After conducting highly successful counter-offensive operations in Kherson
and Kharkiv oblasts, the Ukrainian advance has stalled since late 2022.
For weeks we have been hearing about an imminent major Russian offensive in Ukraine,
possibly on several axes, at a time when Russia is already advancing around Bakhmut in Donbas.
In December 2022, the Ukrainian Commander in Chief General Valery Zaluzhny claimed that a Russian
offensive would start between January and March, noting Donbas, South Ukraine and Kyiv as possible
fighting areas. In early February, the Ukrainian defence minister Oleksiy Reznikov speculated that
the Russian offensive might start before February 24 - the anniversary of the Russian invasion.
On February 6, an unnamed advisor of the Ukrainian Army told Financial Times that the Russian army
would launch its offensive within the next ten days. Signals from the Russian leadership
and expectations of Russian military bloggers also point to an imminent offensive operation
by Russia. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has stated that Russia has more than 200k soldiers
in Ukraine and is actively stockpiling weapons. The Ukrainian military expert Roman Svitan has
claimed that the additional 100k Russians will be sent to Ukraine within February, increasing their
number to 400k men, half of whom are in Donbas. It is clear that Russia is planning something
significant to claim a victory in Ukraine. But what would that something significant look like?
The Russian military blogger Ian Matveev has shared his view on where
and how Russians may intend to attack, and we are going to discuss that in this video.
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First, Matveev rejected a claim that Russia may make another attempt on Kyiv.
He argues that the Russian army would need 1-2 million soldiers to be deployed in Belarus and
Ukraine to conduct such an operation. At this point, Russia reportedly has 5-10k men and very
few tanks and artillery in Belarus, which would be a logical staging point for an attack on Kyiv.
So, we can assume that Kyiv is not a target at this point.
He also downplayed a possibility of an attack on Kharkiv, as it would require at least one new tank
and one new motor rifle division to have a chance. Politically speaking, it may be a tempting target,
so, at some point, Putin may give it a chance, but it looks unlikely. American military analyst
Michael Kofman agrees with this conclusion, as he does not believe that Russia will attempt to open
another front by attacking Kyiv, Kharkiv or Sumy. Ian Matveev believes that the focus of Russian
attacks will be mainly on Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, but there will also be
several supportive actions on other axes. He expects Bakhmut to continue being the central
axis of the Russian attack, with Sloviansk and Kramatorsk being the end goal of this attack.
But an attack on a single axis would not be sufficient to achieve a breakthrough,
as it would enable the Ukrainian defenders to focus on that particular section and negate
any manpower and firepower advantage that the Russians have in this area. Therefore, Russia
will likely conduct offensives on secondary axes too. As of February 10, this is already happening
in the Kreminna section. According to Matveev, the ongoing attacks on Vuhledar and in Mariinka, along
with a potential offensive on Orikhiv sections, may be feints to distract the Ukrainians.
Having said that, Matveev rightly argues that even though these attacks may be secondary initially,
the Russian command may focus on them more if they prove to be successful and promising.
But as the Wagner mercenaries and the Russian army are already progressing around Bakhmut, the
Russian command will probably focus there. The end goal of this offensive is the capture of Sloviansk
and Kramatorsk. Let’s look at a deeper dive of Matveev on the Russian tactics on this axis.
The expert expects the Russian army to continue using its most successful offensive tactic
to date - attacking along a wide front with assault groups to achieve small breakthroughs,
switching from storming Ukrainian positions to flank attacks on key settlements. If successful,
Russia seeks to straighten out the frontline and prepare for an attack on the next line of defence.
The critical feature here is that the depth of attack is usually not more than 10 kilometers.
First, because almost every small town and village on this front is a stronghold,
achieving decisive breakthroughs is very costly and takes a lot of time.
Second, Russia wants to stay within the range of its short-range howitzers and MLRS,
allowing the ground units and artillery units to communicate regularly and act in coordination.
This is an important factor since Russia has suffered from a lack of communication between
different branches of its army since the start of the war. Being close to the frontlines makes
it easier for Russian artillerists to use their drones to spot Ukrainian positions.
At this point, the Russian army is fighting to advance on Chasiv Yar and secure it,
which would allow them to cut the last remaining supply line to Bakhmut. Presumably, the Ukrainian
army would then either be in an operational encirclement and decide to leave Bakhmut to
their next line of defense, while Russia would advance on Konstantinovka to straighten their
lines enabling their artillery to move forward to threaten their next target. According to Matveev,
this will be Siversk. Presumably, they will attempt to move on Siversk from the south from
Soledar, from the east from Lysychansk and the northeast from Bilohorivka. Matveev says that
if Bakhmut falls, the Ukrainian units defending Siversk would be in danger of envelopment, forcing
them to withdraw from the town. We must remind here that Matveev is describing the best-case
scenario for Russia. At the time of writing this script on February 13, the only notable advance
towards Siversk was achieved from the Soledar section, while the Ukrainian defenses mostly stood
their ground in the other two sections. Ukrainians would be threatened by operational encirclement of
Siversk only in the case of the Russian advance on ALL three supply lines leading to Siversk.
Assuming that Russia has secured all its targets until this point, Russia may take the M03 highway
to directly advance on Sloviansk, the presumed end target of the Russian Donbas offensive.
But that would mean advancing on a narrow axis for more than 40 kilometers,
which would require a monumental breakdown of the Ukrainian defenses in Donbas.
Moreover, they would have to secure their flanks to prevent the danger of being cut from their
supply lines. This would also necessitate a simultaneous movement on Kramatorsk, presumably
from Konstantinovka on the H20 highway. This would mean a Russian advance of more than 30 kilometers.
Again, this looks highly unlikely given the pace of the Russian advances in this war.
Just a reminder that the battle of Bakhmut started in August 2022, and Russia has not captured this
city as of February 13. An important factor, which may hinder the Russian advance on this axis is the
elevation between Sloviansk and Krasna Hora. This is a natural advantage for the defending side,
since it gives a better vision of the Russian movement to the Ukrainians. A similar elevation
has so far allowed Ukrainians to defeat waves of attacks on Vuhledar. In any case, Matveev
believes that the Russian army is incapable of going any further than Sloviansk and Kramatorsk,
and they would have to siege these cities for months, if they even reached them.
Then Matveev rightly notes that the success of the Russian advance on Sloviansk and Kramatorsk
will also depend on the Russian offensive on the North Luhansk front from Kreminna on Lyman through
Zarichne and Yampil. This would secure the right flank of the Donetsk group and support them from
the Northern bank of the Siversky Donets river. Michael Kofman identifies another
possible axis of advance for Russia on this front towards Kupyansk, allowing Russians to create a
bridgehead on the Western bank of Oskil. Ian Matveev argues that Russia may also
launch secondary attacks on the Zaporizhia front. One of the options is advancing from
Mariinka on Kurakhove, which would cut one of the supply lines to Vuhledar. Coupled with ongoing
attacks on Vuhledar, Russians may force the Ukrainian defenders to withdraw from Vuhledar,
if Russia also succeeds in taking Velyka Novosilka and cutting the T0509 highway leading to Vuhledar.
Matveev speculates that Russia may launch a feint attack from Orikhiv along the Kakhovka reservoir,
but adds that achieving success on this axis would be challenging. According to Matveev,
the final auxiliary attack of the Russian army may be in the Avdiivka section. The Russian
army has been launching frontal assaults on this town for months without success. The
ultimate target of this attack may be Pokrovsk, another critical highway juncture in Donbas.
Matveev argues that the overall target of the expected or the ongoing Russian
offensive may be to reach the Velyka Novosilka - Pokrovsk - Kramatorsk - Sloviansk line and then
possibly advance on Izium if everything goes swimmingly. Almost nothing has gone according
to Russian plans in this war, so achieving this significant progress looks unlikely at this point.
But the Russian army has some momentum now and may be able to sell the aforementioned potential
advance as a victory to the local public. Matveev notes that Ukrainians will attack Russian supply
lines and weapon depots, which would help remove its most crucial component - artillery support. He
indicates that Russia may bring its reserves and military assets closer to the front to mitigate
its well-documented logistical ineptitude. This would make them more vulnerable to Ukrainian
strikes. The second tactic that the Ukrainian army may use is to prolong battles. This is what they
are already doing in Bakhmut. They are losing men and equipment but winning time for Ukraine,
which still needs several months to get pledged tanks and other weapons from the West.
Matveev rightly indicates that a quick withdrawal will not help the Ukrainian army preserve its
forces, since they would leave well-prepared strongholds for weaker defensive positions and
would be chased by the advancing Russians. Kofman also argues that the Ukrainian army would be wise
to absorb the Russian attack and exhaust its offensive potential to be in a better position
once they are ready to launch its own offensive. According to Matveev, Ukraine may also launch
surprise counter-attacks during the Russian offensive to threaten poorly defended flanks
of the Russian army. For instance, Ukraine may choose to attack the right flank of the Russian
army towards Svatove and Starobilsk forcing the Russians to extend their lines. The author argues
that even a small success of the Ukrainian army in such a counter-attack may force the Russian
advance to stop: the Russian leadership wants to avoid any land losses for political reasons after
debacles in Kherson and Kharkiv oblast and may overcommit units to prevent this from happening.
Matveev concludes his thread by saying that 2023 will be decisive in this war. We will see
Russian offensives, Ukrainian counter-attacks, and possibly a Russian switch to a wartime economy.
Notably, battles are ongoing on almost all axes mentioned by Ian Matveev. So,
one can argue that the long-telegraphed Russian offensive has already started.
The battles in and around Bakhmut, Mariinka, and Avdiivka started months ago.
At the same time, Russians have recently launched an offensive from the Kreminna section, along with
activating in Zaporizhia oblast towards Vuhledar and Orikhiv. According to Kofman, “the offensive
has in practice begun weeks ago, remains focused on the Donbas, and is likely to be underwhelming
relative to some of the pronouncements out there.” The Ukrainian National Security and Defense
Council secretary Oleksiy Danilov agrees that Russia has already launched its planned offensive
but is falling short of their expectations. Russians have been attempting unsuccessful
frontal assaults on Vuhledar, which have bled out its elite naval infantry. They have been fiercely
attacking in the Kreminna section for days too, but have failed to achieve a notable breakthrough.
But their main focus has been Bakhmut, which Matveev and Kofman rightly emphasized as the
primary axis of advance of the Russian army. So far, Russians are gaining ground around Bakhmut,
and very soon, we will see if the Russian army is capable of further progress there.
We will discuss the unprovoked and illegal Russian invasion of Ukraine in the upcoming videos,
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