There is someone at the time who is pushing for Paulus to take the blame. Someone making
a scapegoat out of Paulus to protect his own image. They’re trying to pass the blame for what happened
at Stalingrad, and needed Paulus to be seen as passive, timid, and a poor commander -
and Paulus has subsequently been viewed as someone not willing to defy orders and break out.
But this Mystery Man was also unwilling to defy those exact same orders, even though he has
championed this idea that Paulus was at fault. Why is Paulus not to blame? And who is the
one pushing the idea that he was to blame? And what motive would they have to pin the
blame on Paulus? Let’s find out.
After months of fighting inside the city of Stalingrad, on the 19th of November 1942,
the Red Army launched Operation Uranus. By the 23rd of November, Sixth Army was cut off
inside the Stalingrad Pocket. As shown in a previous video, on the 20th
of November 1942, Jeschonnek (Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff) indicates to Hitler
that it might be possible to supply Paulus’s trapped Sixth Army by air. This is all that
Hitler needs, and his mind is made up. When Göring arrives on the scene on the 22nd of
November - sensing that Hitler’s mind was already made up - he pledged the Luftwaffe
could supply the Sixth Army as well. Paulus is ordered to stand and fight.
“WIth the benefit of hindsight, many have argued that General Paulus should have defied
Hitler and broken out to the west, thereby saving his soldiers and depriving the Soviets
of a great victory. This debate really involves two different issues - Paulus’s moral responsibility
to disobey his Führer, and the practical possibility of actually accomplishing the withdrawal.”
For the sake of this video, we’re going to assume that a breakout attempt was possible
and would have succeeded with relatively minor losses.
This leaves us with one simple question - should Paulus have defied his orders and attemped
to break out? One of Paulus’s corps commanders - Seydlitz
- was so adamant that breaking out was the only option that he ordered the withdrawal of 94th
Infantry Division in preparation for the breakout. Seydlitz was one of the commanders who had
survived the Demyansk pocket, and so had experienced a very similar situation. 94th Infantry Division
even burnt its food supplies in its minor withdrawal. Hitler reacted to this by placing Seydlitz
in charge of the pocket’s northern front, sending a clear message that withdrawal was absolutely
not acceptable, and that he would relieve anyone who attempted it.
Even Seydlitz then remarked -
“There’s nothing left but to obey.” Seydlitz
This was the strongest voice in the pocket, arguing for a breakout and withdrawal. And
here he is accepting Hitler’s will. When you look at the situation in the early
days, not only do you find that Paulus is being reassured that they will be supplied
and relieved, but also that he has no choice but to obey his orders.
“The confrontational, uncouth behavior of Hitler and his adherents undoubtedly repelled
the general, who was himself a model of civility. Nevertheless, Paulus had witnessed and personally
benefited from the phenomenal success achieved by Hitler; to question that success now would
have been an act of egotism comparable to that of the dictator himself. Moreover, Paulus
undoubtedly believed that if he attempted to disobey at this stage, he would simply
be replaced by another commander. Paulus reportedly remarked to Major General Arthur Schmidt,
his chief of staff, that “he would willingly give his head for the Sixth Army, but that
he felt it was useless to do so.” ” Glantz, Stalingrad Volume 3, Book 2 Page 6-7
Those arguing that Paulus should have defied his orders are looking at this problem from
the benefit of hindsight. We know Sixth Army was doomed, we know that the Luftwaffe failed
to supply the army, and so it’s easy to say that Paulus may as well have defied his
orders and broken out. But things weren’t so clear at the time.
Paulus does not know if the Luftwaffe can supply him or not. As I’ve said, in theory,
they should have supplied him with a lot more than they actually did.
Paulus also doesn’t know if he will be relieved or not. We know now that he doesn’t get relieved, but
at the time he was being told that they will break through to him.
The point to note is this - Paulus wants to break out, and is willing to do so. He just
needs the order. If someone would give him the order, he would attempt a breakout. He
later goes on to create Operation Thunder Clap, Sixth Army’s breakout plan, and is
asking constantly - when can I break out, shall I break out, who’s going to give me
the order to break out? And here’s the problem - he never receives
the order. Hitler can give that order, but so can Paulus’s
superiors. At the beginning of the siege, his immediate
superior - Generaloberst Maximilian von Weichs, commander of Army Group B - was also forbidden
to allow the breakout and withdrawal of the Sixth Army.
Weichs was on Paulus’s side, and argued for a breakout.
However, Weichs is only Paulus’s superior for a short while before Paulus is placed
under the command of another general. This new general is our Mystery Man.
Mystery Man agrees with Hitler and wants Paulus to stand his ground as well.
So, to put this in context, Paulus’s former commander (Weichs) argued for a break out,
as does did Richthofen (commander of Fourth Air Fleet, who denies that Sixth Army can
be supplied by air), and as mentioned, the corps commanders in Sixth Army - Paulus’s
subordinates - also want to break out. So, all these generals, and their chief of
staffs, believe that a breakout is the only option and they argued as much as well.
But Mystery Man does not. He believes Sixth Army should stay where it is, and Hitler is
convinced by his influence, and by the fact that the Luftwaffe could supply the Sixth
Army by air. On the 26th of November, Paulus sends a letter
to Mystery Man, describing the situation, and stating that he hadn’t received orders
or information from the high command for at least 36 hours and that his request for “freedom
of action” from Hitler had been denied. Paulus asks Mystery Man to help solve the
problem. Either relieve him, or give him the order to break out.
This is in fact the letter where Paulus ends it, saying -
“In the circumstances, I hope you will overlook the inadequacy of the paper and the fact that
this letter is in longhand.” - Paulus’ Letter, 26th of November
This was because he was running out of paper and didn’t have a typewriter. And this should
be a big clue to some of you, since I’ve mentioned this letter before.
Throughout the siege, and the relief attempts, Paulus asks Mystery Man over and over for
updates on the relief attempt. And doesn’t get anything substantial. He’s left in the
dark, because Mystery Man doesn’t want to upset him - because progress wasn’t going
so well. Paulus asks over and over for the order to break out.
“Am I to take it that I am now authorized to initiate Operation Thunder Clap?” - Paulus
“I can’t give you full authority today. But I hope to get a decision tomorrow.”
Oh, but it’s alright to blame Paulus for not defying orders and not going against Hitler,
but nobody’s blaming Mystery Man for not doing the exacty same thing. He is Paulus’s immediate
superior. He could order Paulus to breakout and shoulder the responsibility himself.
But he doesn’t do this. And in fact, he’s the one making it out
as though Paulus is passive, and timid, and unwilling to defy orders. He manipulates the
evidence against Paulus. He blames Paulus for not ordering the break out, saying he
was ordered to break out when he actually wasn’t. But Mystery Man is the one in the same position,
able to order a breakout, able to defy Hitler’s orders just like Paulus, and able to shoulder
that responsibility. He’s the one who helped persuade Hitler that Sixth Army should stay
where it is. And to top it all off, he later claims to have given Paulus the order to break
out - which he did not do. So, even assuming the breakout attempt was
possible - which is an entire debate in itself - what we have here is a situation where Paulus
is ordered to hold his ground under all circumstances. He’s told he would receive adequate air
supplies and would be able to be rescued soon. So, in late November to early December, why
would Paulus want to break out? In mid-December, with his army weak, and the relief attempt
not even reaching halfway to his forces, he still doesn’t receive the order to breakout.
Thinking objectively, it’s simply not reasonable to assume Paulus should defy his orders and
attempt to break out. Those of you saying he should have broken out, are saying this
from the benefit of hindsight. You know the outcome. You know Sixth Army is doomed. You
know that the army won’t be rescued. But Paulus, at the time, does not know this. He
is being told by Hitler and by the Luftwaffe - we will support you, we will supply you,
and we will break you out. Do not withdraw. It’s no wonder that he doesn’t order a
breakout. And let’s not forget the other person in
this equation. The man who is equally unwilling to defy orders.
The man who is equally unable to issue Paulus the order to break out. The man who actually
helped persuade Hitler to order Sixth Army NOT to withdraw. The man who blames Paulus,
and makes it out as though Paulus is at fault, to cover his own mistakes, and to make himself
look as perfect as possible in the eyes of history.
Who is this man?
It is...
Erich von Manstein.
Yes, Manstein is lying! As you will find out in full in part 2.