The First rule of Fight Club?
I mean, of Geopolitics?
There are no power vacuums.
The current president of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, knows this rule very well.
In recent years he has shown the Western world that geopolitical weaknesses are opportunities
for expansion and conquest for whoever is able to seize them.
Erdogan's motto is "carpe diem".
Ambiguity, double-dealing and diplomatic skill have made Turkey an important player in the
Mediterranean in recent years.
Are we sure that this strategy doesn't have gray areas and in the long run, someone doesn't
come along to present the bill?
After all, as Giulio Andreotti would have said, power consumes those who don't have
it, so we should be careful of those who crave it at all costs.
To understand the rise of the Turkish foreign policy we have to go back twenty years: in
2002.
Erdogan got off to a roaring start in the immediate post-election period in 2002: the
president had impressed everyone with his foreign policy based on the strategy of "no
problems with the neighbourhood".
He had obtained a cease-fire with the Kurds of the PKK; he had normalized relations with
the much disputed Armenia; he had eased tensions in the Aegean with the Greeks.
And he had increased trade with the Arab states of the Gulf, while continuing to negotiate
membership with the European Union.
Yet, over the years, this strategy of détente has been progressively replaced by a vision
that some have called neo-Ottoman.
The goal: to bring back a large part of the Mediterranean under the Turkish sphere of
influence.
The coup attempt of July Twelve Sixsteen and the early elections of Twelve Eighteen (carried
out in a climate that was anything but democratic) quickly made clear how urgent it was to stabilize
the country's home front.
Not an easy task, made even more complex by a Turkish lira subject to continuous devaluations,
by soaring prices as well as by a general slowdown in the economy, which is increasingly
tied to hydrocarbon exports.
Certainly, in recent years, Erdogan's Turkey has made important steps especially in military
technology and in the defense industry (the production of drones, is now the flagship
of the Turkish war industry), and we must not forget the ambitious space program recently
launched by the government.
However, investment demand remains high and Erdoğan's undiplomatic attitude is certainly
not encouraging Western investors.
Simply think of the corruption scandals, the censorship of the media and the shutdown of
Twitter, YouTube and Wikipedia in 2014, the lack of respect for minorities, the amendment
to the Constitution, up to the most recent incident with Von der Leyen's chair, or the
dismissal of Central Bank Governor Naci Agbal, appointed last November 2020 in the midst
of a major currency crisis and removed just four months later following an interest rate
hike.
In an attempt to distract his citizens from the country's shaky domestic situation, President
Erdoğan has shifted their attention to foreign dynamics, riding on nationalistic sentiments,
focusing on the project of regaining, at an international level, the ancient Turkish role
in the Muslim world.
For this reason, Ankara's aim has come to be based on a maritime strategy in the Mediterranean:
the "Blue Homeland" strategy.
First theorized in 2006 by Turkish naval admirals Cem Gürdeniz and Cihat Yaycı, the Blue Homeland
(Turkish: Mavi Vatan) is a geopolitical and economic doctrine that aims to provide a legal
basis for Turkey's expansionist ambitions in the Mediterranean.
Revived by President Erdoğan in recent years, and increasingly popular among Turkey's military
and political elites, the Mavi Vatan theory aims to redraw Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs)
in the waters of the Aegean and Black Seas in Turkey's favor.
The doctrine - outside of alleged pseudo-Ottoman irredentist motivations - has a clear economic
purpose.
But for a better understanding we have to slingshot back to 2015, when large amounts
of natural gas were found on the seabed in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Projections at the time estimated deposits of 3.5 trillion cubic meters of gas, mainly
located in the EEZ of Cyprus, Israel and Egypt.
Quantity that would make even King Midas turn pale - we are still talking about Anatolia
after all.
For Turkey, enlarging its EEZ would potentially mean getting its hands on that wealth.
A scenario that fascinates also the European Union, eager to free itself from its dependence
on Russian gas.
Now, the origin of the dispute in the Aegean dates back to the Cypriot conflict of 1974,
and the consequent division of the island into two areas of interest: the Turkish Republic
of Northern Cyprus (not recognized by the international community but only by Turkey,
which occupies its waters illegally and the Republic of Cyprus, member of the EU since
2004, supported by the government of Athens and the UN.
In the last decade, the discovery of deposits off the coast of Cyprus has allowed the governments
involved to ride the ethnic conflict on the island, transforming it into a metaphorical
gold rush that has quickly involved even states of the European Union, including Italy.
In theory, the division of the territorial waters of the Anatolian peninsula and the
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus should follow the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), according to which each state has the right to apply its jurisdiction
up to 12 miles (about 22 km) from its coast.
Yet the use of this method generates controversies, especially because of the presence of some
Greek islands that, being close to the Turkish coast, create irregularities in the tracing
of boundaries.
This is the case of the island of Kastellorizo.
In Italy we have a famous movie about Kastelorizon: Mediterraneo, Mediterranean Sea.
Here’s a quote from it: "We were being sent on a mission to Megisti, a remote island in
the Aegean, the smallest, the farthest away island.
No strategic importance.
Zero."
Megisti, also known as Kastellorizo, was an Italian possession from the 20s until 1947,
when it was given back to Greece.
Distant 2 km from the Turkish coasts and 570 km from the Greek ones, the island of Megisti/Kastelorizo
represents one of the main nodes of the territorial issue between Greece and Turkey in the Dodecanese:
on one side Kastellorizo allows Athens to claim the legitimacy of the surrounding waters,
according to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, but on the other side
it reduces the Turkish Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
Today Kastellorizo is of extreme strategic importance.
The Water Convention has never been signed by Turkey, as it was considered inconvenient
for its own national interests.
For the EEZ, the Turkish president is absolutely not willing to give in: already in 2019, Erdoğan
signed two bilateral agreements with al-Sarraj, the Libyan president of the Government of
National Accord (GNA), one on military cooperation and one concerning the borders of the respective
maritime EEZs.
In the first one, Erdoğan offered military equipment - thus violating the UN arms embargo
on Libya - in exchange for a second agreement, which would concern the jurisdiction over
the sea borders between the two states.
This document would authorize the exploration of the seabed, following the (Turkish!) theory
of the continental plates and ignoring the law of the sea.
In this way Turkey would actually expand its sovereignty to the areas of the East Mediterranean
Sea where there are important gas fields (to name a few, the Leviathan gas field, of four
hundred and fifty billion square meters, the Zohr of eight hundred and billion m3, and
the Noor Gas Field, this one estimated to be three times larger than Zohr).
In 45 years of dispute, every time the European Court rejected the Turkish hope for a recognition
of the extension of its maritime borders, Ankara responded with the signing of partial
agreements (such as those with Bulgaria, Romania and Russia), drawing new Exclusive Economic
Zones.
This agreement, however, challenges the rules of international law and conceals the project
of an alleged corridor of security and assistance between Turkey and Libya, a real "highway"
under Turkish control to replicate what has already been tested in the EEZ in the Cyprus
waters. he European Council has therefore rejected the agreement, confirming its support
to Greece and Cyprus, but Turkey - which is still part of the NATO alliance - has nevertheless
started its research activities in the Cypriot EEZ.
Good neighborly relationships, kind of like when the pain-in-the-ass neighbor above you
makes noise all night and then accuses you of being the stalker when you point out that
maybe he's gone too far.
However, interests related to the extraction of natural resources are not the only ones
at stake: the agreement with Libya, in fact, hinders the realization of the EastMed Gas
Pipeline, a project conceived in 2013 for a 1900 km pipeline, mainly underwater, that
would connect gas deposits in Israel and Cyprus to European markets passing through Greece
(Crete and mainland), up to, possibly, the coasts of Apulia.
The pipeline would then cross the EEZ claimed by Turkey, allowing it to secure a role in
this business.
Possible nervousness from Europe does not frighten Ankara, which continues in its plan
to gain a strong position in the Mediterranean, aware that no NATO ship will ever fire against
Turkish ships, still formally allied.
As of today, there have been no relevant diplomatic protests to contain the Turkish expansionism.
But in the meantime, the increasing relationship between Erdoğan and al-Sarraj is rapidly
turning Libya into a Turkish outpost in the Western Mediterranean, an outpost destined
first of all to block the possibility of a collaboration between Cyprus, Egypt, Greece
and Israel for the creation of a gas transport line able to cut off the Turks.
Libya is no stranger to Erdogan's flattery: some projects between Turkey and Libya involved
the construction of three power plants, a commercial center and an airfield in Tripoli,
for an increase in import-export of about 5 billion dollars.
All this was possible on the one hand with the exit of the United States from Libya in
2019 and on the other hand with the Italian and French hesitation to take a position in
a country devastated by NATO bombings in 2011.
Also on the issue of migration flows, Turkey has gradually replaced Italy in the management
of relations with Libya.
already in the summer of 2020 Turkey has managed to acquire control of the Libyan Coast Guard
patrol boats (donated by Italy), thus souring relations with Rome.
The event, in fact, goes far beyond a "handover".
The patrol boats, which now have Turkish instructors on board, were financed with the aim of increasing
the efficiency of patrols in one of the most sensitive traffic areas for migratory flows
from Africa to Europe, Italy first and foremost.
In essence, Turkey has now secured management of the two major migratory corridors between
Africa and Italy: the land route from the Anatolian peninsula to the Balkans and the
sea route across the Mediterranean.
If we add to this the fact that the Libyan SAR zone (that is the search and rescue area)
was desired, designed and paid for by Italy, the impatience of the italian government with
Erdoğan's aggressive foreign policy appears at least understandable, if not acceptable.
And that's not all, Turkey has managed to penetrate another nation: Albania. from the
construction sector to the banking sector, Turkey is gradually entering the Balkans,
first of all by taking advantage of the historical bonds with this region.
You know, the Balkans were under the Ottomans for four centuries.
And they still have a significant presence of Muslim believers.
The Turks have come back to Tirana, once again filling a diplomatic space neglected by Rome
and other EU countries.
Since 2020, Turkey has started to take care of the training of the national armed forces.
In addition, the Albanian parliament has allocated funds necessary for the purchase of the famous
Bayraktar Tb2 drones designed by the son-in-law of the Turkish president.
And among other things, the bulky Turkish presence has also generated fears among the
non-Muslim Albanian community, worried about a possible hardening of lifestyles in the
country.
Erdoğan's aspirations do not stop at the exclusively territorial reconquest of Turkish
supremacy in the Mediterranean.
As already mentioned, the president dreams of a Turkey rich in energy resources, strong,
able to become a point of reference also in religious terms to recompose the Arab world.
And this is where the decision to turn the Hagia Sofia museum and the church of St. Savior
in Chora into mosques comes in, a project that is not well liked by a nation not quite
friendly to Turkey: Egypt.
An open supporter of Haftar, Egypt has the United Arab Emirates and Sunni Saudi Arabia
on its side.
Egypt, because of its proximity to Libya, has been one of the few to make tangible moves
to counter Turkish aspirations in Cyrenaica, where, the subsoil is rich in hydrocarbons,
and has repeatedly threatened the Turks of heavy military intervention if armed clashes
spread east of Sirte.
In addition, Al Sisi has immediately stipulated agreements with the Greeks regarding the extension
of their own Exclusive Economic Zones.
This obviously ignored Turkey’s plans for its own EEZ.
But it’s not all: since 2003, Turkish trade in the Horn of Africa has grown considerably,
from 5 to the current 25 billion dollars, expanding Ankara's diplomatic network from
12 to 49 African embassies.
The first to establish trusting relations was Sudan in 2018, with the signing of a $100
million agreement to let the Turks conduct oil exploration in the Abyei district.
Sudan also assigned Turkey thousands of square kilometers of farmland for investment purposes.
And then there's Somalia, which, according to Erdogan, has directly invited the Turks
to conduct explorations off its desert coast.
Let's not always forget the war industry: In the Horn of Africa, especially in Ethiopia,
Turkey has captured the hearts of the Ethiopian Prime Minister - let's remember, awarded the
Nobel Peace Prize - and sold him him armored vehicles, TAI Anka UAVs and Bayraktar Tb2
drones.
The army of Aby Ahmed's government was saved from defeat in the war thanks to the Turkish
drones, when the Tigrinya rebels were no more than 200 km from the capital.
At the beginning, Erdogan's adventure in the Horn of Africa was promoted as a humanitarian
intervention.
A humanitarian intervention which, however, included the construction of a military base
worth 50 million dollars in Mogadishu.
This was meant to be a gateway to East Africa.
The intervention included also the concession of Suakin Island by Sudan for the next 99
years in order to build a civilian and military port.
And also in 2020, Turkish forces have been involved in training a third of the Somali
armed forces.
The commitment is to equip the Somali national army in the fight against the radical Islamic
al-Shabaab militia.
An attitude that denotes a certain medium to long term vision.
Turkish interest has then expanded to Niger and Chad, where Turkey has once again taken
advantage - just like Russia - of the withdrawal of the former French colonial power, acting
as an allied and neighboring force.
Erdogan has leveraged on the fact of having a common religion (Islam) with this region
and exploited the anti-French feelings of the population.
Turkey has therefore expanded its area of influence to the Sahel region, a success that
needs to be added to what has already been achieved in the former Italian colonies of
Libya and Somalia.
All of this denotes a foreign policy capable of exploiting conflicts, tensions and power
vacuums, which is increasingly expanding from the Mediterranean into the African hinterland.
The real questions at this point are many: how will President Erdoğan react if, faced
with yet another episode of Ottoman machismo, NATO forces or EU member states decide to
retaliate?
Will he create the next power vacuum to be filled?
Will the conflict between Ukraine and Russia mark a rapprochement between Erdoğan and
Putin?
In the coming months and years we will perhaps know some definite answers about the future
of Turkey and its "good neighbor" policy, the Mavi Vatan.