In late June, a series of battles and skirmishes erupted in the Bohemian hills as the Prussian
army launched a multi-sided invasion.
The initial clashes took place at Podol, Wysokow, and Trautenau on June 27.
The Austrians suffered significant defeats in the first two battles.
However, at Trautenau the Austrian commander Ludwig von Gablenz utilized his numerical
advantage and the bravery of his Austrian troops to push back Bonin's First Corps of
the Prussian Second Army.
He paid a dear price, suffering nearly four times as many casualties as the Prussians
did.
However, due to limited and slow communication channels, it became evident that both sides
had to operate independently as the invasion progressed.
In the aftermath of the disastrous battle at Podol, the Austrian commander Clem-Gallas
found himself with no viable option but to retreat towards Benedek's main army stationed
at Josephstadt.
Recognizing the overwhelming odds, Clem-Gallas estimated that his Austrian forces, numbering
60,000, were facing approximately 140,000 Prussian troops.
He was taken aback and frustrated when Benedek ordered him to hold the Iser River at all
costs, despite facing an adversary more than double his strength.
To the west, the Prussian Elbe Army under Herwarth von Bittenfeld, which had pushed
the Saxon army into Bohemia days earlier, advanced through the mountain passes.
And to his north, the Prussian First Army under Prince Friedrich Karl had already given
his Austrians a run for the
Disregarding their orders, Prince Albert of Saxony and Clam, having different routes,
made the decision to abandon their vulnerable position at Münchengrätz.
While three brigades under Clam's command remained in Münchengrätz to impede the Prussian
pursuit, the other two brigades, led by Joseph Ringelsheim and Ferdinand Poschacher, marched
eastward towards Glitschin.
Instead of waiting for the road to Glitschin to clear, Prince Albert directed his five
Saxon brigades to take the southern route to Jungbunzlau, a lengthy and arduous detour
that would ultimately cost him half of his forces during the battle at Glitschin.
The situation at Glitschin necessitated urgent reinforcements, as the Prussian Crown Prince
Friedrich's army was advancing through the Wysokow passages.
To aid the defeated Bonin and secure the final passage needed for their full-scale invasion,
Crown Prince Friedrich dispatched the entire Prussian Guard Corps towards Trautenau.
Due to Clam-Gallas's failure to establish communication with the headquarters of the
North Army, Benedek, the commanding officer, remained unaware of the true situation and
held the belief that his forces were adequately positioned to defend against the Prussian
invasion.
This misconception stemmed from Clam-Gallas's negligence in utilizing the corps telegraph
to relay vital information.
In the meantime, the Prussian forces engaged in the looting of the towns in northern Bohemia.
Bohemia's riches proved enticing to Prince Friedrich Karl, to the extent that he contemplated
delaying the crucial march assigned to him by Moltke.
Originally tasked with heading eastward to Glitschin in order to disengage the Second
Army at Skalice and Trautenau, the prince instead set his sights on achieving a momentous
victory in the form of a Kesselschlacht, or encirclement battle.
Based on erroneous Prussian intelligence, Prince Friedrich Karl was led to believe that
not only the Saxons and the Austrian First Corps were trapped in Münchengrätz but also
the Austrian Second Corps.
The prospect of such a significant conquest within close reach fueled his determination.
Accordingly, the commandant of the First Army devised a plan to deviate southward on June
28, with the intention of encircling the Iser Army before subsequently redirecting his forces
back eastward to provide much-needed assistance to the Prussian Second Army.
In Berlin, General Moltke was solely reliant on his three field armies for updates on the
events unfolding in Bohemia.
However, he remained completely unaware of the time-consuming manoeuvre executed by Prince
Friedrich Karl.
This lack of knowledge meant that General Moltke was unable to countermand the manoeuvre
in a timely manner, thereby risking the loss of a march day.
The prince's insubordination led him to divert his attention away from engaging Benedek,
instead pursuing a victory of minimal tactical significance.
Consequently, over the following days, the three Prussian armies operated with varying
degrees of independence, with barely any coordination from the Great Headquarters in Berlin.
Meanwhile, General Benedek, lacking crucial information, focused his attention primarily
on the front near Wysokow and Trautenau, wrongly assuming that his western flank was the only
area experiencing significant resistance.
Unbeknownst to him, General Clam held a naturally fortified position at Münchengrätz, while
General Herwarth von Bittenfeld's Elbe Army was approaching his front.
Furthermore, two of Prince Friedrich Karl's three infantry corps diverted southward from
Podol, intending to strike Benedek's flank and sever his lines of retreat to Glitschin.
[Battle sequence] With the belief that a decisive blow could
be delivered at Münchengrätz, the Prussian forces under Prince Friedrich Karl quickened
their pace.
In order to reach their target, the divisions descending from Podol had to navigate between
two prominent mounts: Musky Hill situated east of the town, and Kaczov Hill located
approximately one kilometre to the north.
Meanwhile, General Herwarth, advancing eastward from Hühnerwasser, faced two significant
obstacles before engaging the Austrian brigades in Münchengrätz: the elevated Kláster monastery
on the west bank of the river, followed by the formidable Iser River itself.
The Austrian left flank was positioned at Kláster, while Münchengrätz and Kaczov
Hill formed the centre, and Musky Hill constituted the right wing.
In the early hours of June 28th, Crown Prince Albert ordered the retreat to Glitschin to
commence at 4:00 a.m.
The cavalry division was given priority and set off first along the Münchengrätz-Gitschin
road.
The Saxon infantry, on the other hand, embarked on a more circuitous route, marching south
to Jungbunzlau, which eventually led them to Gitschin.
It is likely that Albert aimed to keep the direct road relatively clear, facilitating
the escape of the Austrian wagon train and artillery.
Following the cavalry, two brigades commanded by Poschacher and Ringelsheim proceeded along
the main road.
In the retreat, General Clam-Gallas himself opted to join his two brigades, effectively
leaving his rearguard to manage on their own.
While occupied with the retreat, General Clam entrusted Count Leiningen's brigade, accompanied
by the 32nd Field Jäger Battalion, with the defence of Münchengrätz.
Count Leiningen positioned his Jäger battalion within the town and stationed his two line
regiments, the 33rd Giulay and the 38th Hugwitz, across the river in Kláster.
On the sandstone slopes of Musky Hill, Ludwig Piret's brigade, comprising the 9th Field
Jäger Battalion, the 18th Infantry Regiment Constantin, and the 45th Infantry Regiment
Sigismund, took up their defensive positions.
Beneath them, Clam's Abele Brigade formed battalion columns and faced the road originating
from Podol.
The reserve forces included the 22nd Field Jäger Battalion, the 35th Infantry Regiment
Khevenhüller, and the 72nd Infantry Regiment Ramming.
Around 8:30 a.m., the advance guard of the Army of the Elbe's 16th Division made its
appearance on the field.
This division had marched relentlessly for eight hours from Hühnerwässer to Kláster.
It consisted of seven battalions from the 31st Brigade, under the command of Major General
von Schöler, along with the 8th Jäger Battalion, the 29th Regiment, and the 69th Regiment.
The Prussian troops were in a state of frustration, as their arduous march from Hühnerwasser
had taken a toll on them.
As was often the case, Herwarth's supply trains had lagged behind the men, and at every wayside
inn, the Prussian march battalions had discovered depleted provisions and tainted water sources.
Upon reaching a location four kilometres west of the Iser River, the advancing Prussian
forces came under fire from Austrian artillery positioned on the hill at Kláster.
Responding swiftly, Major General Schöler directed his own batteries to engage in a
counter-battery fire while dispatching two infantry columns to flank the Austrian position.
Surprisingly, the defenders of the height, including Leiningen's 38th Regiment comprised
of Italian troops from Venetia, made minimal effort to hold their ground.
As the sounds of combat from the Podol road echoed across the river, they abandoned Kláster,
retreated across the Iser River to Münchengrätz, and deliberately set the bridge ablaze.
Prince Friedrich Karl and his chief of staff, Konstantin Voigts-Rhetz, observed the unfolding
battle from their vantage point in Podol.
They witnessed the flashes and smoke plumes generated by Herwarth's advancing batteries
closing in on Kláster.
Then, at 10:00 a.m., a sudden eruption of black smoke signalled the ignition of the
Iser bridge.
The Prussian prince, upon spotting an Austrian general's entourage through his telescope
on Musky Hill, experienced a thrilling hour or two, believing that he had effectively
trapped the entire Iser Army between the converging Elbe and First Armies.
Meanwhile, Prince Friedrich Karl's advanced brigades, led by Horn's 8th Division, launched
an assault on the northern face of Musky Hill, engaging the forces under Piret and Abele.
Simultaneously, Fransecki's 7th Division, guided by a helpful local, manoeuvred through
the marshland behind the hill, effectively severing the communications of the Austrian
defenders with Münchengrätz and Glitschin.
It became evident that all three Austrian brigades stationed in Münchengrätz were
at risk of being ensnared within Friedrich Karl's encircling manoeuvre.
Recognizing the peril, the Austrian gunners who were shelling Horn's column from Musky
Hill swiftly packed up their artillery and departed as Fransecki's forces manoeuvred
behind them.
They retreated as swiftly as possible, passing through Musky village, where platoons from
Piret's 45th Regiment, consisting of Venetian soldiers from Verona, were observed discarding
their rifles and surrendering to Fransecki's flanking column, their hands raised in surrender.
In Münchengrätz, General Leiningen had commenced a retreat toward the east, heading for Sobotka,
effectively abandoning the deserted town to Herwarth and the Prussian Elbe Army.
Schöler's regiments, suffering from extreme thirst and hunger, took off their shoes, rolled
up their trousers, and anxiously awaited orders to wade across the Iser River in search of
promised sustenance.
By the time Schöler's vanguard reached Kláster, his soldiers were delirious due to their thirst
and hunger.
Failing to find any nourishment on the western bank of the Iser, they waded across to Münchengrätz,
forcefully entered the Wallenstein Palace, and descended into the ducal brewery—an
underground labyrinth stocked with a cool beer.
Kegs were brought to the surface and tapped, with the weary men gathering around to quench
their thirst with deep draughts.
If there was ever a moment for Leiningen to launch a counterattack, it would have been
at this opportune time.
However, the Austrian brigadier was far removed from the situation, already on the outskirts
of Münchengrätz and heading east toward Glitschin.
Thanks to the efforts of Abele's Czech and Hungarian troops, who held the rugged and
overgrown southern slope of Musky Hill, Leiningen and Piret managed to escape to the east, evading
Prince Friedrich Karl's flanking column.
As Prince Friedrich Karl surged through the gap between Kaczov and Musky Hill, he found
himself striking empty space.
The Iser Army had eluded him.
Friedrich Karl's detour south had proven to be in vain, or at least nearly so.
Now, the Elbe and First Armies stood side by side, with the consolation of having taken
1,400 Austrian prisoners.
In total, the Austrians lost around 3000 troops.
The beer of Wallenstein provided the Prussians further solace.
The five Prussian divisions that bivouacked in Münchengrätz indulged in an entire night
of revelry, drinking in celebration.
Their losses in the battle amounted to only 300 fallen comrades, giving them cause for
joyous commemoration.
[Strategic Map]
Despite the formidable nature of Kláster and Musky Hill as defensive positions, the
Prussian forces managed to capture them with the support of only fourteen battalions.
Although Prince Friedrich Karl's left wing remained fifty kilometers away from Friedrich
Wilhelm's right wing, with the Austrian North Army positioned between them, this geographical
distance seemed inconsequential in light of the jubilant atmosphere prevailing among the
Elbe and First Armies.
Still, that same day clashes occurred to the west at Burkersdorf and Skalitz.
And without Prince Friedrich Karl’s Prussian army close-by, the Crown Prince was unable
to act with as much initiative as he would like.