Historians go to great lengths emphasizing that the so-called Byzantine Empire was not
a separate entity from the Roman Empire, but served as a persistent remnant of the larger
structure which survived for 1,000 years after its western half-collapsed.
Despite this indisputable heritage, there were differences between Rome under Augustus,
Marcus Aurelius and Honorius, and the Byzantine Empire of Justinian, Basil and Nikephoros.
One of the foremost ways in which the Byzantines broke from their predecessors was in military
doctrine.
Although not nearly as elevated as the notorious legio in terms of sheer power, Byzantine armies
did adapt in true Roman fashion to fit the methods of the age in which their empire existed,
becoming in the process one of the greatest armies in the Medieval world.
Join Kings and Generals once again as we progress into Late Antiquity as the Romans did, and
describe the armies of the mighty Byzantine Empire throughout its long existence.
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Belisarius’ personal historian Procopius penned one of the most seminal pieces of ancient
literature relating to the early Byzantine Empire, and specifically Justinian’s herculean
attempt at reconquering the west.
After his introduction, we might expect the chronicler to describe the emperor, Belisarius
or the background of his work following the fall of the west.
While such profiles do come later, the very first thing Procopius details is a piece on
the nature of military change, and resistance to it.
Calling out those readers who might decry ‘modern’ achievements as unworthy in favour
of, essentially, recalling the good old days of Classical Rome, the historian further goes
on to outline how some individuals choose to narrow-mindedly deride Byzantine archers,
while at the same time lauding close combat fighters who resemble the Roman legionaries
of old.
Whilst acknowledging that, yes, sometimes in the past ‘bowmen’ were forced to hide
and seem cowardly, Roman archers were different.
Clad in protective armour, these expert horsemen used a bow as their primary weapon, but also
might carry a shield, spear, or sword.
Still, Procopius laments, ‘there are those who take into consideration none of these
things, who revere and worship the ancient times, and give no credit to modern improvements.’
Essentially, the great historian is giving sixth-century Byzantine traditionalists a
verbal slap in the face and telling them to get with the times.
Fortunately for Rome’s eastern remnant, the diminished empire did just that, adapting
constantly.
This example from Procopius’ first book is just a single, but an incredibly stark
instance of how the standard military doctrines of Rome as a centuries’ old unquestionable
hegemon began evolving and molding into that of a limited empire on a controlled and incredibly
slow decline in power.
The fact that the Byzantines were able to make this transition without succumbing to
inaction shows us just how resilient the empire was.
In essence, to change from iconic Roman military styles was in fact more Roman than maintaining
outward trappings.
The ‘drill and discipline’ legions of Caesar and Augustus had been reformed by emperors
at the end of the Third Century Crisis into the Late Imperial forces of limitanei, comitatensis
and more, detailed in the Notitia Dignitatum.
Fifth century disruption and collapse, barbarian incursion, monetary shortage, purposeful change
and other factors led to the reborn, small and elite army of Byzantium in the early sixth
century, where strategy and generalship were more important, and cavalry increasingly prominent.
Still, we must also quash the simplistic notion that the Byzantines’ new emphasis on cavalry
led to the utter dereliction of infantry forces as nothing more than cannon fodder, herded
at an enemy as a meager distraction while mounted troops did the real work.
To begin this process, we must describe this new premier man of the Roman army - Procopius’
vaunted armour-clad archer mounted on horseback.
The glacial process leading to the development and adoption of Byzantine hippo-toxotai heavy
horse archers of the sixth century and beyond might be viably said to have begun as early
as the late first century.
However, if a single date has to be chosen for the date that the transformation from
Roman to Byzantine military truly began, one might choose August 9th 378 - the Battle of
Adrianople, when invading Goths tore an entire eastern field army apart, triggering a number
of unprecedented responses within the buckling Roman Empire.
As the Great Migration continued and disparate barbarian coalitions, most prominently the
nomadic horselord Huns, shunted others to the west throughout the fifth century, these
groups brought their practices and tactics with them.
Particularly following the Hunnic Empire’s collapse at Nedao in 454, a vast quantity
of barbarian mercenaries spilled out from the steppe, using their exotic mounted skills
to gain employment in armies of the Byzantine Empire.
Procopius details many a foreign cavalry unit hired on behalf of the emperor in Constantinople,
such as the Heruli, and how they played a direct role in the Byzantine military and
a key part in ensuring its conquests went well.
However, the mercenaries’ battle tactics also found their way into textbooks and manuals
for training homegrown cavalry, while nomadic equipment and ‘loadouts’ were adapted
and sometimes even improved by imperial generals for use in the future.
The model heavy mounted bowman of Procopius’ first book, for example, most likely wielded
a standard symmetrical composite bow as his primary weapon, replacing the spear and javelin-armed
horse of earlier days.
This design of bow in particular contrasted with the asymmetrical bow favoured by nomadic
horse peoples such as the Huns.
The modification was almost certainly made because this more ‘standard’ model was
simpler to manufacture in large numbers, and therefore equipping the troops would be easier.
For protection, this ideal trooper donned armour including a mail corselet and greaves,
but notably did not wear any kind of helmet, so that the accuracy of his archery wasn’t
significantly impaired.
Instead, the toxotai would rely on the use of a small shield to protect his face from
enemy attacks.
Contrary to popular belief, it is also probable that, unlike cataphractarii, hippo-toxotai
did not clad their mounts in armour.
Making effective use of the empire’s terrain-specific resources, the Byzantines reared notably powerful
Cappadocian steeds which, bred in military stables especially established for the purpose,
could easily maintain high speeds despite the fact that armoured men were mounted atop
them.
Nomadic influence can also be seen in the training and tactics of the armies of Justinian,
such as in the practice of archery, both mounted and on foot.
In contrast to the method of their Sassanid enemies, which relied on blocking out the
sun with a massive blanket of massed fire to inflict casualties, the Byzantine modus
operandi was to depend on accuracy, precision and stopping power.
This ‘quality rather than quantity’ approach was derived from the Huns.
Different types of mounted troops supplemented Procopius’ armoured cavalry archers depending
on the situation, and, as mentioned, many of these horse warriors were allies or mercenary
foederati brought into the empire from outside.
Much like the eponymous Germanic troops of the united empire’s final decades, these
Byzantine foederati were unassimilated barbarians armed in their native styles, but fighting
under Byzantine command.
Among the myriad peoples who served in Justinian’s armies were the Huns themselves, Gepids, Goths,
Heruli, Slavs, Bulgars, Berbers and many, many more whose names were either not noted
down in the historical record, or whose contribution became overshadowed by other barbarian groups
with whom they served.
So in this domain, we see clearly continuity in that the early Byzantines kept up the Roman
practice of welcoming barbarian troops into the army, except they did so more eagerly
and in a more controlled fashion.
Such a vigour for drawing in the best of ‘barbarian’ military talent is exemplified clearly by
the array of foreign leaders who became high generals in Justinian’s service, despite
the taboo that may have developed against such a practice after the collapse of the
western empire.
Much like the retinue of vaunted commanders under Alexander the Great or Napoleon, those
of Justinian were skilled at their craft.
Four names early in Justinian’s reign come to the fore: Sittas, Mundus, Chilbundus and
Belisarius, only one of whom was a ‘Roman’.
Roman to Byzantine Continuity wasn’t only maintained and expanded upon in the realm
of foreign recruitment.
Contrary to popular belief, as we have already mentioned, credit must still be given for
the maintained quality of infantry troops which, although no longer the neatly polished,
standardised soldiers of the old Roman legions, were still a considerable force to be reckoned
with, and who played their part well in the new Byzantine warfare.
They were also far less one-dimensioned than the old legionary heavy infantry.
Armed with roughly two-meter-long spears and bows as standard, supplemented by a spatha
like sidearm, the new ‘legionaries’, known as protostate, would drive their primary weapon
into the ground at the approach of an enemy, loosing bow fire into the foe until their
progress began to slow, at which the spear was retaken up again.
Such a formation of relatively short-weaponed spearmen provided a good middle-ground between
the flexibility of gladius wielding maniples and the rigidity and range of an old sarissa
phalanx.
In his work, Procopius details an occasion in which some Byzantine heavy spearmen; the
armour-clad protostate elite, were charged by Gothic cavalry who thought these footmen
to be an easy target.
They were badly mistaken.
Gathering into a compact but not overly cramped space, the infantrymen raised their shields
and thrust forward their spears, holding ground and pushing on.
Most impressive is Procopius’ detailing of how none of the spearmen interfered with
any of their comrades, so sophisticated was their training and proper interval maintenance.
Regular, leather-armed spear, javelin, sling, throwing axe, or dart wielding infantry formed
the inner mass of Byzantine infantry behind the outer shell of heavy spearmen and in front
of the archers.
They were perhaps trained in a lesser manner, but ability and some level of discipline were
clearly maintained.
In this way, the so-called protostate infantry of the Byzantine Empire was a throwback to
the Polybian legion.
A heavy triarii equivalent was in the vanguard, followed by mid-range throwing missile troops
and then archers at the back.
One aspect of Byzantine warfare that would’ve made earlier imperial emperors and military
leaders scratch their heads in confusion was the bucellarii.
We know a significant amount concerning these household troops, named after the bucellatum
ration biscuit, from Belisarius’ contingent in the Vandal and Gothic Wars.
Unlike many of the other military phenomena of the age, this was a completely alien practice.
Bucellarii were essentially privately-hired personal guards who held direct loyalty to
the general by whom they were hired, rather than to the emperor in Constantinople or to
the wider concept of ‘the empire’.
Such mercenaries often formed the core comitatus of a general - his closest companions and
personal army, and were often professional, elite troops which a larger army could be
formed around.
They might be Roman, but many bucellarii consisted of steppe nobles and their retainers who were
hired by a general before or during their campaign.
This kind of powerful private army was an unquestionable danger to the emperor in Constantinople,
who risked deposition at the hands of soldiers who owed no loyalty to him.
However, the famous Nika Riots were suppressed primarily by the small contingents of bucellarii
under generals Mundus and Belisarius.
Had these key power-brokers leaned the other way, however, Justinian might have had a real
problem on his hands.
To many scholars, this lack of a monopoly on military force is a symbol of the decrease
in imperial authority.
When compared to the imperial legions of old, the Byzantine armies of Justinian’s age
of reconquest, as we have detailed, were often incredibly small by comparison.
While four centuries before, Trajan was able to rally up to 200,000 men for his conquest
of Dacia, Belisarius was only able to bring about 7,000 to bear during his initial landings
in Italy, although he was reinforced significantly in the later years.
This decline was due to the simple fact that the old class of Roman Imperial citizens,
upon which the ever-expanding legions depended for manpower, was all but gone by the time
of Late Antiquity.
What replaced it was this smaller, but infinitely more surgical and balanced Byzantine army
developed by absorbing equipment, training, tactics and doctrine from some of the empire’s
greatest enemies, and greatest failures.
Such a comparatively restrained amount of military power provided the impetus for Byzantium’s
sophisticated and tactful approach to warfare and relations with foreign powers as a whole.
It might even be said that this latter approach, by necessity, was far more intelligent than
that of the united Roman Empire which came before, simply due to the fact that the hegemonic
Romans did not, before the very end, need to be overly smart when dealing with foes.
Those foes could just, most of the time anyway, be crushed under the weight of a legionary’s
boot.
Still, when laymen and even some historians look at the Byzantine army in comparison to
the old Roman one, they rightly see a diminished force.
But it is worth considering Caesar, Germanicus, Trajan or any of the other greats, and how
they would view the new military if they were transported forwards in time.
Given the available resources and situation that the Byzantine Empire faced, matters could
have gone far worse.
In our next episode on the army of the Byzantines, we will examine the unique phenomenon of military
manuals that arose in that empire.
Specifically, we will file through the ancient pages of the strategikon authored by Maurice,
and probably some others, relating how this text became the handbook for imperial warfare
for centuries to come, so make sure you are subscribed and have pressed the bell button
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