By the late 1940s, labor organizations had become a powerful force in America. The government
worked with unions to prevent work stoppages, but widespread fear remained about the crippling
effects of large-scale strikes. In response, Congress, over President Truman's veto, passed the Taft-Hartley Labor Act
in 1947, which limited the negotiation tools unions had in collective bargaining disputes,
This did nothing to soothe the contentious relationship between
Congress and the President, who had been vocal in his criticism for the “Do-Nothing Congress”
in his reelection campaign. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer involved
a labor dispute in the early 1950s between steel mill owners and employees about their
collective bargaining agreements. The two sides were unable to come to terms, even after
federal mediators arrived to help. The workers prepared to strike.
At the time, the United States was involved in the Korean War, and steel was needed for
the military. President Truman believed the reduction in steel production from a strike
would compromise national defense. He issued an executive order instructing the Secretary
of Commerce (Sawyer) to take control of the nation’s steel mills and ensure uninterrupted
production. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. (plaintiff) and
other mill operators sued Sawyer in federal court. Youngstown alleged the President’s
order was unconstitutional, because it amounted to legislation, which was Congress’s proprietary
role. The government argued that because the President
was acting in response to a national emergency, the order was authorized under “the aggregate
of his constitutional powers as the Nation’s Chief Executive and the Commander-in-Chief.”
The district court granted an injunction on the ground that the President had exceeded
his constitutional authority, but the court of appeals, sitting en banc, temporarily stayed
the injunction. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the President
had exceeded his executive powers when he issued the order.
Writing for the majority, Justice Black held that the President could only act where he
had been expressly or implicitly authorized to do so by the Constitution or Congress.
The executive branch could not cite any express constitutional justification for the order,
and the Court rejected as too attenuated the solicitor general’s argument that the President’s
power should be implied. Justice Black found that the war powers granted to the executive
by the Constitution did not apply because there had been no declaration of war, and
no other constitutional provisions conveyed this authority. Justice Black noted that Congress
expressly rejected the use of seizures to solve labor disputes during the drafting process
of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947. Thus, the executive order could not be justified by
any statutory authorization, either. Given the concurring and dissenting opinions
in this case, there has been some debate over the exact limits of the President’s authority.
Justice Jackson’s famous concurrence outlines the authority of the President to act. Where
Congress has expressly or impliedly granted power to the executive, the President may
rely upon his own powers and those of Congress. Where Congress is silent, the President may
rely only on his own authority (though there is a “zone of twilight” where the President
and Congress may have concurrent powers). Lastly, where the President acts contrary
to the will of Congress, “his power is at its lowest ebb.” Jackson found that Congress
had explicitly refused to grant the executive the power to seize real property to avoid
labor disputes and that Truman had acted unconstitutionally. Justice Douglas concurred to say that only
Congress could appropriate money to compensate owners for a nationwide seizure of property;
therefore, the power to seize private property rested squarely with Congress.
Justice Frankfurter wrote a concurrence to point out that while the executive has been
granted the authority to make large-scale seizures in the past, Congress had granted
temporary powers during war or national emergency. Finding neither condition present, Frankfurter
believed Truman’s order was unconstitutional. Justice Burton, in his concurrence, found
the Truman acted outside his authority because he did not abide by the procedures authorized
by Congress in the Taft Hartley Act and had no inherent power to act on his own.
Justice Clark’s concurrence concluded that the executive’s independent power to act
depends on the gravity of the situation, but he did not find the labor dispute to be severe
enough to warrant the President’s executive order.
Justice Vinson wrote the lone dissent, arguing that the President’s order was necessary
to prevent a crisis of national defense that could result if work stoppage caused steel
shortages. The Youngstown decision was a sharp and unexpected blow
to President Truman’s policy ambitions, and Truman made his displeasure known. Justice
Black extended an olive branch by inviting Truman to a party. Truman eventually made
peace with the justices, telling Black, “Hugo, I don't much care for your law, but, by golly,
this bourbon is good."