- [Narrator] In 1968, the Nelson family hired Elmer Gertz,
a prominent Chicago attorney to bring a civil suit
against a Chicago police officer.
Previously, the officer had been criminally prosecuted
for killing their son.
During the course of litigation,
Gertz was featured in a magazine called American Opinion.
Gertz had little to do with the police officer's
criminal prosecution, but the article accused him
of masterminding the whole thing.
The magazine claimed it was all a frameup,
as part of a vast conspiracy to discredit law enforcement.
Many of these statements were blatantly false,
and the magazine's managing editor published the material
without attempting to verify its truth.
Gertz sued the magazine for defamation
in federal district court, claiming damage to his reputation
as both an attorney and a citizen.
After a jury awarded Gertz $50,000 in damages,
the publisher filed a motion for judgment
not withstanding the verdict.
The court granted the motion,
applied the standard articulated
in New York Times v. Sullivan.
That case held that a public official must prove
that a falsehood was published with actual malice.
Finding that Gertz couldn't meet that standard,
the district court issued a judgment
in favor of the publisher.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed,
and the United States Supreme Court granted cert.
The issue before the Supreme Court
was whether a publisher of defamatory material
can claim constitutional privilege against liability
when the defamed person is neither a public figure
nor a public official.
In a five-to-four decision authored by Justice Powell,
the court ruled that the actual malice standard
doesn't apply to private individuals.
Rather, the court permitted the states to determine
the appropriate standard of care for publishers
that defamed private individuals,
as long as that standard requires some level of fault.
The court's reasoning was twofold.
First, the court recognized that the actual-malice standard
articulated in New York Times was too heavy a burden
for private individuals.
The court reasoned that private individuals
are generally unable to publicly rebut false statements
because they lack access to the channels
of mass communication.
Thus, private parties are more vulnerable
to published falsehoods.
Second, the court noted that public officials understand
and accept the risk of public scrutiny
when they take office.
The public commonly takes an interest
not only in the official's performance of their duties,
but also in the makings of their private life.
In contrast, private individuals never signed up
for public scrutiny.
The court held that private individuals don't have to meet
the actual malice standard to recover damages
for the publication of injurious falsehoods,
even if the defamatory statement relates to a matter
of public interest.
The court further held that awarded presumptive
and punitive damages, as typically applied at common law,
required a showing of actual malice.
Applying these rules, the court determined
that Gertz was neither a public official
nor a public figure.
As a result, the lowers courts had erred
in applying the New York Times standard.
The court reversed the Seventh Circuit
and remanded the case for a new trial.
Justice Blackman wrote a concurring opinion,
praising the majority for resolving the uncertainty
engendered by the court's previous defamation jurisprudence.
Justice Douglas dissented.
He suggested that libel laws were already too strict,
and he questioned the majority's wisdom
in permitting the states to determine
their own liability standards.
Justice Brennan also dissented,
raising the concern that debate can't flourish
if states can impose minimal thresholds of fault
on publishers for defaming private individuals.
Rather, Justice Brennan would have applied
the actual-malice standard to Gertz as a private individual,
and upheld the ruling of the lower courts.
Finally, Justice White's lengthy dissent
admonished the majority for overreaching
by invalidating state laws on defamation.
White specifically took issue
with the constitutional requirement created by the majority,
which requires the plaintiff to prove some level of fault
on the publisher's part
and actual damage to the plaintiff's reputation.
He argued that, in so doing,
the majority radically transformed
the traditional law of libel
and intruded on the state's prerogatives.
Justice White also criticized the majority
for barring recovery of punitive damages
without a showing of actual malice.
In Gertz, the court created a boundary
for the actual-malice standard previously announced
in New York Times v. Sullivan,
refusing to apply it to private individuals.
In doing so, the court injected some certainty
into the court's defamation jurisprudence.