was flawed, as the speed of the infantry was subordinated
to the artillery, which could only keep up as preparations allowed.
So when Nivelle attacked on a large front with unlimited objectives, especially against
the new German defenses the Hindenburg Line, it was a catastrophe, made worse by Nivelle’s
refusal to call it off for weeks.
So Nivelle was out and Philippe Petain was in.
Finally a true convinced modernist who had been in favor of modern methods since well
before the war.
He implemented a second rearmament program to give the army Renault FT tanks, infantry
trucks, more planes, but more importantly, the logistical means to properly exploit a
breakthrough of the German elastic defenses once the critical mass of material required
had been secured.
Two conditions were necessary to bring about a war of movement in the Allies favor; guaranteed
local superiority in both firepower and manpower and the motorization of the infantry and artillery
to keep the initiative during exploitation before German reinforcements could arrive
by rail.
This methodology worked well in limited offensives like the Second Battle of Verdun and the Battle
of Malmaison, and really, for the first time in the war, the French Army was truly playing
in the same league as its adversary.
They now understood both German defense in depth and infiltration tactics.
However, the disaster that hit the Italians at Caporetto and Russia leaving the war forced
the Entente to concede initiative to the Central Powers, and as 1918 began they prepared for
the inevitable onslaught.
If they could withstand the storm long enough for the French armament program and the arriving
American troops to give them their two conditions, they could win a war of movement through logistical
superiority.
Germany relied increasingly on shock troops.
Petain and Ferdinand Foch thought this indicated a lack of confidence in the regular infantry,
whether or not true.
French High Command debated something similar, but decided instead to further the integration
of different branches into a coherent, interarm fighting force and the French Modern Infantry
was born.
Still, the first half of 1918 would see the army reel under German attacks; I mean, it’s
difficult to unlearn three years of offensive trench warfare, but you could see- the 4th
army of General Gouraud, that diligently applied Petain’s directives, held its ground, and
by the summer, the troops embraced battle proven concepts.
Let’s see...
Mangin’s counter attack at Matz June 11th, for example, supported by masses of tanks
and planes, just lay waste to the German advance.
Massive motorization and extensive and well-maintained roads allowed France strategic deployment
that Germany just could not keep up with.
In fact, German Quartermaster General Erich Ludendorff claimed, “The Entente victory
of 1918 is the triumph of French trucks over the German railway”.
By August 1918, after four years of bloody war, the French Army was the most modern fighting
force in the world, with a highly motorized infantry, supported by 2,300 tanks, 3,800
planes, and over 10,000 artillery pieces.
1914 had been completely reversed and the victories of 1918 were performed by Allied
troops sharing a cohesive training and a logistical organization.