On the 6th of July 1988 an explosion took place on board the Piper Alpha oil platform
situated in the North Sea off the coast of Scotland.
It was the beginning of one of the most expensive man-made disasters ever to take place – one
which would result in numerous deaths and injuries, and change hundreds of lives forever.
A later investigation would reveal that, in part, the accident could be traced back to
a single misplaced piece of paperwork.
The Piper oil field was first discovered in 1973, and little time was wasted in constructing
an oil drilling platform to exploit it.
The Piper Alpha oil platform was finished and put into operation in less than four years
– an impressively swift construction process for such a complex build.
On board the static platform you would find all the equipment necessary to extract oil
and pump it via a pipeline to an oil terminal on the island of Flotta – part of the Orkney
Islands.
Piper Alpha also received oil via pipelines from other platforms, and piped this on for
processing.
On board there was accommodation and facilities for the platform’s staff, who would live
on board Piper Alpha for weeks at a time.
There were shared bunk rooms, as well as a small canteen, an on-board cinema and a pool
table to help pass any free time workers had.
In order to maximise safety, the rig was divided into sections with fireproof walls.
The accommodation was, by design, situated as far as possible from the oil processing
section.
Once in operation, Piper Alpha proved extremely prolific.
It could pump as many as 300,000 barrels of oil per day.
The rig also dealt with natural gas, which was produced as part of the oil extraction
process.
Initially, this gas would simply be burned off with a flare.
In 1978, however, the rig’s operator Occidental Petroleum Caledonia Limited, got permission
to process and export this gas as well.
This made the already-profitable rig even more valuable… but also meant that gas processing
equipment had to be retro-fitted into the structure.
Unlike the oil processing equipment, it was installed in an area relatively close to the
employee accommodation.
On the 6th of July, 1988, one of two pumps that formed part of the gas processing equipment
was taken out of service for maintenance.
Engineers working on the pump were unable to finish the job in one session, and so capped
off the pump with a metal plate that was bolted in place by hand.
An engineer then completed the necessary paperwork to inform the next shift that Pump A should
not be used under any circumstances.
Ideally he would have handed this paperwork to the manager for the next shift… but as
the manager was busy that evening, he instead simply left the paperwork in the control room.
At 9:45pm, Pump B failed due to a build-up of ice.
This pump was the only source of power for the whole rig.
If it was not restarted within thirty minutes, there would be a complete power failure.
The shift manager checked through the paperwork he had at hand to determine if it was safe
to switch Pump A back on.
It was, of course, not safe to do so… but the paperwork stating this was not found.
The metal plate which capped off the out-of-service pump was difficult to see during a visual
inspection, and so there was no reason to suspect that starting the pump would cause
any issues.
At 9:52pm Pump A was restarted.
As gas entered the out-of-service pump, it caused a pressure build-up which ruptured
the temporary plate.
Gas escaped, triggering multiple alarms.
Before anyone had time to act, the escaped gas ignited in a massive explosion that ripped
through the control room of the rig.
The walls between sections were fireproof, but not blast proof.
Workers in the adjacent employee accommodation section were thrown to the floor, or knocked
out of their beds by the force of the blast.
Meanwhile, many workers within the control room were instantly killed.
In any other emergency, it would have been these workers who would have initiated an
evacuation.
With the control room destroyed, this could not happen.
Furthermore, automatic fire suppression systems were not active at the time.
These systems drew water from the sea below, and had been switched off so that divers could
safely carry out maintenance in the water that day.
This combination of factors meant that there was little chance to fight the flames which
took hold of the platform, and that the evacuation from it was chaotic.
Some workers were able to climb down ropes to lifeboats and life rafts.
Others were forced to jump, enduring a fall into water equivalent to jumping from a 40-storey
building.
Many donned life jackets when they realised they would have to evacuate, but were forced
to remove them before jumping – hitting the water while wearing a lifejacket could
result in serious injuries.
Even those who reached the water weren’t safe.
Oil collected on the surface and caught fire, while burning debris from the disintegrating
rig fell around them.
Secondary explosions followed the first.
In one area, burning oil dripped down onto a platform used by divers.
The platform was a metal grating, and the oil should have fallen through and down to
the water below… but it was prevented from doing so by rubber matting.
This rubber matting had been placed to protect the feet of divers as they worked.
Now it caught the burning oil and created a raging fire that heated up an active oil
pipeline, causing it to rupture and explode.
The semi-submersible vessel Tharos was nearby when the disaster began, and rescued several
people from the water.
It also attempted to use on board water cannons to fight the flames, but could only do so
very cautiously.
The cannons were so powerful that they would cause injury if they should accidentally be
directed at a person.
Also nearby was the Sandhaven, which launched a motor boat to pick up survivors.
It successfully collected six oil rig workers from the waters below the platform.
Unfortunately, as it moved to pick up more survivors, it was destroyed by a secondary
explosion.
All six rescued men, and two crewmembers from the Sandhaven were instantly killed.
On board the rig, workers had gathered in the accommodation block.
They were surrounded by smoke and flames, and could hear and feel the rig beginning
to give way.
One survivor, Billy Clayton, later recalled his escape:
“I remember looking around us and everything around us, even the cranes, were burning and
the helideck was the only option.
Seven or eight of us went up there and I can remember waving down to the people below and
they were waving back up but we couldn’t do anything for each other.
I was looking down when there was another fireball below us.
I fell back and everybody went different ways.
There were two men holding on to each other running out of the smoke and I saw another
guy in a white t-shirt just staring ahead.
I told him he had to move but he just kept staring, completely still…
The last thing I remember is the orange blur of the lifeboat going past me.
Then I woke up, floating face-up in the water with this huge burning orange fire above me.
I knew I had to get away so just kept swimming as much as I could until I found someone else
floating in the water.
I grabbed on to him, chatting away, looking for help.
We found a boat and I helped them haul in the guy I’d been floating with.
It was only then I realised he was dead.
It hadn’t dawned on me at all.”
At 11:50pm the platform collapsed and sank into the North Sea.
The search for survivors continued into the next day, and the search for bodies went on
for weeks after that.
In total, the disaster had taken 167 lives, and caused life-changing injuries and trauma
to almost all of the 61 survivors.
It took three weeks for the fire to be fully extinguished.
The inquiry which followed revealed a series of issues that complicated and worsened the
disaster.
Not least among these was that other nearby rigs did not immediately stop pumping oil
to Piper Alpha – as workers were uncertain whether they had the authority to stop operations.
The rig’s operator, Occidental, was criticised for having inadequate safety and maintenance
processes, but faced no criminal charges.
Over a hundred recommendations were made to operators in the North Sea oil industry, covering
everything from worker training to clear communication.
Additionally, responsibility for safety in the North Sea oil fields was passed to the
Health and Safety Executive (an organisation solely concerned with safety), where previously
it had been managed by the UK Department of Energy (an organisation which had been concerned
with both safety and productivity).
The workers who survived the disaster have gone on to form the Piper Alpha Families and
Survivors Association, which campaigns on safety issues that affect workers in the North
Sea oil industry.
On the third anniversary of the disaster a memorial statue was unveiled in Aberdeen.
It depicts three oil workers, one of which is modelled after a survivor of the disaster.
Oil extraction continues to this day in the Piper oil field.
Piper Alpha has been replaced by a more modern platform, Piper Bravo.
While oil extraction will always be a difficult and dangerous job, the people who work there
now do so in safer conditions than they otherwise might have, in 1988.