In 2016, Hillary Clinton had won
the statewide popular vote in Washington state
and so the slate of presidential electors
that had been nominated
by the Washington State Democratic Party
were appointed as electors.
State law specified that they were required
to cast their votes in accordance with
the outcome of the popular vote in that state,
but three of them didn't, and so
under state law, they were each fined $1,000
and they appealed those fines up through
the state courts in Washington
and ultimately to the U.S. Supreme Court.
There were really two related questions
the Court was dealing with.
First, can states require their electors
to cast their electoral votes for the candidate
that won the statewide popular vote within the state?
And then, a second, related question was
are there limits on the enforcement mechanisms
that states can adopt for these types of
elector-binding laws?
The electors argued primarily that the original intent
underlying the creation of the electoral college
was that electors would exercise their independent judgment
about who should be president.
And they were able to point to
various excerpts from the debates
surrounding the ratification of the Constitution
and they basically said it would
defeat the point of the electoral college
if states could simply direct their electors
to vote in a particular way.
They also pointed to particular words in Article II
and they said that the very notion of a vote itself
implies that the person casting it has discretion
as to the candidate for whom it should be counted.
The state of Washington raised several arguments.
First, it argued from a textual perspective
that there simply weren't any limits in the Constitution
as to a state legislature's ability to bind electors
or to require them to cast their votes
in a particular manner,
that since the Constitution was silent on the issue,
there wasn't a basis for imposing restrictions
on a state legislature's ability.
It emphasized Supreme Court precedents
that had held that legislatures have broad plenary authority
concerning the appointment of presidential electors.
And so building on Ray versus Blair,
the state said if a state can require electors
to pledge to cast their electoral votes
in a particular manner,
it would be highly unlikely that the Constitution
prohibits states from enforcing those pledges,
whether through fines or through removal mechanisms.
The Court ultimately held
that states may bind their electors
and it affirmed both Washington state's decision
to fine electors who violated those requirements
and, in the companion case Baca,
it affirmed the state's decision to simply
remove electors who voted for the wrong candidates,
disregard their votes, and appoint replacement electors
who would cast their votes in accordance with
the outcome of the election within that state.
Justice Kagan acknowledged that many framers
may have subjectively intended that presidential electors
exercise their independent discretion,
but she said there was no basis for the Court to enforce
those unexpressed, subjective personal intentions,
that the only thing the Court could do
is enforce the text of the Constitution.
And nothing in the Constitution's text
established or guaranteed electors' independence
or electors' discretion.
All of the justices agreed with the conclusion
that states are free to bind their electors
and to enforce those requirements.
The decision promotes federalism
by giving states broad discretion to regulate
the manner in which their presidential electors
cast their electoral vote
and it reaffirms authority that many states
have been exercising for several decades
as to the manner in which electors
will ultimately vote for president.