On October 27, 1942, two battered fleets sailed away from the Santa Cruz Islands.
The US Navy had suffered the loss of 262 men killed in action or lost at sea.
One carrier, USS Hornet, had gone to the bottom of the South Pacific along with 118 of its
crew.
Additionally, an unlucky destroyer, USS Porter, had been sunk by a freak torpedo accident,
claiming 15 lives.
USS Enterprise had lost 44 men, USS Smith lost 57, the carrier air groups lost 22, and
six others died on USS Pensacola, USS South Dakota, and USS Morris.
From his base at Noumea, Admiral Halsey ordered USS Enterprise and its escorts to return to
the harbor, where repair ships waited to patch up the carrier’s battle damage.
Working at a feverish pace, the repair crews got the job completed in a mere 11 days.
On November 11, Enterprise sailed out of Noumea, and two days later, the fleet engaged in a
climactic three-day battle that ended the Japanese threat to Guadalcanal.
After Santa Cruz, the Imperial Japanese Navy had considered pursuing the retreating American
ships, but once their admirals took stock of the situation, they deemed that decision
unwise.
Although the Japanese fleet had not lost a single ship, they had lost twice as many men.
Two of their carriers—Shokaku and Zuiho—were so badly damaged that they could not continue
flight operations.
Another carrier, the Zuikaku, although undamaged, could not stay in the area either.
It had lost so many planes and aircrew that it, too, could not conduct combat operations.
The commander of the Japanese carrier task force, VADM Chuichi Nagumo, withdrew his battered
carriers to Truk Atoll, and eventually to the home islands for repairs.
Only RADM Nobutake Kondo’s surface fleet remained to protect the Solomon Islands.
It contained only one carrier—the Junyo—and a greatly reduced air group.
Kondo’s fleet soon found itself far outmatched by the American counteroffensive.
Nagumo had trouble coming to grips with the outcome of the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands.
He was loath to call it a defeat for Japan, but as a victory, the results were disappointing.
Shortly after the battle—just as he was relieved of command and reassigned to shore
duty—Nagumo wrote, “This battle was a tactical win, but a shattering strategic loss
for Japan.
Considering the great superiority of our enemy’s industrial capacity, we must win every battle
overwhelmingly in order to win this war.
This last one, although a victory, unfortunately, was not an overwhelming victory.”
Ever since October 1942, military historians have been unsure how to explain the significance
of the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands.
Some have said that the battle could only be viewed as a tactical American defeat.
After all, the US Navy had lost an aircraft carrier and ended up retreating at the end
of it.
By contrast, the Japanese kept all their ships and held the field.
Other historians have said that the battle must be considered a draw since it resulted
in no forward movement by either side, keeping the status quo in the Solomons.
However, these opinions did not reflect how Americans viewed the battle at the time.
Despite the loss of Hornet, the US fleet emerged from the battle as the powerhouse fleet in
the South Pacific and the Americans knew it.
Admiral Halsey had promised to come to the assistance of the Marines on Guadalcanal and
the Battle of Santa Cruz had not changed that promise.
The battle forced Japan to sideline its carrier fleet just in time for the pivotal naval battle
in mid-November, which, in essence, set Japan on the path to defeat.
The American survivors of Santa Cruz were optimistic of success.
An officer on USS Enterprise wrote, “We know we licked the Japanese.
They suffered far heavier naval losses than we did and we still hold Guadalcanal.
Let’s not even give the enemy the satisfaction of knowing even what relatively little damage
they did to us.”
In October 1942, the American effort in the South Pacific teetered in the balance.
After Santa Cruz, it teetered no more.