As 1941 ended and 1942 began, the fate of Malaya hung in the balance. After winning a decisive
victory at the Battle of Jitra, forces of the Empire of Japan were sweeping south,
embarking on a remarkable run of victories that would carry them all the way to the gates of
Singapore in just 50 days. -
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Following the defeat at Jitra, the Indian 11th division retreated about 30 miles to Gurun. It
was a great natural defensive position but there were no defences prepared there, so the troops had
to dig in themselves . Two days after they began this back breaking work, the Japanese arrived,
attacking straight down the road as they had done at Jitra. The initial assaults were repelled with
heavy Japanese losses, but that night a second attack drove a wedge all the way to the HQ of 6th
Brigade, destroying it and forcing a retreat. Dislodged from their half prepared positions,
11th division fell back again, as the strategic situation for the British began to unravel.
When the British and Indian troops regrouped at the Krian river, both the airfield at Butterworth
and the island of Penang were hopelessly exposed to the Japanese. After a series
of devastating air raids killed more than 5000 civilians on Penang the island was evacuated-
though only European civilians were given the option of becoming refugees in Singapore. Penang
was occupied by Japanese troops on December 19th, and Butterworth airbase fell not long after that,
further tightening Japan’s grip on the air war that it had dominated since the invasion.
General Murray-Lyon’s 11th division was soon on the move south again,
crossing the Perak river on December 17th with Japanese troops in pursuit. The division by this
stage was not in a good way, with the 6th and 15th brigades having to be consolidated
into one another and morale extremely low. To try and change the divisions fortunes
General Arthur Percival, the overall commander of British ground troops in Malaya, decided to
make a leadership change. On December 23rd he sacked General Murray Lyon and gave command of
the division to Brigadier Archibald Paris. Paris had been leading 12th Brigade, who had spent the
last couple of weeks fighting rearguard actions to cover 11th divisions retreats.
There were further changes at even more senior levels. On December 27th
Air Chief Marshal Robert Brooke-Popham, the commander in chief far east, was also removed,
and his role was soon subsumed into a unified allied command for the whole of south east asia.
The so called American-British-Dutch-Australian Command, or ABDACOM, was led by General
Archibald Wavell, who became on paper the ultimate commander of every allied soldier,
sailor and airman between Burma and Australia. Back in Malaya, by Christmas the Indian
11th division was now intending to hold a position at Kampar. It was a decent spot,
with mountainous jungle terrain meaning it could not be easily flanked from the east.
The Japanese reached this position in strength on the last day of 1941,
and found a much tougher allied defence this time around.
An attack on two Gurkha battalions north of the village of Sahum was driven off, as the Gurkhas
excelled themselves in fierce hand to hand combat against the Japanese attackers. It was a similar
story the next day on the western side, as the 6th/15th brigade resisted fiercely, supported by
British artillery that held an excellent position on the mountainside to the east of Kampar.
By the end of the day all of the Allied positions were intact,
but the Japanese had secured a foothold on the high ground, enabling them to press an attack
on the merged battalion of Leicesters and East Surreys on January 2nd. All through the day,
against a superior force, the British and Indian battalions held out. Despite this though,
their position was being undermined even as they fought. To the south of Kampar, the Japanese were
landing the 4th Guards regiment in the estuary of the Perak river, and the 11th infantry regiment
further south on the Bernam river. Brigadier Paris moved the 12th brigade to face up to the landings,
but they were outnumbered and pushed back. With the Kampar position flanked and the Allied
troops in danger of attacks from their rear, the 11th division withdrew once again over the
night of January 3rd. In contrast to the earlier battle of Jitra though, all three brigades were
able to withdraw in good order without suffering serious damage. Overall the battle of Kampar was
a much better showing by 11th division – but the battle had still ended in further retreat.
It was a similar story on the eastern coast of Malaya, which saw the Japanese
55th and 56th regiments defeat the 22nd Indian Brigade at Kuantan on January 3rd,
seizing the town and its airbase. The Brigade was ordered to retreat inland, with a battalion
commander winning a Victoria cross for gallantry during a chaotic rearguard action after dark.
On the same day as this was happening, in Singapore itself reinforcements were
beginning to arrive to bolster the defences, starting with the 45th
Indian Brigade. They’d be joined by the 44th Indian Brigade and the British 18th Division
in late January, but the flow was too slow to make an immediate difference at the front.
With Allied troops in retreat across the board, on January 5th General Percival now planned a steady
withdrawal into Malaya’s most southern state, Johore to shorten the frontline and secure its
flanks. The key hub of Kuala Lumpur would be surrendered without a fight, but the British
hoped to maintain control of the airfields in the area until January 14th so that a convoy carrying
the reinforcing 54th Brigade could be covered from the air until it arrived in Singapore. After that,
Percival planned to fall back to a line of resistance between Mersing and Muar that would be
formed as the last stand on the Malayan peninsula. Within a matter of days however, it all started to
go a bit wrong. -
Keen to reach and secure Kuala Lumpur quickly, the commander of the Japanese forces General
Tomoyuki Yamashita was pushing his forces south as quickly as possible, with little regard for
his flanks or logistics. Infantry on bicycles kept up alongside the armored units. On January 5th,
the vanguard of 5th division reached Slim river, where a dug in British force awaited them.
Slim river was considered an excellent location to hold Japanese troops north of the airfields
at port Swettenham and Kuala Lumpur. Only a single road ran through the area, which was
criss-crossed by rivers and thick jungle that the British thought would make outflanking impossible.
Two brigades were deployed in depth on the road, armed with anti-tank guns, mines and concrete
blocks to hold up Japanese tanks. The Allied positions were well prepared, but the troops
were tired and low on morale- they had withdrawn almost 180 miles in three weeks, with little rest.
On January 5th the Japanese 42nd regiment and a spearhead battalion of tanks attacked
the forward positions of 12th Brigade, manned by a battalion of Hyderabads.
Beaten back initially, they managed to flank the defenders along the railway line to the
west and forced them to retreat in the early hours of January 7th. The Punjab battalion
immediately to the south was able to knock out four Japanese tanks with mines, but their
strongest position was then outflanked through the jungle and bypassed with relative ease.
By 7 am on January 7th, the Japanese spearhead had cut through the 2nd Argyll battalion too,
who would not have been expecting to have Japanese troops all over them so quickly.
The lack of communications equipment and personnel in 11th division was making itself known-
the rest of 12th brigade did not know about the disaster unfolding at the front,
let alone 28th brigade further south. When demolition of a bridge at Trolak failed, the
road south was completely open, and the Japanese tanks pressed on to exploit it, even as this meant
pushing ahead without infantry support. At 7.30 they met the 5th Punjab battalion on the road,
which was marching north and could not get its anti tank guns deployed before their opponents
swept through, inflicting heavy casualties and scattering the survivors into the jungle.
Without taking any kind of break the 30 or so Japanese tanks now smashed into the western
elements of 28th brigade, which were taken totally by surprise, and two battalions of
Gurkhas were swept aside in a matter of minutes. It was now a full scale rout. Batteries of allied
artillery were simply ignored as the bridge over the slim river itself was seized at 8.40
in the face of ineffective resistance from a troop of anti air guns in the area.
Still not satisfied the tanks now turned south, pushing for two more miles
until they came up to the 155th field artillery regiment- which, despite being taken by surprise,
was able to bring its 25-pounder guns to bear on the tanks, finally halting the advance.
It had been a calamitous morning for the Allied forces – in a little over six hours
a single group of tanks had rampaged down a single road, shooting everything in sight,
with no adequate Allied response. As a result, 12th brigade was effectively wiped out,
and 28th brigade lost two-thirds of its strength. More than 3000 troops were taken prisoner,
for Japanese casualties of just 150. Any hope of a slow and orderly retreat south vanished,
and the chances of holding Johore long enough for strong reinforcements to arrive in Singapore
reduced dramatically. -
After Slim River the Indian 11th division was shattered, and had to be withdrawn from the
fighting immediately. The Australian 8th Infantry division was deployed to take over the front line,
doing their best to hold the Japanese up alongside the newly-arrived Indian 45th Brigade
and British 53rd brigades. Initial attacks against the newly-named ‘Westforce’ under
Lt. Gen. Gordon Bennett were repulsed by the aussies, but the strength of the two Japanese
divisions now opposing them was too great. Further retreats were forced by January 20th,
and any hope of holding onto the mainland was now disappearing. Rearguard actions were fought by
Westforce from January 24th as the Allies tried to get as many troops as possible evacuated to
Singapore. When the 15th Indian brigade was cut off at Rengit it had to be evacuated by sea,
and the 22nd Brigade was not so lucky when it was cut off in the jungle and forced to surrender.
The last Allied unit crossed the straits of Johore to Singapore island on January 31st.
The only road and rail bridge across the straits was then blown up,
and the siege of Churchill’s ‘fortress Singapore’ began with his order that “every inch of groud
[was] to be defended… and no question of surrender to be entertained until protracted fighting
among the ruins of Singapore city.” The battle for Singapore had begun.