Africa has been a hotbed of conflict for the last century. As the colonial regimes
of the Old World withered, the shadow of the Cold War enveloped the continent.
Vast natural resources were discovered, and weapons proliferated, providing the means
for idealists and renegades to take power for themselves. This is Untangling Africa, and in
this episode, we’re examining the Guinea-Bissau War of Independence—Portugal’s Vietnam.
Africa has three Guineas. One used to be French,
and is now called Guinea, another used to be Spanish, and is now Equatorial Guinea,
and the third, the subject of this video, was ruled by Portugal. It’s now called Guinea-Bissau.
Guinea-Bissau has a 500-year history of Portuguese domination, and by the 1950s, it was a backwater.
The reclusive dictator António de Oliveira Salazar ran Portugal, and his administration
wasn’t all that interested in the old colonial empire. Investment in Guinea-Bissau was minimal,
and the country’s governor didn’t even know how many people he governed.
Infrastructure was neglected and roads were unpaved, meaning schools and clinics
were inaccessible for most. In 1950, 99% of the population was illiterate.
Epidemics, particularly sleeping sickness, often swept the nation, killing thousands.
Small-scale resistance movements had popped up throughout Guinea-Bissau’s colonial history,
but none had been particularly successful. One man believed he could change that: Amílcar Cabral.
An agronomist by training, Cabral became an activist while studying in Lisbon.
He strongly opposed Portugal’s dictatorship and promoted the independence of Portugal’s overseas
territories. Upon his return home, he founded the African Party for the Independence of Guinea
and Cape Verde, shortened to PAIGC, alongside fellow activist Rafael Barbosa. Their activities
started peacefully, with demonstrations, but it wasn’t long before things turned violent.
On August 3rd 1959, dockworkers in Bissau’s port went on strike. Extremely low wages left
them unable to provide for their families, and the Portuguese company that owned the
docks refused to negotiate. The police were called, and they arrived ready for a fight.
When the men refused to work, the police hurled several grenades and opened fire. The strikers
scattered, with many jumping into the water to escape; they were shot as they tried to swim away.
Between 25 and 50 workers died on-scene, while many more were seriously wounded.
The incident, which became known as the Pidjiguiti massacre,
demonstrated to the whole of Guinea-Bissau that the Portuguese tolerated no dissent
and were willing to shoot unarmed people to maintain control.
The incident, which became known as the Pidjiguiti
massacre, demonstrated to the whole of Guinea-Bissau that the
Portuguese tolerated no dissent and were willing to shoot unarmed people to maintain control.
PAIGC relocated its headquarters to Conakry, the capital of neighbouring Guinea, in 1960. Here,
Cabral gathered strength and readied his forces. A pact was made between PAIGC and forces fighting
for the independence of Angola, Mozambique, and the island nation of São Tomé and Príncipe.
All were Portuguese colonies, like Guinea-Bissau, and all were committed to fighting the Portuguese
for independence. Together, they established the Conference of Nationalist Organizations of the
Portuguese Colonies (CONCP) to champion their interests to the rest of the world. Cabral also
declared the PAIGC to be Marxist, winning them considerable support from the communist bloc.
The war started in January 1963, when PAIGC guerrillas attacked a Portuguese garrison
in Tite. Other towns in southern Guinea-Bissau with Portuguese military presences were attacked
soon after. The colonials tried to hit back, but it was a nightmare. Guinea-Bissau’s geography was
ideal for guerrilla warfare. Thick jungle, deep rivers, and a dispersed population made it very
easy for PAIGC fighters to slip away before the Portuguese could bring heavier weapons to bear.
This was one area where they possessed a decisive advantage, as, at this stage, most PAIGC platoons
had no more than one pre-World War Two rifle or SMG and a handful of pistols to go around.
If PAIGC fighters were masters of the jungle, the Portuguese were masters of the air. Their response
to PAIGC raids was bombing campaigns against villages thought to be harbouring the enemy.
Hundreds of settlements were destroyed, often on no more evidence than a vague suspicion.
Five hundred thousand people were displaced and fled across the border into Guinea.
Those who wanted revenge were only too welcome in the ranks of PAIGC.
Attacks ramped up at the end of 1963, with Cabral even declaring the islands around Como [3] free
from colonial control. This finally caught the attention of the government in Lisbon,
which, until this point, hadn’t taken the independence movement in Guinea-Bissau seriously.
Salazar approved a troop surge and, before long, 35,000 Portuguese troops were in-country.
They launched Operation Tridente in January 1964, with the goal of annihilating the rebels
in Guinea-Bissau’s southern coastal region, around modern-day Caito. It was believed that
Cabral had a major base in the area, so the Portuguese went all-in trying to destroy it.
Marines landed on the beach and secured strategic points. All farm produce in the area was burned,
livestock were shot, and villages were bombed to prevent them from falling into enemy hands.
A few isolated skirmishes were fought, and the rebels managed to shoot down a
T-6 Texan fighter plane with rifle fire, but otherwise, things were quiet. Many Portuguese
found the environment unbearable and just wanted to smash the rebels and move on.
They were trying to fight a conventional war against an unconventional enemy.
By April 1964, Portuguese forces had withdrawn from Como. It was
soon back under PAIGC control, and Cabral’s forces helped the villagers replace their lost livestock.
Though technically a Portuguese victory, Operation Tridente became a propaganda coup for Cabral.
Armed with stories of burning villages and starving people,
Cabral asked the international community for help. Cuba was quick to support him and sent
several army medical units as well as other specialists to fill capability gaps. The Soviet
Union also took pity on the neglected nation, choosing to send crates of Kalashnikovs and RPGs.
In 1965, 75 Bissau-Guineans were enrolled in a guerrilla warfare training course in Soviet
Ukraine, while a cadre of women was trained as nurses elsewhere in the USSR. Generous supplies of
ammunition and additional weapons were sent with warm regards from the People’s Republic of China.
A great deal of the logistics behind this international support was
organised by the Guinean government. They were ideologically aligned with Cabral’s cause and,
at the expense of their own security, committed to helping the movement however they could.
With weapons and official support from the communist bloc, the PAIGC’s ranks swelled.
This put pressure on their food supplies, however, as Cabral was especially keen to avoid taking too
much from locals. His solution was agronomy. He trained a detachment of farmers in agronomy and
sent them out alongside the guerrillas. When they moved into a new village, Cabral’s men
would teach the locals new farming techniques and gift them modern tools, thereby increasing
agricultural output. It didn’t matter, then, that the guerrillas had to take more from the locals,
because now the locals had much more to give [Text: When not actively fighting, guerrillas
were encouraged to help the farmers tend to their crops.]. This was part of a broader hearts
and minds campaign to win Bissau-Guineans over to PAIGC’s cause. Alongside the brutal suppression of
other independence groups, such as the “Struggle Front for the National Independence of Guinea,”
whose members were murdered when they refused to switch allegiance to the PAIGC, the campaign
worked. By the mid-1960s, PAIGC was the most powerful independence force in Guinea-Bissau.
Growing international support for the rebels legitimised the conflict and worried Lisbon. By
1968, losing Guinea-Bissau to a hostile government had become a real possibility. To remedy the
situation, they deployed General António de Spínola and began a new campaign. Instead of
burning villages and shooting cattle, Portugal would try to win the locals over by being nice.
General Spínola started by building roads, schools, and clinics in
outlying areas. He also overhauled the colonial administration to make it much less
discriminatory toward local Bissau-Guineans and kickstarted a massive recruiting drive.
Africans were welcomed into the colonial military and some
even became officers—something previously unheard of. Their flagship unit was the African Commandos,
a cool-sounding force led exclusively by black officers. It was believed by the
Portuguese that these men would make better jungle fighters, and they might have done,
but they couldn’t hold a flame to the highly experienced and battle-hardened fighters
of the PAIGC. The rebels thought of the African colonial soldiers as cannon fodder.
The last of General Spínola’s changes was the Portuguese plan of attack.
Targeted raids against rebel supply bases replaced grand manoeuvres,
and intelligence agents began collecting data on PAIGC’s leaders. As the founder of the movement,
Cabral was an obvious target. But he was also increasingly in the international spotlight.
He closed a deal with Sweden for medical aid in 1969, and Sweden quickly became PAIGC’s
most important non-military backer. They were particularly impressed with Cabral’s competence
in leading the liberation struggle, but this posed a threat to the Portuguese.
They went after him in November 1970, as part of Operation Sea Green.
Four hundred and twenty colonial marines stormed ashore into the Guinean capital of Conakry.
Their objectives were to destroy PAIGC landing ships, rescue POWs, overthrow Guinea’s government,
and neutralise Cabral. The first two objectives were achieved swiftly,
but overthrowing the government proved to be a bigger job than they had planned for. Most of
Guinea’s officials managed to escape, and Cabral was actually away in Europe during the operation.
Nevertheless, the Portuguese chalked it up as a win and withdrew. Maybe they knew what was coming.
Cabral was assassinated by revolutionary rival Inocêncio Kani and another PAIGC member on
January 20th 1973. It’s still not clear if Lisbon was involved, but it’s a little too convenient
for them not to have been. In response, PAIGC’s allies stepped up their efforts. The Soviets began
supplying the rebels with the brand new Strela-2 shoulder-mounted heat-seeking missiles. These were
a game-changer. By 1973, guerrilla activity kept the Portuguese restricted to the major towns and
fortified bases. But their airpower still posed a significant threat. Now, rebels could shoot down
aircraft without exposing themselves, effectively grounding the Portuguese colonial air force.
With their airpower grounded, the Portuguese were besieged within their bases. In September,
the PAIGC declared Guinea-Bissau’s independence, and it was generally recognised internationally.
Lisbon vowed to fight on, but Salazar’s regime was toppled in the Carnation Revolution
before he could follow through on the threat. Portugal’s new regime granted Guinea-Bissau
its full independence on September 24th 1974, ending the 11-and-a-half-year war.
But what do YOU think? Why do YOU think PAIGC’s guerrilla campaign was so
successful? Would the outcome have been the same if Cabral HADN’T mobilised international
support? Who do YOU think ordered his death? Let us know in the comments!