As we saw in our last episode, we are amidst one of the key points of the Pacific War.
With the disastrous defeat on the bloody slopes of Edson’s Ridge, the Japanese high
command started to comprehend that they were losing the initiative against the tenacious and
resilient American forces in the Pacific. Now, General Horii continues his difficult and harsh
advance along the Kokoda Track, not knowing that the recent failures in the Guadalcanal Campaign
were soon to affect his overland offensive against Port Moresby. Nonetheless,
the stubborn but effective commander will soon face the might of the Australian soldiers in yet
another delaying action, and also the even more threatening prospect of straining his supply line,
so join us today to cover the Battle of Ioribaiwa and the crucial aftermath of the offensive.
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As we last saw in the series, the situation on the Kokoda Track was very grim both for the Japanese
and for the Australians. General Horii’s South Seas Detachment had successfully defeated the
defenders at Isurava, Eora and Efogi, but the engagements had been very bloody, leaving the
Japanese with a large number of casualties and delaying their advance for more time than Horii
could afford to. This is because the invaders were facing a dire situation in regards to
the supply problem. Air attacks on the track and the desertion of native carriers strained
Horii’s supply line and brought it ever closer to a complete collapse, so the Japanese soldiers were
starving, supplementing their dwindling rations with raids on village gardens along the road
and with the supplies that the Australians left behind as they retreated southwards.
Horii also had orders to stop his advance on the southern slopes of the Owen Stanley Range,
both because of the supply dilemma and because the Japanese high command was worried about the
recent defeats on Guadalcanal, a theater which they were beginning to prioritize.
Yet the relentless commander of the South Seas Detachment decided to press on south
towards Port Moresby, driven by his desire to exert vengeance on the stubborn enemy
and thus avoid the disgrace of defeat. Port Moresby also meant food and shelter for his men,
an end to the supply problem that had plagued his offensive from the beginning. With his forward
units already in hot pursuit of the retreating enemy forces, Horii was now preparing to resume
his advance towards Port Moresby, not knowing that he was reaching the end of the line.
As for the Australians, Brigadier Potts had been forced to abandon his main supply base at Myola,
so he was also facing a difficult supply situation.
The enemy had been advancing in force, and although he and his 21st Brigade had been
offering much resistance ever since the defense of Isurava, his forces were rapidly dwindling
due to the strong Japanese attacks. Diseases like malaria and dysentery were also plaguing both the
Australian and Japanese forces, inflicting more casualties than the actual battles themselves.
By September 9, the bulk of Maroubra Force finally regrouped at Menari with the invaders
on hot pursuit and executing a strong mortar barrage, although the 2/27th Battalion had been
cut off during the retreat and had to subsequently traverse through the jungle until they arrived
at Jawarere on September 22. From Menari, Potts would have to continue his withdrawal southwards
because of his exposed position against enemy attacks, with the 2/14th and 2/16th Battalions
taking new defensive positions on the Maguli Range between Nauro and Ioribaiwa.
Meanwhile, General Rowell continued to deal with the administrative problems at Port Moresby,
trying to build a stable supply line despite the few maps and transport aircraft at hand.
With the enemy slowly but surely advancing along the Kokoda Track, Rowell’s small but
experienced staff was beginning to comprehend how enormous their task of defending New Guinea was.
To add to all his problems, General MacArthur requested from Brisbane to be informed with a
“ball to ball” description of the situation; yet Rowell opposed this,
and he instead sent only factual information at stated times.
Without knowing what exactly was happening but seeing that the Japanese advance still continued,
General MacArthur started to doubt the capabilities of Rowell and of Maroubra Force,
planning to replace both of them as soon as possible. On September 10,
Rowell also decided to recall Potts because of the disaster at Brigade Hill, appointing Brigadier
Porter to again take command of Maroubra Force. The Australians then continued their withdrawal
towards the higher ground at Ioribaiwa, with the Japanese still close behind them.
While the 2/16th prepared an ambush , the 2/14th was holding off a strong Japanese attack coming
from three sides at the Meguli Range. Suffering many casualties, the defenders eventually withdrew
and their pursuers found in the Ofi Creek some scattered supplies left behind by the Australians.
But it was a trap, and as the Japanese desperately fell into the rations,
they were fired from several directions and had to retreat . This gained enough
time for Porter’s men to safely arrive at the Ioribaiwa Ridge by September 12, where they
were reinforced by two infantry battalions and a special force under Colonel Honner,
the last commander of the formidable 39th Battalion. To help Porter stabilize the situation,
Rowell was also sending the 25th Brigade of Brigadier Ken Eather to reinforce him,
which would finally arrive at Ioribaiwa by September 14; while the Honner Force was
also sent forward through the Goldie River to cut off the enemy line of communications at Menari.
At the Ioribaiwa Ridge, Porter deployed the 2/14th and 2/16th Battalions, with the 3rd and 2/33rd
Battalions protecting their right flank and with the 2/31st Battalion guarding their left flank.
Finally, the 2/25th Battalion was left in reserve at the rear,
preparing to be the one to spearhead a counterattack along the track towards Nauro,
with the other two battalions of the 25th Brigade tasked with outflanking the invaders.
In the meantime, Horii set up a mountain gun high on the northern slope of the Ofi Creek valley,
starting a heavy bombardment of the Australian positions at Ioribaiwa.
On September 14, the South Seas Detachment began its first charges against the enemy, with the 3rd
Battalion of Colonel Kuwada attacking the main position at Ioribaiwa and the 2nd Battalion of
Major Horie attempting a flanking move towards the west. Kuwada had little success at first,
as the higher ground enabled the defenders to keep his men at bay with grenades and gunfire;
but the Japanese would relentlessly continue to charge, finally gaining a foothold although they
would be unable to press the advantage any further. On the other side, the 2/31st had
swung off the track in the morning trying to outflank the invaders, yet they were rapidly
engaged by Horie’s unit and were at last forced to retreat back towards the crest of the ridge,
where they managed to hold their position against the strong attacks of the enemy.
The following day, Kuwada sent a platoon towards the eastern flank,
finding there a long line of Australian defenses manned by the 2/33rd and 3rd Battalions.
Despite this, the Japanese quickly found a weak point in the line, where a militia unit had put
its weapons to the side and hadn’t posted sentries while digging deeper. Rushing over, the Japanese
platoon rapidly overcame the militia unit and seized this high point along the ridgeline, from
where the invaders could fire down on defensive positions in both directions along the line.
In response, Eather ordered the 2/25th Battalion to counterattack and dislodge the enemy from this
position, while the 2/33rd drove to the left to outflank them. Yet the ruggedness of the terrain
prevented the 2/33rd from making any progress, and the 2/25th would have to assault the strong
Japanese position by itself, losing many men and finally getting pushed back. Meanwhile,
in the center, the 2/14th and 2/16th Battalions were under much pressure from the Japanese who
had crept closely with machine-guns and by their powerful artillery which was inflicting many
casualties on them; and to the west, the 2/31st was facing a similar situation. At the same time,
the supply problem was becoming serious for the defenders, as air supply was impossible
in these conditions, the native carriers refused to move to the frontlines and lack of water was
lowering the strength of the Australians. By September 16, the fighting at Ioribaiwa
had reached a stalemate, as either side was failing to break through with flanking attacks.
Yet the Japanese continued to strain harder at the Australian positions, and the battered
2/14th and 2/16th Battalions were beginning to get pushed back after three weeks of heavy fighting.
Eather and Porter didn’t believe they could hold off the enemy much longer,
even despite their numerical superiority, so they finally elected to withdraw farther back
towards Imita Ridge . About this decision, Eather reasoned that if he continued to hold Ioribaiwa,
then all his forces would be committed to the defensive, preventing him from preparing for
any offensive operations. He also wanted to gain more time to relieve the exhausted men
from the 21st Brigade and to prepare better defensive positions from which to launch his
counteroffensive. But unbeknownst to him, the Japanese were also facing a dilemma.
Aside from their breakthrough to the east, they hadn’t made much progress against the enemy,
and the Japanese commanders were beginning to understand that they were outnumbered
and lacked reserves to continue their assaults. Despite this, Major-General Arthur Allen of the
7th Australian Division finally approved Eather’s request to fall further back towards Imita Ridge,
but warned that this position was to be held “to the death” . Thus, the fresh 2/25th Battalion was
brought forward to the Ioribaiwa Ridge to protect the withdrawal of the bulk of Maroubra Force.
By late afternoon, the 2/25th also began to fall back, with the 2/33rd Battalion
forming a rearguard while the rest of the brigade struggled through the heavy rain and the slippery
track of the Ua-Ule Creek. The following day, the Australian forces had successfully
deployed on Imita Ridge, with the 3rd and 2/33rd Battalions to the east, the 2/25th in the center
and the 2/31st to the west, reinforced with the 2/1st Pioneer Battalion. With the withdrawal of
Porter’s 21st Brigade southwards, Eather also took formal command of Maroubra Force at this point.
In the meantime, the Honner Force was carrying a difficult journey through the muddy tracks
and dense jungle, and by September 19, they would arrive at the vicinity of Omaramara. Yet the men
were exhausted and lacked sufficient supplies, horses and suitable air drop groun to continue
forward, so they would be unable to move from there, Honner was told not to go beyond the limits
of the rations he was given. For the Japanese, however, the victory had been surprising, and they
knew now that behind Imita stood Port Moresby, the objective - and obsession - of their invasion. In
that regard, the officers were readying their men for a final desperate charge towards Port Moresby.
Yet back on September 14, worried about the supply problem and fearing that with the
recent defeats on Guadalcanal the Americans might take the initiative to invade Buna,
the Japanese high command had decided to cancel the Port Moresby offensive
and to reassemble the South Seas Detachment north of the Owen Stanleys in protection of Buna.
On September 16, however, General Hyakutake sent the wrong order to Horii, indicating that he was
to halt his advance to secure Ioribaiwa and then prepare for a future offensive.
Port Moresby was so close, but so far away at the same time; and Horii had no other choice but to
stop his advance at Ioribaiwa, because his supply line had virtually ground to a halt and his men
were on the brink of starvation. His troops on the ridge, meanwhile, dug their distinctive foxholes
and trenches, and then started to send patrols forward. For the next couple of days, there would
be only small-scale actions, and the Australians would finally solidify their position at Imita.
With the strength of his men ebbing for lack of food and with discipline getting harder
to maintain, Horii would have to appeal to their military pride with encouraging speeches
so as to maintain their fighting spirit. The Japanese commander also knew that the
enemy had amassed more than 20000 troops in Port Moresby and that Tokyo was probably not going to
send any more resources to New Guinea because of the prioritization of the Guadalcanal theater.
The bad weather of the region was also preventing to airlift food supplies from Rabaul,
with only one attempt successfully dropping supplies on Kokoda on September 23. Finally,
on September 24, orders from Generals Imamura and Hyakutake would arrive, telling Horii to withdraw
from Ioribaiwa towards the Isurava-Kokoda area and to strengthen the defenses in Buna. Horii was
adamant not to carry out these orders after all the blood that had been shed to get them there,
but after getting a signal by the Emperor himself, he had to crushingly prepare for his withdrawal.
At the same time, General MacArthur was very angry about Rowell’s decision not to constantly inform
him about the situation in New Guinea, and he was concerned about what he perceived as a lack of
efficiency by Australian forces. Thus, he decided to send General Blamey to take personal command
of the New Guinea Force and he also wanted to send US forces to Port Moresby to offer more resistance
against the Japanese advance. General Rowell would be allowed to keep command of the 1st Corps,
but he took this situation very badly, stating that Blamey came to New Guinea when the tide
was on the turn and that he would be recognized for it without actually having done anything.
A very strained situation then continued between the two men, and on September 28, Blamey would
finally relieve Rowell from his command because of his “non-cooperative attitude” , replacing him
with Lieutenant-General Edmund Herring. In response to the Japanese passivity,
Eather had also sent forward the 2/25th Battalion with caution along the track, successfully
gaining some ground by September 25 to start an artillery bombardment of the Japanese positions.
The Australians then began to move forward in preparation for an offensive against Ioribaiwa;
but on September 26, Horii finally began his withdrawal.
The South Seas Detachment had never retreated before, and Horii had no protocol for retreat,
so he had to devise an ad-hoc plan to meet the circumstances, planning to execute a
fighting withdrawal like the one the enemy had been carrying out along the Kokoda Track.
On September 28, Eather’s attack against Ioribaiwa then began as planned, but they
found there no opposition at all and also much equipment left behind by the retreating invaders.
After so many gruesome delaying actions, after the loss of so many courageous men who
sacrificed their lives to gain time - a minute, an hour, a day - the task was at last complete.
Yet the men knew that much fighting still lay ahead of them, but the threat to Port Moresby
had at last been removed. With the Japanese withdrawal, the Australians had suffered their
true baptism of fire in the Pacific War. Now, it was finally time for the counterattack, although
we’ll have to wait a couple of weeks for that. Next week, however, we’ll return to Guadalcanal
to cover the direct aftermath of the Battle of the Bloody Ridge, including the naval action on this
period, the efforts to reinforce from both sides and the actions carried out along the Matanikau.
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