JUDY WOODRUFF: Over the weekend, North Korea tested a missile that flies
so far, it could have reached the U.S. territory Guam in the South Pacific.
It is North Korea's longest range test since 2017, and seventh such test this month,
the most launched so closely together in the 10 years of leader Kim Jong-un's rule.
Nick Schifrin picks up the story from here.
NICK SCHIFRIN: Judy, this weekend's test was of an intermediate-range ballistic missile.
North Korean media showed photos of the Hwasong-12 launching and entering space.
South Korean and U.S. officials believe its range is more than 2,000 miles.
This test is the most aggressive step in a series of moves that began in September,
including multiple short-range missile tests just in the last few weeks,
Kim Jong-un's first visit to a munitions factory in years, and repeated tests of
missiles designed to improve survivability, such as train-launched ballistic missiles.
Many of these tests break U.N. Security Council resolutions. But none, so far, has broken
Kim's 2017 promise not to test another nuclear device, or intercontinental ballistic missile.
North Korea has warned its future priorities include
larger nuclear weapons and bigger missiles.
So, what's the implication for U.S. policy?
For that, we get two views.
Anthony Ruggiero is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies
and was the National Security Council senior director for counterproliferation and biodefense
during the Trump administration. And Jenny Town is a senior fellow at the
Stimson Center and the director of its analysis site, 38 North.
Welcome, both of you, back to "NewsHour."
Anthony Ruggiero, let me start with you.
Why do you believe now for this intermediate-range test?
ANTHONY RUGGIERO, Foundation for the Defense of Democracies: Kim is looking to test to make and
sure these missiles work. So, there is a technical reason. But there's also a political reason.
As you noted, they have been testing missiles since September
2021, and there is no consequences for that, only one set of sanctions that came earlier this
month. So Kim may have thought that missile tests are OK to the Biden administration.
NICK SCHIFRIN: Jenny Town, do you think this is about a lack of consequences,
or is it about North Korea doing what it said it would about a year ago,
which is going through a list of tests, including this one?
JENNY TOWN, Managing Editor/Producer, 38 North: I think there are domestic underpinnings to this
Kim Jong-un set these goals for the economy and for the missile program. The economic
goals are not being met. And the military side is one area in which they can control and can
get some successes against the plan ahead of some big political meetings coming up.
NICK SCHIFRIN: Anthony Ruggiero, I asked a senior administration official yesterday
whether they had the right policy.
And they said -- quote -- "We believe
we have the right approach" calling for talks without preconditions.
Is that the right approach?
ANTHONY RUGGIERO: I mean, we need to do that.
Certainly, have talks without preconditions is the right message.
But it was the wrong message after a long-range missile test, an intermediate-range missile tests.
I mean, Biden's policy in 2021 was essentially engagement only.
We know that doesn't work. And so now he needs to find both engagement and pressure.
And he needs to rebuild the diplomatic pressure too.
Last week, Secretary Blinken talked to his Chinese counterpart. North Korea missile
launches wasn't even mentioned in the readout. That's an unforced error by the administration.
NICK SCHIFRIN: Jenny Town, increased pressure?
JENNY TOWN: I think there's a role for sanctions here. But, certainly, pressure is not going to
change North Korea's calculus. It's clear that they're moving forward with their technical
capabilities, and they're willing to accept the political consequences that come with it.
But especially right now, when China and Russia are not in agreement that these
measures really rise to the level of sort of unified international response,
I think it really calls for, how do we get back to negotiations? How do we get back to a place
and create incentives for North Korea to make different decisions?
Because leaning on the pressure is only continuing this track of development.
NICK SCHIFRIN: Anthony Ruggiero, what about that? Incentives?
ANTHONY RUGGIERO: We know the incentive-laden track does not lead to negotiations.
That's what the history tells us. North Korea responds to pressure. China responds to pressure,
when the U.S. sanctions Chinese banks, Chinese individuals, Chinese
companies, Russian banks, Russian companies, Russian individuals.
The sanctions the Biden administration put in place earlier this month
was interesting because it targeted DPRK individuals in Russia and in China. We know
that North Korea responds to pressure. They did it for the Trump administration. They did
it with the Bush administration. We know that works. That leads to negotiations.
NICK SCHIFRIN: Jenny Town, haven't we seen this before, North Korea escalating, in order not
only to improve its weapons, but to try and get concessions? It hasn't worked in the past, right?
JENNY TOWN: We have to look at the bigger picture here, in terms of,
the more pressure we applied, for instance, in 2017, the more
North Korea doubled down on its development as well. It didn't bring them to the table.
They went all the way to the end and declared victory first. So, I think we need to think
more about the message that we're sending on the diplomatic side,
and remembering that there's a consequence for failed diplomacy on the North Korean side as
well and be ready to come up with more concrete proposals, not just an open call for negotiations.
NICK SCHIFRIN: Anthony Ruggiero, during the Trump administration, you tried something
different. You tried high-level direct diplomacy between Kim and President Trump.
There were letters. There were statements. There was
"We fell in love" from President Trump. It didn't work. Why not?
ANTHONY RUGGIERO: Well, I think one of the reasons
it didn't work is because the pressure was relieved.
North Korea continued their activities. They continued proliferation.
They continued these prohibited programs, and the pressure waned.
I mean, I agree with Jenny Town that the bottom line is that we had maximum pressure.
Then that brought Kim back to the table.
And then he -- Kim ran out the clock, as he and his father and his grandfather has done before.
Now, the issue here is, how do you combine engagement and pressure? That's the real
question here. Biden tried engagement only in 2021. That doesn't work. And
Trump tried early on just pressure. How do we combine the two for a better policy?
NICK SCHIFRIN: Jenny Town,
does the international community need to resign itself to a nuclear North Korea?
JENNY TOWN: The North Koreans have agreed to denuclearization as recently as 2018.
The question is, what is our expectation? It's not going to happen overnight. And
it will come at a cost. And the longer it takes to come up with even the first step
down a denuclearization path means that the price is going to get higher every time.
There are security reasons why they're doing this. There's coercive reasons why they're doing this.
And I would disagree that it was pressure that brought North Korea back to the table in 2018,
but more a diplomatic opening from the South Koreans that there was actual incentives
on the table for them to take up and created a different opportunity for them to change course.
NICK SCHIFRIN: Anthony Ruggiero, North Korea is going through a checklist,
as we have discussed, that it published last year.
And on that list is a larger-capacity nuclear warhead and a 9,000-mile-range
missile. Do you fear that those tests are next?
ANTHONY RUGGIERO: Yes, I think those are coming.
I think that he has a list that he's going through. If you look
at the reactions to the seven rounds of tests here in January,
I think, again, he's getting the message that there's very little consequences.
NICK SCHIFRIN: Jenny Town, do you fear that this is only going to escalate further
toward nuclear tests and bigger warhead tests?
JENNY TOWN: North Korea has been very cautious
so far over the past couple of years to stay below that threshold, knowing that back what we
saw in 2017 was ICBM tests, nuclear tests really did unify international community against them.
And I think they have been very careful to sequence this in a way
to really ensure that they still have some buffer along this way,
especially while the country is still under lockdown and the domestic situation is in crisis.
NICK SCHIFRIN: Jenny Town, Anthony Ruggiero, thank you very much.
JENNY TOWN: Thank you.