Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel, and Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting
me to discuss Nigeria's struggle against Boko Haram, one of the most lethal terrorist groups
in Africa today.
Over a month ago, the world was shocked when Boko Haram kidnapped over 250 young women
from a secondary school in Chibok.
The United States swiftly joined the effort to help the Government of Nigeria safely recover
the hostages.
President Obama pledged our full support, and President Goodluck Jonathan readily accepted
Secretary Kerry's offer of assistance.
Today in Nigeria's capital, Abuja, a robust multidisciplinary team from the United States
government is working hand in hand with Nigerian counterparts and teams from a half dozen other
countries such as the United Kingdom and France.
Our military and civilian experts in intelligence, military planning, hostage negotiations, strategic
communications, civilian protection, and victim support, have been given unprecedented access
and cooperation to assist Nigeria's effort to safely recover the kidnapped schoolgirls.
This effort -- one that is extremely difficult and, as we know from our own experience, may
take far longer than we would like -- will necessarily entail not just a military approach,
but also law enforcement and diplomatic approaches.
This kidnapping -- and addressing the threat of Boko Haram more broadly -- would be daunting
for any government.
That is why the United States is doing all it can to help Nigeria address these challenges
-- today and longer term.
During our trip last week, AFRICOM Commander General David Rodriguez and I met Nigeria's
top security officials to stress the importance of resolving this crisis and redoubling the
effort to defeat Boko Haram, while respecting human rights and ensuring the protection of
civilians.
In Paris, Under Secretary for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman continued this conversation
with Nigerian President Jonathan and heads of state from neighboring countries at a summit
convened by French President Hollande in Paris.
The summit brought together President Jonathan with presidents of his four neighbors (Benin,
Cameroon, Chad, and Niger) as well as senior representatives of the United States, United
Kingdom, and European Union.
Coming one day after Boko Haram killed and kidnapped Chinese nationals in northern Cameroon,
the summit made clear and urgent for all parties the growing regional dimension of this challenge.
The leaders discussed the safe return of the school girls held hostage, and shared concrete
ideas on how to defeat Boko Haram such as improving cooperation on border security,
countering violent extremism, and redoubling efforts to promote economic growth and create
jobs in the affected region.
This is consistent with the comprehensive approach Nigeria announced in March and we
have repeatedly called for this broad effort to be implemented.
At the summit, the U.S., United Kingdom, and France established a coordination mechanism
at various levels to ensure our development, diplomatic, and security assistance are synchronized,
including with our African partners.
We again called on our African partners to establish national CT strategies, to integrate
them across the region, and to share them with P3 and other partners.
The United States has worked with Nigeria to impose UN Security Council sanctions on
Boko Haram, which we expect to be completed this week.
Peace and security in Nigeria is one of our highest foreign policy priorities in Africa.
The tragedy of this kidnapping has rightfully focused our attention on the need to return
these girls to their families, and on Boko Haram's increasingly brazen assaults on youth
seeking education.
Ensuring that girls and boys alike have the opportunity to learn is essential to ensuring
that all of Nigeria's people contribute to and benefit from its economic prosperity.
As the First Lady recently observed, stories like those of the kidnapped girls -- and others
who have risked their lives to pursue an education -- should serve as a call to action to help
the millions of girls worldwide who are not in school.
The kidnappings have also exposed the long-term security challenges that confront Nigeria,
one of our most important partners in Africa.
The fight against Boko Haram requires more than just military action, it requires a comprehensive
approach to improving the lives of people in Northeast Nigeria.
Just as my portfolio at the State Department includes counterterrorism, law enforcement,
democracy promotion, human rights, conflict response, criminal justice, refugees, trafficking
in persons, and religious freedom, Nigeria needs to address all of these important, inter-related
issues in its fight against Boko Haram.
Nigeria is not only a critical regional political and economic leader, but also a partner with
which we work closely together in multilateral fora, including the UN Security Council.
While the kidnapping in Chibok has cast a spotlight on Boko Haram, I want to emphasize
that we have long been working to help the people of Nigeria and the Nigerian government
address this terrorist threat.
Boko Haram is a Nigerian-based group that became considerably more violent in 2009 and
has metastasized into a regional threat.
It is responsible for the brutal killing of thousands of people in Nigeria, resulting
in over 1000 deaths and injuries in 2013 alone.
Boko Haram also operates in Cameroon's Far North Region and the Lake Chad Basin and has
kidnapped high-profile Westerners and, just recently, Chinese nationals in Cameroon.
While we are rightfully focused on the almost 300 girls who were kidnapped, this tragedy
is not an isolated incident.
Going back just a few months, in February, over 59 teenage boys were killed in an attack,
and, earlier this month, Boko Haram carried out an attack on two towns, killing an estimated
300 people.
As we pursue an integrated approach to helping Nigeria meet its challenges, we want Nigeria
to prevail in its efforts, which we believe can only be accomplished through a comprehensive,
whole-of-government approach to defeating Boko Haram.
We know from experience the difficulty in confronting an enemy that knows no borders
and kills civilians indiscriminately.
The most urgent need we see today is for Nigerian forces to conduct intelligence-driven operations
that avoid civilian casualties, in order to help enhance trust and cooperation with northern
populations and expose the relatively small numbers of Boko Haram fighters.
More broadly, Nigeria's approach in the Northeast should emphasize and inspire respect for human
rights, rule of law and accountability, and development and responsive governance.
We are seeing small measures of slow progress, including the Nigerian government's announcement
two months ago of a multi-faceted "soft" approach to Boko Haram.
We are eager to see and to help Nigeria now implement this plan and have offered assistance
to that end, including sharing our own lessons learned in how to effectively carry out counterterrorism
operations while ensuring the protection of civilians.
Today, I would like to highlight some of the kinds of security assistance that we have
been providing to help Nigeria address Boko Haram.
A fuller description of our counterterrorism assistance to Nigeria can be found in the
Fact Sheet about Boko Haram and U.S. Counterterrorism Assistance to Nigeria released by the State
Department on May 14.
In Fiscal Years 2012 and 2013, the Department of State planned approximately $35.8 million
in security assistance programs that benefit Nigeria, subject to Congressional notification
and approval.
Our security assistance reflects our efforts to ensure Nigeria takes a comprehensive approach
to countering Boko Haram.
We are working with vetted police and civilian security components to build Nigerian law
enforcement capacities to investigate terrorism cases, effectively deal with explosive devices,
and secure Nigeria's borders.
We do this because the most effective counterterrorism policies and practices are those that respect
human rights and are underpinned by the rule of law.
For example, our West African Regional Security Initiative provided nearly $3.7 million in
assistance to the Nigerian Economic and Financial Crimes Commission in Fiscal Year 2013 to help
Nigeria counter corruption, money laundering, and terrorist financing, and help reform the
police and promote the rule of law.
We are also focused on enabling various Nigerian security services, including the police, various
intelligence agencies, and the ministry of defense, with fusing multiple information
streams to develop a better understanding of Boko Haram.
My DOD colleague will speak to this more fully, but our military assistance supports the professionalization
of vetted military units and improves their ability to plan and implement appropriate
steps to counter Boko Haram and ensure civilian security.
We have a robust dialogue with our Nigerian counterparts on all of these efforts, including
through the U.S.-Nigeria Binational Commission's Regional Security Working Group.
While these efforts will make a difference, we continue to have concerns that human rights
violations by government forces -- particularly those forces that have operated in the Northeast
-- are undermining the government's attempts to defeat Boko Haram.
Given these concerns, we continue to press the Government of Nigeria to demonstrate that
it is working to protect civilians where Boko Haram is not—this means ending impunity
for human rights violations by security forces.
For example, alongside the Nigerian people and their own human rights commission, as
well as Amnesty International and others, we have asked the Government to investigate
massacres allegedly committed by government security forces that occurred in the village
of Baga in April 2013 and at the Giwa Barracks detention facility after Boko Haram staged
a prison break there in March of this year.
Only with facts uncovered and perpetrators brought to justice can the Nigerian government
demonstrate that it is working to preserve life and fairly administer justice.
Let me be clear that there is no equivalence between the actions of the Nigerian military
and those of Boko Haram, a terrorist group which has made clear that it is seeking to
murder civilians in large numbers and terrorize the civilian population as a matter of policy.
Yet, we also know the power of popular grievance narratives against governments, and it is
incumbent on Nigeria's government to demonstrate through specific steps the will to ensure
its forces protect the human rights of all of its people and end impunity for those that
use violence indiscriminately.
Civilians in the Northeast must be assured that security services are there to protect
them from Boko Haram's violence.
The confidence and cooperation of civilians is critical to deny Boko Haram a safe haven
and gather the intelligence necessary to, among other pressing goals, safely recover
the girls kidnapped at Chibok.
Moreover, when military and security forces are found to commit human rights violations
and the government does not act to hold the perpetrators of these incidents responsible
for their actions, we are then limited as a matter of U.S law and policy to work with
units involved in these incidents.
We are eager to help the Nigerian government address these concerns, which impede our ability
to help in preventing punishing, and rectifying Boko Haram's atrocities.
Let me say a few words about how the provisions of law concerning security assistance and
human rights known as the "Leahy laws" affect our work to assist the Nigerian government
combat Boko Haram.
Let me be clear: We value and strongly support the tenets and purpose behind the Leahy laws,
and we have worked within U.S. law and policy to assist the Nigerians in their fight against
Boko Haram.
There is no question that the behavior of certain Nigerian military actors have made
it impossible for the United States to work directly with them.
To better understand the possibilities of promoting change, I will ensure that we are
working to the greatest extent possible to build Nigeria's capacity as a rights-respecting
security partner and to encourage the reform of its military to more effectively address
the Boko Haram threat.
In addition, pervasive corruption undermines the government's fight against Boko Haram.
The Nigerian government has one of sub-Saharan Africa's largest security budgets, with $5.8
billion dedicated to security in its proposed 2014 budget.
Yet corruption prevents supplies as basic as bullets and transport vehicles from reaching
the front lines of the struggle against Boko Haram.
Morale is low and desertions are common among soldiers in Nigeria's 7th Army Division.
For example, on May 14, 7th Division soldiers reportedly fired at their commander's car,
complaining that he had failed to ensure they received the necessary equipment.
As this incident shows, Nigeria will need to seriously tackle corruption if it is to
succeed in stamping out Boko Haram.
These challenges are even more acute in the lead up to February 2015, when Nigeria will
hold its fifth presidential election since its return to democracy in 1999.
The last election, held in 2011, showed improvements in election administration, but was followed
by riots that claimed over 800 lives, mostly in northern states.
Insecurity and political tensions have fueled fears that 2015 may see even greater violence.
We are of course concerned about the northeast, where Boko Haram operates, and where it will
be critical for the government to ensure security so that Nigerians in the Northeast are able
to vote, including in three states of emergency.
We are also working to help address instability in Nigeria's Middle Belt, where complex conflicts
over land have pitted communities against one another, and the Niger Delta, where tensions
over the allocation of oil revenues remain high and a long-running insurgency is yet
to be fully settled.
As Nigerians prepare to vote against this backdrop of corruption, tension, and uncertainty,
we must look at more than the kidnapping at Chibok to understand and help Nigeria address
the full range of challenges to its future.
We are therefore working in other ways to help Nigeria keep civilians safe and strengthen
democracy.
For example, we are reviewing ways to establish a community-based early warning response to
combat GBV in Nigeria, and particularly in the north.
We are striving to promote interreligious tolerance in the Middle Belt, and we have
an initiative championing narratives of non-violence in the Niger Delta led by local Nigerian community,
business, cultural, and economic leaders, and aimed at giving local populations' a voice
to promote peace through media.
As the 2015 elections approach, our diplomatic engagements are supporting USAID's elections
assistance package, which will help the Independent National Electoral Commission, or INEC, to
register voters, conduct elections, and run a nationwide voter education campaign to ensure
that all citizens understand their rights and know how to exercise them.
During my trip to Nigeria, I met INEC Chairman Professor Attahiru Jega to discuss preparations
for the elections, the status of northeastern states' ability to participate in elections,
and convey our interest in the credibility and peacefulness of the vote.
We continue to call on all political parties and candidates to publicly renounce violence
and commit to ensuring a free, fair, and peaceful election.
Before I close, I would like to address two aspects of the State Department's approach
toward Nigeria and Boko Haram.
The first concerns the timing of the designation of Boko Haram as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.
While I was not at the State Department at that time, the Department pursued the designation
after careful deliberation and consultation with the Nigerian government and after a series
of steps that included our June 2012 designation of Boko Haram's top commanders as Specially
Designated Global Terrorists and our June 2013 decision to add Abubakar Shekau, Boko
Haram's official leader to our Rewards for Justice Program.
We made the FTO designation after implementing and assessing these earlier steps, and shortly
after Nigeria and the United Kingdom made their own designations.
In short, our approach to the FTO designation reflected our evolving assessment of Boko
Haram's threat potential, the utility of additional sanctions available pursuant to FTO designation,
and our close coordination with our partners.
Significantly, while Nigeria has been reluctant to seek international attention to the Boko
Haram crisis, it has moved forward this month, in part at our urging, to request that the
United Nations Security Council designate Boko Haram under its al Qa'ida sanctions regime.
The second issue concerns whether Boko Haram, and particularly the kidnapping at Chibok,
is part of a worldwide trend of persecutions against Christians.
We are committed to protecting the rights of people of all religions, including Christians,
to practice their beliefs freely and peacefully.
Certainly Boko Haram has targeted Christians, and Nigerian officials believe that 85% of
the girls kidnapped at Chibok are Christians and have been forced to convert to Islam after
their kidnapping.
We want to highlight, however, that Boko Haram is a problem that affects Nigerians of every
religion.
Indeed, the majority of Boko Haram's estimated 4,000 total victims to date have been Muslim.
Even as we work to help the Government of Nigeria protect Christians, we are also helping
it protect its population as a whole.
In the aftermath of the kidnappings, we have encouraged Muslim and Christian faith leaders
alike to speak out, in Nigeria and around the world, to urge respect for religious diversity
and interfaith cooperation.
I can assure you that we treat issues of religious freedom, like other issues of universal human
rights and fundamental freedoms, with utmost seriousness.
The State Department, like the American people, hope to see the girls reunited with their
families soon.
But we are also preparing for a long, tough fight to defeat Boko Haram and to help the
Nigerian people -- including Nigeria's girls and boys alike -- realize the full political
and economic potential of their great country.