Manchester United took a two goal deficit to Paris for the second leg of their Champions
League Round of 16 tie. United were exposed at home by Thomas Tuchel’s team, Ole Gunnar
Solskjaer suffering his first defeat at United boss, and the BBC’s Phil McNulty was not
overstating the case when he said that “it would be optimism gone mad to suggest the
second leg in Paris will be anything other than a completion of the formalities.”
Optimism may have been in short supply but Solskjaer and United, without key players
due to suspension and injury, nonetheless pulled off probably the most unlikely win
of the entire Champions League campaign.
As these stats from OneFootball demonstrate, United were dominated by PSG in almost every
regard except the one that matters most – goals scored. United’s shooting accuracy was excellent,
but the numbers clearly show how much pressure Solskajer’s team were under.
So how did Solskjaer engineer such a turnaround, fielding a side without Paul Pogba, with Eric
Bailly at right back, and a midfield of Ashley Young, Scott McTominay, Fred, and Andreas
Pereira.
The average positions of the players show that Solskjaer effectively doubled up on the
right, using Ashley Young, who has played regularly at full-back, to shield Eric Bailly,
a centre back playing on the right hand side of defence. Andrea Pereira pushed up and in
from left midfield, so that United’s 4-4-2 looked more like a very lopsided 4-3-1-2.
Indeed, at times, it resembled a 3-4-1-2 with Luke Shaw pushing up and Bailly covering slightly
infield from a normal right back station, which meant that United could, if they wished,
cover PSG’s 3-4-2-1 almost man for man.
United tended to sit off, especially when the ball was being passed around the back,
withdrawing to a 4-4-2 but with a deep line. While PSG exerted fairly consistent pressure
on the ball throughout, United sat off, only starting to press with any real vigour as
the end of the each half approached, a direct contrast to the first leg.
Pereira was the most aggressive presser out wide, quite possibly because of his energy,
but otherwise United tended to be quite passive in the mid and low block. The aim appeared
to be to deny progressive passing opportunities rather than actively tackle the man – United
sought to block penetrating movement forwards, content to let PSG have the ball, as long
as the option was not there to pass directly into dangerous areas.
The one obvious situational difference, aside from when there was a genuine chance to win
back the ball as in the instance of United’s opening goal, was in the central areas. McTominay
and Fred particularly *did* try to win back the ball, especially from Verratti and Marquinhos,
when PSG looked to build through the middle.
This is probably because it also fed into United’s main attacking option when winning
back possession, which was to break quickly, mostly through the centre, and look to release
Rashford and Lukaku into the channels between PSG’s three centre backs. Because they were
not required to pressing insistently, and because PSG were invited onto United, creating
space, the two strikers could find room into which to run and attempt to isolate a PSG
defender. Turnovers from pressing in central areas would facilitate this, which is probably
why United effectively pressed PSG’s central midfielders, while allowing the ball to be
moved around wide or at the back.
United’s other option was not dissimilar, and that was to go long to Lukaku or Rashford,
with support coming from the wide players, especially Pereira. Again, this direct approach
was designed to catch PSG out having pushed too high while in possession, or to get Rashford
or Lukaku running either into the channels or directly at a PSG defender. With a combination
of intelligent off-the-ball running and pace, both United strikers posed a considerable
threat in these situations.
Lastly, with around half an hour to go, and with Diego Dalot on, Solskjaer withdrew his
side to make more of a 5-4-1 shape. The intensity of the pressing upped in the final ten minutes,
as United sought to increase the pressure on a frustrated PSG side and perhaps force
an error, but the change of shape was Solskjaer responding to PSG’s increased pressure,
even with the score at 2-1. Rashford’s expertly taken penalty was just deserts for a team
that had played with huge discipline and organisation, and taken their chances well.
With the upcoming tie against Barcelona having the same home and away order, will Solskjaer
be tempted by the same approach? While United did try to play more assertively at home,
and pressed relentlessly to start with as well, the Norwegian may infer from his team’s
away performance that a tight first leg, followed by an away leg in which United accept they
won’t have the ball, but look to rely on astute counter-attacks and attacking Barcelona’s
centre, could yield an unexpected, positive result.
Will it be enough? Well, Barcelona are very good, obviously, and in Lionel Messi have
the world’s outstanding footballer. They are especially strong on the right where United
tucked Pereira from his wide left berth in against PSG to support Rashford and Lukaku
where possible; this asymmetry could be flipped against the Messi, Rakitic, Sergi Roberto
axis that operates down Barcelona’s right.
If Busquets drops in to play between the centre backs, as he often does, and Barcelona look
to support attacks through the middle with their other midfielders pushing high up, United
could find themselves facing a shape not dissimilar at times to the one PSG played.
A United win would be a surprise, but Solskjaer has shown that he can set his team up to play
a certain way away from home and get a result. Barcelona will present a different set of
questions to PSG, but Manchester United may find the answer is the same.