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In Soviet films about the initial period of the Great Patriotic War, Simonov and Degtyarev
anti-tank rifles are very often extremely effective.
If cinematographers — and not only domestic ones — show the end of the war, then German
faustpatrons have an even greater effect.
One shot is one tank, and not otherwise, and from incredible distances.
Of course, people do not come to the cinema to wonder why such a perfect weapon did not
prevent the appearance of Soviet T-34 and American Shermans on the streets of German
cities.
How effective were German hand-held anti-tank grenade launchers?
It is generally believed that the first version of the "faustpatron" was born in 1942, when
the Wehrmacht tanks were still on the way to Stalingrad and Caucasus.
The reports coming from the Eastern Front about the number of destroyed Soviet tanks
inspired joy in the headquarters from the victories of German weapons, but there was
still reason to think.
The USSR, even after losing a significant part of its territory, produced countless
tank hordes, and on the other side of the Atlantic at the same time, military production
of the United States did the same thing.
Of course, artillery, tanks, partly aviation and mines were considered as the main anti-tank
means.
But the practice of the first years of the war clearly showed that the infantry also
needed a means of effective protection against tanks — preferably as massive and cheap
as possible, as well as easy to use.
The initial requirements for the new weapon were: a range of 30 meters and an efficiency
greater than that of a rifle grenade Gewehr-Panzergranate 61.
which was developed in 1944 and could penetrate up to 126 mm of armor.
One of those who responded to the request of the Wehrmacht Armaments Department was
Dr. Heinrich Langweiler.
Interestingly, it became something of a side job for him: Langweiler was a specialist in
ballistics and since 1939 was engaged in the problem of creating active-reactive bullets.
He understood quite vaguely how to make anti-tank weapons, so it is not surprising that the
first samples of future "faustpatrons" were far from ideal.
The short tube of the grenade launcher was convenient for transportation, but at the
same time forced the shooter to keep it as far away from himself as possible when launching,
which did not affect the accuracy of aiming in the best way.
The inertial fuse refused to fire when it hit the inclined armor, and the sharp-nosed
shape of the first grenades further contributed to the ricochet.
Finally, stabilization by rotation, as it turned out, significantly reduced the penetration
capacity of the cumulative jet.
Actually, the only thing that deserved attention in the first samples of Langweiler was the
idea of a pipe made of low-grade steel capable of throwing something at 30 or even 60 meters
that poses a danger to the tank.
Nevertheless, they decided to continue the work.
Taking as a basis for the projectile a manual cumulative magnetic mine, Langweiler, with
a total weight of a grenade launcher slightly more than five kilograms, received an impressive
penetration of 200 mm of armor.
For military tests, 3000 pieces were ordered.
The infantry asked to raise the firing range, emphasizing that it is unsafe to wait for
a reduction in the distance with a roaring "thirty-four" to 30 meters.
The order was fulfilled by simply increasing the knock-out charge first to 140 grams, and
then to two 95-gram charges.
However, despite its simplicity, the production of "faustpatrons", later renamed "panzerfaust",
really unfolded only in the second half of 1943.
In turn, the USSR reacted to the appearance of the German novelty quite quickly.
If the first reports usually contained a retelling of information from prisoners together with
drawings made on their basis, then quite detailed instructions went to the front line - with
photographs, detailed characteristics and methods of counteraction.
For example, in the instructions dated January 25, 1944 of the headquarters of the 1st Belorussian
Front, it is indicated that a reliable means of protecting against cumulative mines and
shells is shielding according to the type of German tanks Pz.Kpfw.IV.
In the meantime, this is not the case, in battle you should try not to substitute the
sides and conduct increased fire on the trenches from where the grenade launchers are firing.
Over time, the Germans began to have more and more "faustpatrons" — in total, they
managed to produce more than 8 million.
However, this fact did not cause any panic or demands from Soviet commanders to "urgently
do something."
On the contrary, following the results of the summer offensives of 1944, reports of
the massive use of "faustpatrons" and "offenrors" by the Germans were usually followed by information
like "in addition, the enemy leaves a large number of them on the battlefield."
The Germans themselves generally agreed with a not very high assessment of the role of
the "faustpatrons" — for example, in February 1944, they announced the destruction of 1,219
Soviet tanks, while only 35 vehicles accounted for the "faustpatrons".
Even the battles that began in 1945 on the territory of Germany with its dense urban
development did not lead to a sharp jump in losses:
"According to the data of the Operation Department of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, in February 1945,
out of a total of 160 combat damage to tanks and self-propelled guns, two combat damage
belong to "faustpatrons", which is 0.5–0.6% of the total number of losses.
The combat damage inflicted on the tanks from the "faustpatrons" is characterized by the
following: one T-34 tank has a broken caterpillar from a distance of 50 meters, the second T-34
tank has a hit in the inclined side armor plate, resulting in a crack.
The shooting was conducted from a distance of 50 meters."
As can be seen from the report, even in the case of a Faustpatron grenade, the T-34 was
not always torn to pieces.
There are other similar documents:
"Operational Department of the headquarters of the 1st Red Banner Insterburg Tank Corps
on No. 0802 dated 31.03.1945.
Effectiveness of the use of German Faustpatron grenade, and the losses we suffered in tanks
and self-propelled guns, we inform that for the entire period of the operation in East
Prussia (January—February 1945), the brigade had losses from Faustpatron grenades - two
tanks and one self-propelled gun in the area Trausitten.
The brigade had no losses in tanks and self-propelled guns from the shelling of the "Panzerschreck"
and "Ofenrohr".
It can be added that the 89th Tank Brigade in January-February 1945 did not sit in the
rear at all, but took an active part in the battles on the outskirts of Konigsberg.
In February alone, its losses were 50 burnt-out and 38 damaged "thirty-fours” tanks During
the fighting, the brigade was replenished twice, receiving 44 tanks.
Of course, according to one team, it is early to draw any conclusions about the effectiveness
of "faustpatrons".
Fortunately, there are many documents about the actions of Soviet tank troops in the second
half of the war.
For example, at the beginning of the victorious 1945, by order of Marshal G.K.
Zhukov, an investigation was conducted into the causes of large losses of tanks of the
8th Guards Army of Colonel-General V.I.
Chuikov on March 22-24 during attempts to expand the bridgehead on the west bank of
the Oder.
The report on the results of the investigation says a lot about the mistakes of intelligence
that did not notice the preparation of the enemy to repel the Soviet offensive, shortcomings
in the planning of the operation, erroneous reports of units, insufficiently developed
interaction with infantry and much more.
"Faustpatrons" are mentioned only in the final table: out of 122 lost tanks and self-propelled
guns, as many as 98 were destroyed by artillery and tanks, 15 vehicles were killed by mines;
only seven cases were attributed to "faustpatrons", and two more tanks were disabled by aviation.
In March 1945, even in unsuccessful battles for Soviet tankers, the German infantry armed
with "faustpatrons" could not achieve too much.
And the final chord of the "faustpatrons" was the battle for Berlin.
It would seem that there can be no doubt about their role here.
However…
For example, the 2nd Guards Tank Army of Colonel General S.I.
Bogdanov is considered to be the most affected by German hand grenade launchers.
However, as the commander himself reported in the report on the actions of the army in
the Berlin operation, with the total number of armored vehicles disabled at 576 units,
106, or about 18.4%, were attributed to the share of "faustpatrons".
The reasons for such high results are clear from the same report — Bogdanov writes a
lot and in detail about the shortage of infantry:
"The infantry, acting in conjunction with the tanks, cleared only the lower floors of
the houses, leaving the rest untouched, and thereby gave the opportunity to the fausts
and snipers to fire on the tanks."
The Red Army, Marshal of Tank troops P.A.
Rotmistrov, also added his weighty word
"The assault groups created in the tank units of the armies during the preparation for the
Berlin operation, by the beginning of the assault on Berlin, had actually disintegrated
as a result of intense fighting on the outskirts of the city.
The groups had to be restored during the battles.
This circumstance, as well as the acute shortage of their infantry in tank armies, significantly
reduced the effectiveness of the assault groups.
Assault groups created in field armies, reinforced with tanks attached to tank corps and tanks
from the infantry direct support group, thanks to a sufficient number of infantry showed
great stability and survivability.
The same applies to assault groups organized in mechanized corps."
Even in fairly favorable conditions — in a large city, in battles with tanks that had
insufficient infantry cover — "faustpatrons" did not even come close to proving themselves
as a miracle weapon.
Taking into account the specific requirement of 2-4 meters of free space behind the grenade
launcher, it is not at all obvious that ordinary grenades and molotov cocktails when thrown
from the upper floors to tanks passing below would be much worse.
In any case, it was already too late to expect something supernatural from the "miracle weapon"
when Soviet tanks rumbled on the cobblestones of Berlin.
In addition, Soviet tankers began to weld metal grilles to their tanks.
Which further reduces the likelihood of destruction by the panzerfaust.
If you want i will make a video about this topic write please in comments.
Dear friends, that's all for today.
It was Tim and the Eastern Front channel.
And as usual I wish you peace and health.
See you.