In the last month, our main attention has been mainly focused on the North Pacific and China,
where two important operations were taking place; but with the end of those engagements, we now have
to look south once again, where the decisive Operation Cartwheel was starting to take shape.
In New Guinea, the drive to Salamaua was in full swing,
as the forces of General Savige consolidated their positions in Mubo and Bobdubi;
and in the Solomons, the Japanese were preparing to use their aircraft
for another air operation while the Americans planned their incoming New Georgia offensive.
Looking west, there was also a shift in the Indian command and doctrine, which is going to be very
important for the future; so join us as we delve into another exciting episode of the Pacific War.
Nobody likes sponsors cutting into the video's flow, but a channel like ours can’t survive
without sponsors. At some point, we would like to stop relying on the sponsors and present our
videos sponsor free to everyone. To do that, we need at least 10 thousand youtube channel
members and patrons. Your kind support is always appreciated; we would not be able to create so
many videos without you. Channel members and patrons get weekly exclusive videos,
like our finished series on the Peloponnesian War, and the ongoing series on the Italian Wars
of Unification - Risorgimento, as well as the Anabasis of Xenophon and the History of Prussia,
as well as many interesting non-serialized videos. Our supporters also get our schedule, early access
to the videos, access to our exclusive discord and much more. Thank you for supporting us!
We first have to talk about Operation Cartwheel. As we’ll recall, the Pacific Military Conference
carried out in March saw the approval of a broader offensive in the South West Pacific Area which
involved a series of operations directed towards Rabaul like the spokes of a cartwheel. As it
was expected to carry out offensives against Madang, the southern portion of Bougainville,
Cape Gloucester and the Kiriwina and Woodlark Islands in the year of 1943,
the Southwest and South Pacific Areas immediately began to plan their next moves.
Although the original plan was to first secure the Kiriwina and Woodlark Islands and then capture
the Huon Peninsula and western New Britain before continuing up the Solomons, Admiral Halsey would
manage to convince General MacArthur to allow him to move against New Georgia simultaneously with
the occupation of Woodlark and Kiriwina. Thus, by the end of April, Operation Cartwheel was born,
with MacArthur incorporating Halsey’s proposed changes into the revised plan. MacArthur also
gave Halsey a relatively free hand, so the Navy immediately set out to plan the invasion of New
Georgia, codenamed Operation Toenails. The Munda Bar ruled out a direct attack on Munda, and after
a thorough reconnaissance of Kolombangara, the idea of bypassing Munda by attacking Vila was
also discarded. Instead, in an operation Halsey described to Nimitz as “infiltration and staging,”
four simultaneous landings would be made on June 30. The main force assigned to Operation
Toenails was General Hester’s 43rd Division, although there were also other various units
that would take part in the landings. Once again, Admiral Turner was in charge of the amphibious
landings , with Admiral Fitch’s grand total of 1182 aircraft granting air cover and with Admirals
Ainsworth and Merrill providing naval support . On the other side, Admiral Kusaka and General
Imamura also prepared to face the incoming American offensive. As we’ll recall, it had
been decided back in January that the Central Solomons were under the exclusive responsibility
of the IJN; yet the Bismarck Sea disaster would soon force a change of plans for the Japanese.
As IJA units had suffered because of the ineptitude of the IJN, it was ultimately decided
that both the army and navy “would literally operate as one unit”. Though the Central Solomons
were still under the overall responsibility of the 8th Fleet, now commanded by Vice-Admiral Baron
Samejima Tomoshige, some IJA units would be placed under navy command according to agreements between
Imamura and Kusaka. Thankfully, just like Halsey and MacArthur, Imamura and Kusaka would develop
a deep friendship , so many army units would be sent to reinforce the New Georgia defenses.
By late May, the bulk of the 229th Regiment had arrived at Munda, with the 13th Regiment doing
the same at Vila by the end of June. Imamura would place both regiments under Major-General
Sasaki Noboru’s Southeast Detachment, which responded directly to Samejima. Samejima’s first
orders were to arrange responsibilities between General Sasaki’s Southeast Detachment and Admiral
Ota’s 8th Combined SNLF, with Sasaki in charge of Munda itself while Ota had to defend the
northern sector . If the situation demanded it, command would be unified under the senior
officer in New Georgia: General Sasaki. Ota also had responsibility for coastal artillery defense,
radio communications with the rear, and the all-important barge operations
that would transport troops and supplies from Kolombangara and evacuate the sick and wounded.
In the meantime, Admiral Koga, new commander of the Combined Fleet,
had to preemptively send most of his forces home to support the planned reinforcement of Attu.
With the fate of the Aleutian Island sealed by the end of May, Koga decided to concentrate
the Combined Fleet at Truk to have it ready by August for a decisive battle with the US Navy.
Without the aid of Koga’s carriers, Kusaka decided to launch another air counteroffensive in the
month of June, trying to prevent the Americans from invading the Central Solomons. While his G4M
bombers were to repeat operations against American shipping east of San Cristobal and night missions
over Guadalcanal, Kusaka planned to first gain control of the air with Operation SO , sending
his total of 105 Zeros to sweep and bomb the enemy airfields with a new type of gasoline bomb. Having
dealt with the Allied fighters, Operation SE was to immediately start, with 25 D3A dive bombers
attacking shipping in the Guadalcanal-Tulagi area. Operation SO began on the morning of June 7,
with 81 Zeros under Lieutenant-Commander Shindo Saburo attacking the Russels; yet 104 Allied
fighters were expecting them there, so they lost nine Zeros and only inflicted six casualties.
A second attack was sent on June 12, this time by 74 Zeros under Lieutenant Miyano Zenjirō,
but once again they suffered more losses than those inflicted . Claims were much higher though,
so Kusaka decided to go ahead with Operation Se. On June 16, the main attack was thus launched,
with 24 D3As covered by 70 Zeros swinging south of the Russells to approach from the south. Yet they
were once again intercepted by around 74 Allied fighters over Beaufort Bay, with the ensuing air
battle rolling north over the mountainous spine of Guadalcanal. In result, the Japanese lost
15 Zeros and 13 D3As, only destroying six enemy fighters. Among the first-rate pilots who failed
to return was Lieutenant Miyano, who had scored a total of 16 kills since the start of the war,
so the Japanese were continuing to lose their most experienced airmen,
something that severely affected the declining Japanese fighter performance. Furthermore,
even though their formation had been disrupted by the Allied interception, the dive bombers pressed
their attack and managed to hit two ships . Yet these were meager results for such an exorbitant
price, so Kusaka would have to urgently request reinforcements. The carrier Ryuho’s bombers would
be immediately sent to replace those lost in the operation, successfully arriving on July 2,
but almost no more reinforcements would arrive before the end of the New Georgia Campaign.
Additionally, Japanese formations would never again appear over Guadalcanal in daylight,
and the Americans would have assured their air superiority over the Solomons.
Meanwhile, Generals MacArthur and Blamey had also been planning their New Guinea offensives as part
of Operation Cartwheel. While MacArthur entrusted Lieutenant-General Walter Krueger’s 6th Army with
the invasion of the Woodlark and Kiriwina Islands , a group of islands northeast of the Papuan coast
that could allow the Allies to have air bases closer to Japanese targets in the Solomons and
around Rabaul; Blamey had devised a plan to secure northeastern New Guinea. Blamey’s main plan had
two phases: the first entailing the capture of Lae and the Markham Valley and its airfields;
and the second, exploitation around the coast to Finschhafen and Madang.
To capture Lae, a seaborne landing would be necessary, and for that, Blamey reasoned
that they would first have to seize a shore base within 60 miles of Lae. Nassau Bay was
selected as the area most suited for the purpose since its capture would also enable a junction to
be made with General Savige’s forces operating at Mubo. A beachhead at Nassau Bay could also
greatly shorten the supply line for Allied troops fighting in the Salamaua region.
To support the Nassau Bay landings, which were to be carried out by a regiment of
Major-General Horace Fuller’s 41st Division, the 17th Brigade was to seize the high ground around
Goodview Junction and Mount Tambu and the ridges running down therefrom to the sea, so that the
Australians could link up with the 15th Brigade at Bobdubi and the American landing force at Nassau.
The Doublet Plan, with D-Day finally set for June 30, was also to act as a feint, hoping to draw
enemy reinforcements from Lae to Salamaua and expecting to draw attention away from the other
operations that were due to take place on the islands of Kiriwina, Woodlark and New Georgia.
As we last saw in New Guinea, General Savige had sent his forces to carry out a limited offensive
against the Japanese presence in Mubo and the Bobdubi Ridge. With the enemy rapidly attempting
to reinforce its defensive positions, Major Warfe had managed to lightly occupy the Bobdubi Ridge,
successfully luring Japanese resources away from Mubo and Lae, and inflicting many casualties
on the invaders with his small, mobile and well-trained force of Australian commandos.
But with the arrival of reinforcements, the Japanese counterattacked and, by the end of May,
Major-General Muroya Chuichi’s forces had expelled Warfe’s commandos from the northern ridge.
Meanwhile, Brigadier Moten had been attempting to subdue the Pimple position just east of Mubo,
yet his efforts would all be in vain. From May 15 onwards, the 17th Brigade would thus concentrate
more on aggressive patrolling in all sectors than on actual attacks; and by the end of the month,
Savige would finally decide to relieve the exhausted 2/7th Battalion with the fresh 2/6th
Battalion. The forward move of Lieutenant-Colonel Frederick Wood’s 2/6th began on May 27, the day
on which 15th Brigade headquarters and the first company of the 58th/59th Battalion arrived in Wau.
On the other side, General Nakano had successfully brought enough reinforcements to defend Mubo,
even launching a strong counterattack on May 9 that almost managed to break through towards
the main Australian camp at Lababia Ridge. On May 23, with the arrival of two battalions of
the recently-landed 66th Regiment , Nakano then began to work out a plan for assembling supplies
and ammunition in the Mubo area in preparation for another attack. His goal was to clear out Lababia
Ridge as far as Guadagasal, thus securing Mubo and forcing the Australians to withdraw from Mat Mat.
Looking west, the 24th Battalion continued to defend the Zenag and Bulwa airfields,
as well as the entrance to the Bulolo Valley from the Markham. On June 3, after a patrol skirmish
near the river, it was discovered that Nakano had reoccupied Markham Point , which essentially
forced Savige to keep the bulk of the 24th away from the action at Bobdubi and Mubo.
From their camp at the bank of the Markham, Savige would further order that a small reconnaissance
patrol from the 24th Battalion should go to the Nadzab area. On the night of June 14,
the river was crossed by a three-man patrol, which then moved northeast towards the village
of Gabsonkek, where friendly natives informed them of the Japanese doings in the area.
By June 18, the Australians were back in their camp, with valuable information for future
operations against Nadzab and Lae. Additionally, the depleted 2/7th Independent Company was flown
to Benabena on May 29 to reinforce the Australian position in the airfield, where 57 men of the
2/7th Battalion had been stationed since late January; and on June 8, the 57th/60th Battalion
was prepared to fly to the Marilinan airfield with the task of defending the Watut Valley, where an
airfield was being built. On June 2, Colonel Wood also completed the relief of the 2/7th,
immediately sending a number of two-men patrols towards Nassau Bay to reconnoiter the area.
Although the first patrol was discovered, suffering the loss of one of the scouts; the
second patrol would manage to get to Nassau Bay by way of the Tabali River, successfully recommending
that the area was suitable for landing and road construction. Furthermore, in preparation for
the American landings, the Australians built a footbridge over the Bitoi River and blazed
a track up to the Bitoi Ridge. On Lababia Ridge, the main defensive positions were also withdrawn
to a higher point where it would be easier to counter another enemy attempt at encirclement.
Only a platoon would be left forward, occupying a semi-circle of listening posts south of the
Pimple. Both this platoon and Warfe’s commandos at Bobdubi would report considerable activity
along the Komiatum-Mubo track. This was Nakano’s 66th Regiment , which was carrying forward its
food and ammunition for the upcoming attack. In response, Savige ordered Brigadier Frank
Hosking , who assumed command of the Bobdubi Ridge area, to harass the Japanese supply route.
While the 58th/59th Battalion relieved the 2/3rd Independent Company at Hote, a party of
Warfe’s commandos was thus sent to strike at the Komiatum-Mubo track ; yet the Australians would
soon run into one of their own booby-traps on June 16, suffering a number of casualties. By June 20,
however, the party had established ambush positions in an area near Goodview Junction.
They would successfully ambush three Japanese soldiers later in the day, killing them and
capturing valuable documents about the arrival of the 66th Regiment. Yet Nakano’s troops had
already moved up close to Mubo on June 17, and they would assemble in front of Lababia Ridge by
June 19. Nakano’s attack was thus about to start. But now we have to move to India, where Marshal
Wavell’s forces still had to deal with the harsh consequences of the disastrous
First Arakan Campaign. Wavell, who was soon to succeed Lord Linlithgow as new Viceroy of India,
knew the difficulties and dangers of using troops not fully trained for jungle warfare,
but was still disappointed by their lack of skill and fighting spirit at Arakan. Therefore, he
wanted to make full use of the next six months to improve physical fitness, train junior officers,
adapt to jungle fighting, and mentally prepare troops to fully realize the importance of the
CBI theater’s contribution to the war effort in order to improve their fighting spirit.
By the end of May, Major-General Roland Richardson would also head an Infantry Committee at New Delhi
to investigate the Arakan debacle. Richardson began by acknowledging that the troops’ fighting
spirit was fundamentally sound and that the major problems that affected combat performance were the
overexpansion of the army in India , which forced them to give a rushed and inadequate
basic training and made supplying the sheer number of recruits a problem; the low status
and inferior pay of the infantry, which deprived them of skilled and well-educated recruits; the
lack of specialized jungle training and collective training; the high command’s inability to relieve
front line units with fresh, highly-trained reserves; the lack of experienced leadership
in battalions; and finally, the difficulties to deal with malaria and other tropical diseases.
By far, however, the Infantry Committee noted that the most serious problem was
the training and replacement systems. Yet these problems would not be tackled
until June 20, when General Claude Auchinleck was appointed as the new Commander-in-Chief, India.
Auchinleck was well-respected by both British and Indian officers, so this was an “inspired choice”.
One of his first decisions would be to oversee a changeover of senior front line commanders
and staff officers at GHQ India that primarily brought to the fore battle-experienced Indian
Army officers, who understood the strengths and limitations of Indian troops and the key
importance of morale and hard, intensive training in building combat effectiveness. As such,
he also set out to improve the welfare, health and feeding of the army to foster improved morale.
One of the most important shifts in command would be the dismissal of the inefficient General Irwin,
who would be replaced by General George Giffard as commander of the Eastern Army.
Additionally, Major-General Temple Gurdon was given responsibility for overseeing the reform
of the training system and the development of doctrine. Thus, a strenuous effort was made
to conduct intensive collective training under jungle conditions , in an effort to
give commanders of all formations destined for Burma a chance at handling units at all levels,
improving standards of staff work, practicing combined army tactics and building team spirit.
Furthermore, Auchinleck also initiated a policy of active patrolling at Assam and Arakan to gather
intelligence, maintain touch with the Japanese and establish moral superiority over the enemy,
which paid dividends as it essentially allowed Indian patrols to be more effective.
Although we’ll continue to cover the reforms of the Indian Army in the future, next week
we have to return to the Solomons and New Guinea to continue to cover the plans for the invasions
of New Guinea, Kiriwina and Woodlark, as well as to witness the start of the Japanese attack
on Lababia Ridge. If you don’t want to miss this episode, make sure you are subscribed and pressed
the bell button. Consider liking, commenting, and sharing - it helps immensely. Recently we
have started releasing weekly patron and youtube member exclusive content, consider joining their
ranks via the link in the description or button under the video to watch these weekly videos,
learn about our schedule, get early access to our videos, access our private discord,
and much more. This is the Kings and Generals channel, and we will catch you on the next one.