If you’ve watched all episodes in this series so far, then you know what the plan was. You’ve
seen what happened. You know the outcome. Now we have to ask the question that has sparked
controversy ever since: Who was to blame for the failure of Operation Market Garden?
Intro graphic. This was the biggest airborne operation of
all time and the last major defeat of the British military. Historians have come up
with a host of reasons for the failure of Market Garden and we’re going to delve into
them today. If you’ve watched from the beginning of this series, you’ll have seen the battle
as it happened. But just so we’re up to speed, let’s quickly recap.
The plan was to take all the bridges between Eindhoven and Arnhem using paratroopers and
create a corridor for British tanks and infantry to drive up and over,
We saw how the initial landings went well, and we’ve seen how most of the bridges were
taken without much trouble. Only a small portion of the British paras got to Arnhem bridge,
but they held until the fourth day of the Operation. The Polish had dropped five days
later and fought well to try support the British on the opposite side of the Rhine. Son bridge
had blown, but was rebuilt by the 101st and by XXX Corps who made good their delay and
raced to Nijmegen. Here they fought a tough battle for Nijmegen city and the bridge, which
as a result of the determined and heroic effort from the soldiers of the American 82nd Airborne,
saw the capture of that bridge. Sadly, despite the efforts of every Allied soldier up and
down the corridor, the Germans had delayed them long enough to prevent them getting to
the final bridge. Arnhem bridge. As General Browning had supposedly said before the battle,
it was “a bridge too far”.
It may come as a shock then to hear that,
immediately after the battle, Sosabowski (commander of the Polish paras) was relieved of command
and blamed for the failure of Operation Market Garden. This may seem a little
strange, and it was. Because of bad weather, the Polish had landed five days after the
beginning of the Operation, and despite a portion of their force jumping into the jaws
of the enemy, they’d fought hard to support the British trapped at Oosterbeek. Why then,
was Sosabowski relieved? How could he be blamed for the failure of Operation Market Garden?
The truth is that at the time, a scapegoat was needed. And the Polish were an easy target.
Some have even suggested that the Poles were only included in the battle just in case it
did go wrong. After the war, historians started to look deeper into the reasons for the failure
of the Operation, and nobody now thinks the Polish were to blame.
So, let’s look at three of the main arguments for the failure of Operation Market Garden.
The first argument is that it was “a rotten plan, poorly executed”, to quote Max Hastings.
Now, there are a few variations to this somewhat popular and traditional argument, but the
basic principle is this: the entire Operation was a failure from its conception. It was
an over-ambitious plan, created in haste by a poor general, and the major mistakes that
were made, were made mainly by the British units in the battle, and it was the British
that ultimately should take the blame for the failure of Operation Market Garden. This
argument makes clear that the ignored intelligence reports of enemy tanks, the landing zones
miles away from the bridge, not being able to land the entirety of the Airborne divisions
at once, faulty radios, and a host of bad decisions by commanders like Horrocks and
Urquhart, essentially proves that the Operation was poorly executed.
1st Airborne failed to get most of it’s troops to Arnhem bridge on day 1. They were
too eager to fight the Germans than get to their objective. They were dropped too far
away from the bridge. Their radios didn’t work so they became disorganised. XXX Corps
wasn’t hasty enough driving up Hell’s Highway, especially after getting across Nijmegen
bridge. They delayed when they could have pressed on towards Arnhem, and may have gotten
to Frost’s men in time. And as General Gavin of the 82nd said, XXX Corps were 36 hours
delayed before reaching Nijmegen, and as a result they were never going to get to the
British at Arnhem in time. For this argument, blame is then usually placed
on one of the British generals. Montgomery, despised by many people for many different
reasons, often receives criticism for coming up with this “rotten plan”. Urquhart gets
a lot of criticism for accepting landing zones miles from Arnhem bridge, and for accompanying
3rd Battalion, slowing them down, and for getting trapped in a house with his second
in command, and for not making it clear who would take command of 1st Airborne if he and
Lathbury were lost. So yeah, Urquhart has his fair share of the blame. Equally, it’s
fair to say that Browning is the one who should take the blame, since he made plenty of mistakes
too - the most noteworthy of which is dismissing the intelligence reports of German tanks in
the Arnhem area. But Browning also takes criticism for taking vital transport aircraft from the
British, and therefore weakening 1st Airborne on that first vital day. And let’s not forget
Horrocks, who’s slow advance up Hell’s Highway effectively doomed the Operation,
if you support this argument. XXX Corps took every opportunity to stop and rest, drink
tea, and generally didn’t perform well at all. The usual fact that this argument says
is that once the British tanks were over Nijmegen bridge and the road ahead was clear, they
stayed there and drank tea - despite an American paratrooper offering to go with them to Arnhem.
So a few variations in who is to blame, but this argument is the one that’s been ingrained
in the minds of majority of people when they think about Operation Market Garden. The massively
popular film, “A Bridge Too Far” probably did more than anything else to cement the
popularity of the argument. A lot of the books that focus solely on the Arnhem part of the
battlefield tend to agree with this argument too, because as has been pointed out time
and time again, the British made a lot of mistakes at Arnhem. So, do you agree with
this argument? Let us know in the comments. The second argument is that - wait for it
- the Germans were the reason why the Allies failed. Yes, surprisingly some people think
it wasn’t as much an Allied defeat, as it was a German victory. Robert Kershaw, in his
book “It Never Snows in September” is adamant that the Germans outfought the Allies
during Market Garden, despite having to rely on eyes and ears battalions and other unfit
or reserve units. And when you look at the evidence, the Germans did a remarkable job
with the little resources they had. All they had was two depleted Panzer Divisions, not
even at half strength, backed up by Krafft’s force, which is actually part of 16th Panzergrenadier
Division. So you could make the claim that there were two and a half panzer divisions
at Arnhem. They also had Panzer Brigade 107, which successfully harassed the American 101st
Division, and the super successful 406th Division, that was more of a brigade than a division.
But despite having this severe lack of men and equipment, the Germans were able to concentrate
the rag-tag forces they had, throw them at the enemy, and win this battle. Training their
units to fight, rather than march. Improvisation, and the creation of kampfgruppen - or battle
groups - and the initiative of their leaders, were the decisive factors that ultimately
allowed the Germans to prevail. Kampfgruppe Spindler at Arnhem was decisive in stopping
the rest of 1st Airborne reaching Frost at the Bridge. 10th SS Panzer Division fought
at Nijmegen in a similar situation to Frost at Arnhem. They delayed XXX Corps at Nijmegen
for 36 hours. It was the Germans who cut the corridor in the final days of the battle,
and it was the Germans that came to the conclusion that it wasn’t the British landing zones
being so far from Arnhem that was an issue, it was “that a second airborne division
was not dropped in the area west of Arnhem”. This argument raises the question. Was it
more an Allied defeat, or a German victory? If you support this argument, let us know.
And, the final argument makes the case that the battle was lost, not at its inception,
not at it’s planning, not even by the Germans (sort of), but by the decision not to capture
the Nijmegen bridge on day one. This argument makes the case that the original Market Garden
plan was thrown out as soon as General Gavin of the 82nd made the decision to deprioritise
the capture of the Nijmegen bridge and focus his division on the Groesbeek Heights. Without
the capture of Nijmegen bridge, there was no way XXX Corps could get to Arnhem in time.
Proponents of this argument also make the case that XXX Corps wasn’t delayed before
they reached Nijmegen, they were delayed 36 hours at Nijmegen. They also point out that
it was Gavin who later claimed XXX Corps was 36 hours behind schedule before reaching Nijmegen
bridge. So basically, because Nijmegen bridge wasn’t taken on day one, the Germans were
able to block the road to Arnhem, and therefore the Operation was doomed. It wasn’t that
XXX Corps was too slow as the first argument suggests, but that they suffered a far too
crucial delay at Nijmegen. The whole point of the Operation was to lay an airborne carpet
for the tanks to roll over. The bridges were the priority of the Operation. They were the
main objective. Market Garden failed because one of those bridges was ignored for a few
hours after the initial landings, allowing the Germans to secure it. Gavin certainly
comes under flak by supporters of this argument, since he made the original decision to deprioritise
Nijmegen bridge. But blame also goes to General Browning, commander of the whole airborne
part of the plan, since his hand was in that decision too. When asked, who made the decision
to prioritise the Groesbeek Heights rather than the bridge at Nijmegen, General Gavin’s
response was: This decision was made by myself and approved by my Corps Commander. As a result,
it’s fair to place the blame on General Gavin of the US 82nd Airborne, and his superior,
British General Frederick Browning, for the failure of Operation Market Garden.
So there is a basic overview of the three main arguments for the failure of Operation
Market Garden. Which do you agree with? Let’s give you a second to pause the video so you
can let us know your opinion in the comments. Ok.
Having seen the battle unfold, it’s hard not to come to the conclusion that the Operation
was lost at Nijmegen. Gavin and Browning failed to take a bridge, which was the one thing
they had to do. The objective of the whole Operation was to take the bridges. And they
didn’t do it. And whilst you could say it was the Germans who held the Nijmegen bridge
for so long, it was only because Gavin didn’t send troops to take it until the early evening
of the first day, by which point, it was too late. It’s almost as if it was an afterthought.
There is this fact floating around that XXX Corps was 36 hours behind schedule by the
time they reached Nijmegen bridge. But this is actually something Gavin said after the
battle to bend the truth. XXX Corps was at Nijmegen at the beginning of day 3 of the
Operation. So 42 hours after the beginning of the Operation (since it started in the
afternoon) they couldn’t be 36 hours behind schedule.
They’d gone 50 miles and they’d got to Nijmegen with time to spare. Unfortunately
not enough spare time to fight the 10th SS Panzer Division, but if Nijmegen bridge had
been taken by the 82nd, it’s likely they could have reached Arnhem by the end of day
3. Because the 82nd hadn’t taken Nijmegen Bridge,
it took XXX Corps and the bravery of the 82nd troopers paddling across the Waal another
36 hours to get across the bridge. Nijmegen cost XXX Corps a day and a half, and as a
result, caused Frost’s troops to be overwhelmed, caused 1st Airborne more casualties, and caused
the failure of the entire Operation. The British troops at Arnhem were not relieved, and if
they had been on day three, or even on day four, it’s reasonable to assume that XXX
Corps could have been across the Rhine. So why didn’t they take Nijmegen bridge
on day one? The obvious problem was that most of the 82nd
had been ordered to guard the Groesbeek Heights. Now, you could say that they needed the Heights
as this was their Landing Zone. But the issue isn’t that they guarded the Landing Zones,
the issue is they guarded the landing zone with as many troops as they did, and also
flew in artillery to pound the “1000 tanks” in the Reichswald, rather than take extra
troops that could go towards Nijmegen. And Warren, who in the end sent 1st Battalion
towards the bridge, wasn’t told to take Nijmegen bridge until the evening of the first
day. There is a debate, still ongoing, as to whether Warren was issued pre-drop orders
to take Nijmegen Bridge or not. He insists that he wasn’t until around 7 or 8pm on
day one. Prior to this, he’d been ordered to dig in at the Groesbeek Heights, which
he’d done. The blame therefore rests on General Gavin for not sending anyone towards
Nijmegen. Because Gavin feared an attack from the 1000
German tanks that were meant to be hiding in the Reichswald, he placed priority on taking
the Groesbeek Heights, to protect against their attack. Except there weren’t 1000
tanks in the Reichswald. In fact, there is no evidence that anyone other than Gavin thought
there were any tanks in the Reichswald. The German 406th Division that did move out on
day 2 of the Operation could barely be called a brigade. The first time any German force
worth defending against that was to come from the Reichswald moved out on Day 4, after XXX
Corps had arrived, and then it wasn’t that big of a deal. At that point, the battle should
have been over anyway. Of course, Gavin made the initial decision
not to take Nijmegen Bridge. This was a poor idea and Browning, as Gavin’s superior,
should have questioned Gavin’s decision to take the Groesbeek Heights. Browning should
have ordered Gavin to make the Nijmegen Bridge the priority once more. He didn’t do that.
Why? Because he wanted to be on the ground to command the Operation from the front. He
wanted the glory of leading a successful Operation from the ground, and setting up his Headquarters
on the Groesbeek Heights would allow him to direct the battle, in theory. In practice
Browning did next to nothing practical when he was on the ground. So rather than telling
Gavin to change his plans, he reinforced them, which ultimately proved to be a disastrous
decision. Browning also made several other disastrous decisions, like dismissing the
intelligence reports about enemy tanks, so if you come to the conclusion that it was
Browning’s fault, you can certainly argue the case.
But ultimately, the failure of this Operation was at Nijmegen, and when asking who was to
blame for the failure of Operation Market Garden, you have to blame the person who changed
the plan to suit their own wants. And the evidence here points to General Gavin.
The thing is, Gavin knew his head was likely to roll. To quote Max Hastings in his book,
Armageddon: “Gavin of the US 82nd urged that the US Army should review its policy
of ruthlessly relieving formation commanders who failed in a single battle. He argued that
it might be wiser to allow general officers to gain experience, and to enjoy at least
a second chance.” Because he’d messed up. He was urging this because he was responsible
for the failure of Operation Market Garden, basically he was begging to keep his job.
I’m going to recite a lengthy but relevant quote from John Frost: “[By] far the worst
mistake was the lack of priority given to the capture of Nijmegen Bridge. The whole
essence of the plan was to lay an airborne carpet across the obstacles in southern Holland
so that the Army could motor through, yet the capture of this, perhaps the biggest and
most vital bridge in that its destruction would have sounded the death-knell of the
troops committed at Arnhem, was not accorded priority. The capture of this bridge would
have been a walk-over on D-day, yet the American 82nd Airborne Division could spare only one
battalion as they must at all costs secure a feature called the Groesbeek Heights, where,
incidentally, the H.Q. of Airborne Corps was to be sited. It was thought that the retention
of this feature would prevent the debouchment of German armour from the Reichwald in Germany.
This armour was there by courtesy of rumour only and its presence was not confirmed by
the underground. In fact, as a feature it is by no means dominating and its retention
or otherwise had absolutely no bearing on what happened at Nijmegen Bridge.” Thus,
who was to blame for the failure of Operation Market Garden? Gavin.
But I’m certain some of you will disagree, which is why I told you right at the beginning,
that this was a controversial battle. [wink] The myths surrounding the Market Garden battle
have been burned into history. I hope we've made a dent in those myths today.
Of course, history does not stand still. Tomorrow, new evidence or a new theory could come along
and sweep away the conclusions we make today. But until then, I’d like to hear who or
what you guys think is ultimately responsible for the failure of Operation Market Garden.
Do you agree with the conclusions of this documentary? Comment below and let me know.
Hopefully you don’t because that’s what’s great about history. It’s not just about
facts and figures, it’s about arguing. And we all like a good moan. This won't be the
last documentary I make so make sure you subscribe to be notified of more. I hope this has been
entertaining and enlightening. Thanks for watching, thanks for subscribing, bye for
now.