The Carolingian dynasty was a Frankish noble family with origins in the
Arnulfing and Pippinid clans of the 7th century AD. The name "Carolingian"
derives from the Latinised name of Charles Martel: Carolus. The family
consolidated its power in the late 8th century, eventually making the offices
of mayor of the palace and dux et princeps Francorum hereditary and
becoming the de facto rulers of the Franks as the real powers behind the
throne. By 751, the Merovingian dynasty, which
until then had ruled the Germanic Franks by right, was deprived of this right
with the consent of the Papacy and the aristocracy, and a Carolingian, Pepin
the Short, was crowned King of the Franks. The Carolingian dynasty reached
its peak with the crowning of Charlemagne as the first emperor in the
west in over three centuries. His death in 814 began an extended period of
fragmentation and decline that would eventually lead to the evolution of the
territories of France and Germany. The area of West Francia, that was
eventually to become known as France, however, grew in prosperity under the
Carolingian Period due to economic activity brought on by greater
international trade. History
Traditional historiography has seen the Carolingian assumption of kingship as
the product of a long rise to power, punctuated even by a premature attempt
to seize the throne through Childebert the Adopted. This picture, however, is
not commonly accepted today. Rather, the coronation of 751 is seen typically as a
product of the aspirations of one man, Pepin, and of the Church, which was
always looking for powerful secular protectors and for the extension of its
spiritual and temporal influence. The greatest Carolingian monarch was
Charlemagne, who was crowned Emperor by Pope Leo III at Rome in 800. His empire,
ostensibly a continuation of the Roman Empire, is referred to
historiographically as the Carolingian Empire. The traditional Frankish
practice of dividing inheritances among heirs was not given up by the
Carolingian emperors, though the concept of the indivisibility of the Empire was
also accepted. The Carolingians had the practice of making their sons minor
kings in the various regions of the Empire, which they would inherit on the
death of their father. Following the death of Louis the Pious, the surviving
adult Carolingians fought a three-year civil war ending only in the Treaty of
Verdun, which divided the empire into three regna while according imperial
status and a nominal lordship to Lothair I. The Carolingians differed markedly
from the Merovingians in that they disallowed inheritance to illegitimate
offspring, possibly in an effort to prevent infighting among heirs and
assure a limit to the division of the realm. In the late ninth century,
however, the lack of suitable adults among the Carolingians necessitated the
rise of Arnulf of Carinthia, a bastard child of a legitimate Carolingian king.
The Carolingians were displaced in most of the regna of the Empire in 888. They
ruled on in East Francia until 911 and they held the throne of West Francia
intermittently until 987. Carolingian cadet branches continued to rule in
Vermandois and Lower Lorraine after the last king died in 987, but they never
sought thrones of principalities and made peace with the new ruling families.
One chronicler of Sens dates the end of Carolingian rule with the coronation of
Robert II of France as junior co-ruler with his father, Hugh Capet, thus
beginning the Capetian dynasty. The dynasty became extinct in the male
line with the death of Eudes, Count of Vermandois. His sister Adelaide, the
last Carolingian, died in 1122. Branches
The Carolingian dynasty has five distinct branches:
The Lombard branch, or Vermandois branch, or Herbertians, descended from
Pepin of Italy, son of Charlemagne. Though he did not outlive his father,
his son Bernard was allowed to retain Italy. Bernard rebelled against his
uncle Louis the Pious, and lost both his kingdom and his life. Deprived of the
royal title, the members of this branch settled in France, and became counts of
Vermandois, Valois, Amiens and Troyes. The counts of Vermandois perpetuated the
Carolingian line until the 12th century. The counts of Chiny and the lords of
Mellier, Neufchâteau and Falkenstein are branches of the Herbertians. With the
descendants of the counts of Chiny, there would have been Herbertian
Carolingians to the early 14th century. The Lotharingian branch, descended from
Emperor Lothair, eldest son of Louis the Pious. At his death Middle Francia was
divided equally between his three surviving sons, into Italy, Lotharingia
and Lower Burgundy. The sons of Emperor Lothair did not have sons of their own,
so Middle Francia was divided between the French and German branches of the
family in 875. The Aquitainian branch, descended from
Pepin of Aquitaine, son of Louis the Pious. Since he did not outlive his
father, his sons were deprived of Aquitaine in favor of his younger
brother Charles the Bald. Pepin's sons died childless. Extinct 864.
The German branch, descended from Louis the German, King of East Francia, son of
Louis the Pious. Since he had three sons, his lands were divided into
Bavaria, Saxony and Swabia. His youngest son Charles the Fat briefly reunited
both East and West Francia — the entirety of the Carolingian empire — but
it split again after his death, never to be reunited. With the failure of the
legitimate lines of the German branch, Arnulf of Carinthia, an illegitimate
nephew of Charles the Fat, rose to the kingship. At the death of Arnulf's son
Louis the Child in 911, Carolingian rule ended in Germany
The French branch, descended from Charles the Bald, King of West Francia,
son of Louis the Pious. The French branch ruled in West Francia, but their
rule was interrupted by Charles the Fat of the German branch, two Robertians,
and a Bosonid. Carolingian rule ended with the death of Louis V of France in
987. Charles, Duke of Lower Lorraine, the Carolingian heir, was ousted out of
the succession by Hugh Capet; his sons died childless. Extinct c. 1012.
Grand strategy The historian Bernard Bachrach argues
that the rise of the Carolingians to power is best understood using the
theory of a Carolingian grand strategy. A grand strategy is a long term military
and political strategy that lasts for longer than a typical campaigning
season, and can span long periods of time. The Carolingians followed a set
course of action that discounts the idea of a random rise in power and can be
considered as a grand strategy. Beginning with Pippin II, the
Carolingians set out to put the regnum Francorum back together, after its
fragmentation after the death of Dagobert I, a Merovingian king. After an
early failed attempt in ca 651 A.D. to usurp the throne from the Merovingians,
the early Carolingians began to slowly gain power and influence as they
consolidated military power as Mayors of the Palace. In order to do this, the
Carolingians used a combination of Late Roman military organization along with
the incremental changes that occurred between the fifth and eighth centuries.
Because of the defensive strategy the Romans had implemented during the Late
Empire, the population had become militarized and were thus available for
military use. The existence of the remaining Roman infrastructure that
could be used for military purposes, such as roads, strongholds and fortified
cities meant that the reformed strategies of the Late Romans would
still be relevant. Civilian men who lived either in or near a walled city or
strong point were required to learn how to fight and defend the areas in which
they lived. These men were rarely used in the course of Carolingian grand
strategy because they were used for defensive purposes, and the Carolingians
were for the most part on the offensive most of the time.
Another class of civilians were required to serve in the military which included
going on campaigns. Depending on one's wealth, one would be required to render
different sorts of service, and “the richer the man was, the greater was his
military obligation for service” For example, if rich, one might be required
as a knight. Or one might be required to provide a number of fighting men.
In addition to those who owed military service for the lands they had, there
were also professional soldiers who fought for the Carolingians. If the
holder of a certain amount of land was ineligible for military service they
would still owe military service. Instead of going themselves, they would
hire a soldier to fight in their place. Institutions, such as monasteries or
churches were also required to send soldiers to fight based on the wealth
and the amount of lands they held. In fact, the use of ecclesiastical
institutions for their resources for the military was a tradition that the
Carolingians continued and greatly benefitted from.
It was “highly unlikely that armies of many more than a hundred thousand
effectives with their support systems could be supplied in the field in a
single theatre of operation.” Because of this, each landholder would not be
required to mobilize all of his men each year for the campaigning season, but
instead the Carolingians would decide which kinds of troops were needed from
each landholder, and what they should bring with them. In some cases, sending
men to fight could be substituted for different types of war machines. In
order to send effective fighting men, many institutions would have well
trained soldiers that were skilled in fighting as heavily armored troops.
These men would be trained, armored, and given the things they needed in order to
fight as heavy troops at the expense of the household or institution for whom
they fought. These armed retinues served almost as private armies, “which were
supported at the expense of the great magnates, [and] were of considerable
importance to early Carolingian military organization and warfare. The
Carolingians themselves supported their own military household and they were the
most important “core of the standing army in the” regnum Francorum.
It was by utilizing the organization of the military in an effective manner that
contributed to the success of the Carolingians in their grand strategy.
This strategy consisted of strictly adhering to the reconstruction of the
regnum Francorum under their authority. Bernard Bachrach gives three principles
for Carolingian long-term strategy that spanned generations of Carolingian
rulers: “The first principle… was to move cautiously outward from the
Carolingian base in Austrasia. Its second principle was to engage in a
single region at a time until the conquest had been accomplished. The
third principle was to avoid becoming involved beyond the frontiers of the
regnum Francorum or to do so when absolutely necessary and then not for
the purpose of conquest” This is important to the development of
medieval history because without such a military organization and without a
grand strategy, the Carolingians would not have successfully become kings of
the Franks, as legitimized by the bishop of Rome. Furthermore, it was ultimately
because of their efforts and infrastructure that Charlemagne was able
to become such a powerful king and be crowned Emperor of the Romans in 800
A.D. Without the efforts of his predecessors, he would not have been as
successful as he was and the revival of the Roman Empire in the West was likely
to have not occurred. See also
References and sources = References=
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MacLean, Simon. Kingship and Politics in the Late Ninth Century: Charles the Fat
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Leyser, Karl. Communications and Power in Medieval Europe: The Carolingian and
Ottonian Centuries. London: 1994. Lot, Ferdinand.. "Origine et
signification du mot «carolingien»." Revue Historique, 46(1): 68–73.
Oman, Charles. The Dark Ages, 476-918. 6th ed. London: Rivingtons, 1914.
Painter, Sidney. A History of the Middle Ages, 284-1500. New York: Knopf, 1953.
"Astronomus", Vita Hludovici imperatoris, ed. G. Pertz, ch. 2, in
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