The Necessary and Proper Clause, also known as the Elastic Clause, the Basket
Clause, the Coefficient Clause, and the Sweeping Clause, is a provision in
Article One of the United States Constitution, located at section 8,
clause 18. Text
The Necessary and Proper Clause is as follows:
The Congress shall have Power ... To make all Laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or
in any Department or Officer thereof. History leading up to ratification
According to the Articles of Confederation, "Each state retains its
sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and
right, which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated".
Thus, the Continental Congress had no powers incidental to those which were
"expressly delegated" by the Articles of Confederation. By contrast, the
Necessary and Proper Clause expressly confers incidental powers upon Congress,
while no other clauses in the Constitution do so by themselves.
The draft Necessary and Proper Clause provoked controversy during discussions
of the proposed constitution, and its inclusion became a focal point of
criticism for those opposed to the Constitution's ratification. While
Anti-Federalists expressed concern that the clause would grant the federal
government boundless power, Federalists argued that the clause would only permit
execution of power already granted by the Constitution. Alexander Hamilton
spoke vigorously for this second interpretation in The Federalist Papers.
At this time James Madison concurred with Hamilton, arguing in Federalist No.
44 that without this clause, the constitution would be a "dead letter".
At the Virginia Ratifying Convention, Patrick Henry took the opposing view,
saying that the clause would lead to limitless federal power that would
inevitably menace individual liberty. National bank
For several decades after the Constitution was ratified, the
interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause continued to be a powerful
bone of contention between the Democratic-Republican Party and the
Federalist Party, and several other political parties in the United States.
The first practical example of this contention came in 1791, when Hamilton
used the clause to defend the constitutionality of the creation of the
First Bank of the United States, the first federal bank in the new nation's
history. Concerned that monied Northern aristocrats would take advantage of the
bank to exploit the South, Madison argued that Congress lacked the
constitutional authority to charter a bank. Hamilton countered that the bank
was a reasonable means of carrying out powers related to taxation and the
borrowing of funds, claiming the clause applied to activities reasonably related
to constitutional powers, not just those that were absolutely necessary to carry
out said powers. To embarrass Madison, his contrary claims from The Federalist
Papers were read aloud in Congress: "No axiom is more clearly established in
law or in reason than wherever the end is required, the means are authorized;
wherever a general power to do a thing is given, every particular power for
doing it is included." Eventually, Southern opposition to the
bank and to Hamilton's plan to have the federal government assume the war debts
of the states was mollified by the transfer of the nation's capital from
its temporary seat in Philadelphia to a more southerly permanent seat on the
Potomac, and the bill, along with the establishment of a national mint, was
passed by Congress and signed by President Washington.
= Landmark decision by Chief Justice Marshall=
This clause, as justification for the creation of a national bank, was put to
the test in 1819 in the case of McCulloch v. Maryland, wherein the state
of Maryland had attempted to impede the operations of the Second Bank of the
United States by imposing a tax on out-of-state banks, of which the Second
Bank of the United States was the only one. The court ruled against Maryland,
and Chief Justice John Marshall, Hamilton's longtime Federalist ally,
wrote the opinion, which stated that while the Constitution did not
explicitly give permission to create a federal bank, it conferred upon Congress
an implied power to do so under the Necessary and Proper Clause so that
Congress could realize or fulfill its express taxing and spending powers. The
case reaffirmed Hamilton's view that legislation reasonably related to
express powers was constitutional. Marshall wrote:
We admit, as all must admit, that the powers of the Government are limited,
and that its limits are not to be transcended. But we think the sound
construction of the Constitution must allow to the national legislature that
discretion with respect to the means by which the powers it confers are to be
carried into execution which will enable that body to perform the high duties
assigned to it in the manner most beneficial to the people. Let the end be
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which
are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not
prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution,
are constitutional. The court in McCulloch v. Maryland held
that Federal laws could be necessary without being "absolutely necessary",
and noted that "The clause is placed among the powers of Congress, not among
the limitations on those powers." At the same time, the court retained the power
of judicial review established in Marbury v. Madison, declaring that it
had the power to strike down laws that departed from those powers: "Should
Congress, in the execution of its powers, adopt measures which are
prohibited by the Constitution, or should Congress, under the pretext of
executing its powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not intrusted
to the Government, it would become the painful duty of this tribunal, should a
case requiring such a decision come before it, to say that such an act was
not the law of the land." As Chief Justice Marshall put it, the
Necessary and Proper Clause "purport[s] to enlarge, not to diminish the powers
vested in the government. It purports to be an additional power, not a
restriction on those already granted." Without this clause in the Constitution,
there would have been a dispute about whether the express powers imply
incidental powers, whereas this clause resolved that dispute by making the
incidental powers express instead of implied.
In a related case following the Civil War, the clause was employed to give the
federal government virtually complete control over currency.
Later applications The clause has been paired with the
Commerce Clause to provide the constitutional basis for a wide variety
of federal laws. For instance, various reforms involved in the New Deal were
found to be necessary and proper enactments of the objective of
regulating interstate commerce. Indeed, the influence of the Necessary
and Proper Clause and its broader interpretation under McCulloch v.
Maryland in American jurisprudence can be seen in cases generally thought to
simply involve the Commerce Clause. In Wickard v. Filburn, the Supreme Court
upheld a federal statute making it a crime for a farmer to produce more wheat
than was allowed under price controls and production controls, even if the
excess production was for the farmer's own personal consumption. The Necessary
and Proper Clause was used to justify the regulation of production and
consumption. Also, in addition to this combination of
clauses being used to uphold federal laws affecting economic activity, they
also were used to justify federal criminal laws. For example, Congress in
the Federal Kidnapping Act made it a federal crime to transport a kidnapped
person across state lines, because the transportation would be an act of
interstate activity over which the Congress has power. It has also provided
justification for a wide range of criminal laws relating to interference
with the federal government's rightful operation, including federal laws
against assaulting or murdering federal employees.
In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius the Supreme Court
ruled that the individual mandate of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act cannot be upheld under the Necessary and Proper Clause. Chief Justice John
Roberts wrote in his ruling that the mandate cannot "be sustained under the
Necessary and Proper Clause as an integral part of the Affordable Care
Act’s other reforms. Each of this Court’s prior cases upholding laws under
that Clause involved exercises of authority derivative of, and in service
to, a granted power. [...] The individual mandate, by contrast, vests
Congress with the extraordinary ability to create the necessary predicate to the
exercise of an enumerated power and draw within its regulatory scope those who
would otherwise be outside of it. Even if the individual mandate is “necessary”
to the Affordable Care Act’s other reforms, such an expansion of federal
power is not a “proper” means for making those reforms effective."
According to its proponents, this ruling in NFIB v. Sebelius returns the
Necessary and Proper clause to its original interpretation outlined by John
Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland. According to David Kopel, the clause
"simply restates the background principle that Congress can exercise
powers which are merely 'incidental' to Congress’s enumerated powers."
Name of the clause The specific term "Necessary and Proper
Clause" was coined in 1926 by Associate Justice Louis Brandeis, writing for the
majority in the Supreme Court decision in Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581,
wherein the court upheld a law restricting medicinal use of alcohol as
a necessary and proper exercise of power under the 18th Amendment establishing
Prohibition in the United States. This phrase has become the label of
choice for this constitutional clause, and it was universally adopted by the
courts, and it received Congress's imprimatur in Title 50 of the United
States Code, section 1541(b), in the purpose and policy of the War Powers
Resolution. See also
McCulloch v. Maryland United States v. Comstock
Wickard v. Filburn Federalist No. 33
Federalist No. 44 References