Welcome to Millennium seven star the channel that
helps you make sense of military history and military technology please stay with me till
the end because the stuff we discuss here is not easily found anywhere else
the Indian air force has quite a large variety of combat planes in service. At the moment of
recording this video it has 54 mig-21 118 Sepecat Jaguar 45 mirage 2000 261 Sukhoi Su-30 MKI18
HAL Tejas and five Rafales. There are 36 of them in order. That makes seven distinct combat
models of Russian, French or local origin. There are also more than 80 combat planes on order,
again of various models. The Saudi air force, a little populated by rich country, has
the following: 62 f15 136 f-15E Strike Eagle 72 Euro Fighter Typhoon and 81 Pananvia Tornado. Four
different models of European and American origin. The Qatari air force, an even smaller country,
deploys the following: 9 mirage 2000 24 Dassault Rafale with 12 more on order 36 f-15E on order and
24 euro fighter typhoon, again, on order. Less than 100 combat planes split among four models of
French and American origin. These are only a few examples but there are many others for example
Korea, Japan and so on. If we compare these air forces with traditional western air forces,
yes we see a difference. France: Rafale and Mirage 2000 progressively retiring. Royal Air Force:
Typhoon and F-35. German air Force: Typhoon and Tornado. Italian air force: Typhoon, Tornado, AMX
and F-35 but AMX and Tornado are being retired as well. Even the Chinese and Russian air forces are
very differentiated too and comparatively way more differentiated than the United States Air Force.
So it seems immediately clear that some air forces, even the relatively small ones do not
refrain from variety while traditional western air forces do. You actually would expect the
opposite because we all know a large variety has larger cost as well and you would expect that only
traditional forces in rich developed countries could afford it. So there is this assumption that
it's commonly accepted that a limited number of platforms is better for logistics and since most
of modern combat aircraft are multi-role platforms eventually a single model could cover all the
combat missions for an air force. In fact many minor air forces do follow exactly this approach;
they are single model air forces. However let's unpack this idea that logistics is
more complicated and expensive if there are many different models in service. Modern combat planes
are very complicated even the simplest among them is an order of magnitude more complex of
'40s plane or even anything designed in the early 50s. The complexity started being a real factor
in the '60s when electronics became essential to accomplish the mission. The flip side of this
complexity is that about 20 percent of the force is not available at any given time for repairs
and maintenance. Actually 20 is an excellent percentage to be honest; an air force left
with insufficient maintenance is going to lose its effectiveness very very quickly. So it would
seem just natural that if there was a single model in service there would be no differentiation for
the parts that will be procured in bulk at better prices thanks to the economy of scale. Also if all
the air bases and all the warehouses stock the same spares they could exchange them in case of
need. This would indeed be true if the model used for the maintenance would be as just described. In
reality there are different levels of maintenance, some of it, the simplest, is executed at the air
bases by the air force personnel. More complex interventions or repairs though, are often
executed by the manufacturer in the factory or by a maintenance facility located where the planes
can freely fly to. These factory based operations are way less sensitive to the scale economies than
just plain spares being the resource consumption, i.e. salary, the most expensive element. Training
is perhaps the most crucial element to maintain the air force operational. Training doesn't
involve only pilots but also the large number of ground specialists and all the ground personnel,
necessary to keep the organization going; from the line of flight manager to the cooks.
A variety of models means that there need to be dedicated training facilities for each model,
training the aircraft bi-place usually, but also simulators technical schools and so on and the
trainers too need a specific experience on that specific model that they're teaching about. So
obviously having everything duplicated is more expensive unless you do the bulk of
your training abroad. This is not the case for the Indian Air Force that we mentioned before,
but many gulf states for example make large use of foreign training facilities. In this
case the cost is for the trained pilot or for the trained specialist rather than for maintaining
the infrastructure and the organization. Another additional complexity connected with the variety
is that multiple supply chains are required. The supply chain is the complex of people
companies and, in general, organizations required to keep the planes operational. We are talking the
manufacturer, its suppliers and the suppliers of its suppliers and so on. Having multiple
supply chains completely separate places an extra burden onto the air force organization
and the air force itself is a less relevant client for a large organization;
but on the flip side it is also useful for the air force not to rely on a single source
and put all the eggs into one big basket. Where the complexity becomes really relevant is with
weapons. Different design schools use different weapons families, so different weapons need
to be provisioned for each model. Let's keep considering the Indian air force. It has a mix
of French and Russian designs. The families of weapons these planes use in their original version
could not be more different. In India a huge work has been done around weapons integration.
For example the Sukhoi 30 MKI, other than the usual family of Russian weapons it can also use
the Darter, the local Astra and the integration has been tested with the MICA. All these
integrations are extremely expensive and require time and expertise and resources and ultimately
money. Basically the plane needs to be modified to use the weapon. Often these modifications are
mostly at software level but in some cases new pylons new interfaces new electronics
need to be developed. This is an area where having planes all of the same family drastically brings
costs down and obviously all this does not only apply to the weapons but also to the communication
systems the data links and the various pods that an aircraft may need to execute the mission. So to
wrap it up it is true that variety implies higher cost even if there are some mitigating factors
as we have explained. But there is one huge advantage in variety that is hardly spoken of.
The Indian Air Force, which is paradigmatic in this respect, has seven frontline combat models.
There are obviously overlaps among their missions. Su-30MKI and Rafale are true modern multirole
Mig-29 and Mirage 2000 have air to air and air to ground capabilities,
albeit to a lesser extent than the two before. The Mig-21 is basically an interceptor,
with limited air to ground capabilities The Tejas is a light multirole,
good to complement the other models The Jaguar is an old but still effective ground
attack plane. It may seem that all these overlaps are a waste of money and an unnecessary complexity
but with complexity come options. The Indian Air Force for example can execute the same mission
with different planes and different weapons the Indian planners have the possibility to hit
the same target in various different ways. Not all the options are equally modern they're not equally
sophisticated or effective but the opponent doesn't know at least in principle what is
going to happen this is a huge advantage. Surprise is the most important force multiplier in conmbat
and surprise can be generated through incertitude. The defender has to consider different options,
it might spread itself too thin and leave gaps thereby being unprepared to counter the menace.
And the same may be true for an intruder in the Indian airspace. It might be confronted
by the Rafale with the long range Meteors or by fast and nimble Mig 21 acting as interceptors
or by Mirage 2000 operating at medium or close range. It is not easy being ready for everything.
There is also an advantage in variety: a mix of different models is more resilient against counter
measures. Let us suppose that your opponent finds a very effective way to jam the mig-21 radar. The
same jammer may be not equally effective against the other models that can keep operating
in the same role while the mig-21 is moved to another mission or to a different area. This is
not the case for electronics only the tactics that turn out to be effective against a model
can be ineffective or even harmful against another. It is in the nature of war,
an action will cause a reaction and, over time, what used to be effective may
be countered effectively by new tactics, that, in turn, will cause changes and so on. Going through
this process for 7 different types of planes and many more weapons, is clearly more difficult
than for one. A very complex air force like the Indian can be neutralized only by neutralizing
each different model if there are many models it is much more difficult to neutralize all of them
So, if this is the case, we still have a question to answer:
why western air forces tend to uniformity then?
Well, I suspect that there are two different forces at work here.
The first is the economic and managerial culture that imbues all the west. In the
world of management reducing costs almost always has a positive spin.
This managerial culture is taught to officers and decision makers in the military too.
So, I suspect that a disproportionate attention is placed on efficiency per unit of money spent.
The second is the complacency that western military organizations
have, almost unconsciously, matured from the fact that they never had to fight a peer adversary
since WWII. Deep in their mind, they are convinced to be the best and that they
will always ultimately prevail. I personally and humbly consider
this a very dangerous line of thought. So if you liked this video I'm sure you will
like the videos that are going to appear beside me and while please like dislike
subscribe and hit the bell so you won't miss anything and if you could consider supporting the
channel on patreon or subscribe star that would be amazing and you will have my multitude forever
the meanwhile thank you very very very much for watching and see you in the next video