The Gulf of Tonkin incident was the last straw
that led to the open engagement of the United States in the Vietnam War.
In early August of 1964, two encounters between American
and North Vietnamese warships in the waters of the Gulf of Tonkin
allowed President Lyndon B. Johnson the authority to get involved in the war.
The US blamed the communists for both confrontations, but subsequent
investigations years later would put the veracity of the second incident into question…
Animosity in Vietnam
A mandated temporary ceasefire was put into motion at the international Geneva Convention of 1954
to facilitate the separation of the Vietnamese and French forces in Indochina.
In addition, the political future of the country would be settled by a formal election
in the following two years, and no new government could be created without them. Needless to say,
the accords forbade any political interference of other countries and foreign military presence.
The United States attended the convention to sort out the hostilities between the natives
and the colonizers, but did not participate in signing the agreement. The country had
already been sending military advisers to Vietnam as early as the mid-1950s.
After the agreement, Vietnam was divided into North Vietnam and South Vietnam
as a temporary measure, and Ho Chi Minh was appointed Prime Minister of the North,
leading the communist forces in the area.
The Soviet Union’s expansion was a significant matter of concern for the United States,
and they believed that a policy of containment needed to be applied
to prevent the fall of any country in the region to communism.
Meanwhile, the Viet Minh national independence coalition campaigned
for unifying elections from 1955 to 1959, but they were suppressed. As a result,
the South Vietnamese government led by Ngo Dinh Diem faced significant discontent,
and a communist uprising led by the Viet Cong intensified in 1961.
While President John F. Kennedy had initially agreed to send military advisers to support Diem,
he eventually approved a limited recall of US forces in the area. It is believed that Kennedy
perceived the government in Saigon as unable and unwilling to make much-needed reforms.
But days before his assassination in November of 1963,
a group of Army of the Republic of Vietnam officers deposed the South Vietnamese government,
and Diem was executed. The American government did not do anything to stop the coup.
The next US President, Lyndon B. Johnson, openly supported military escalation in Vietnam
as a result of the Soviet Union’s expansionist policies.
He was supported by the Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, who wanted immediate action.
Still, Johnson decided to hold back a few more months because
of international friction and confusion.
Misunderstandings
A CIA top-secret operation of covert actions against North Vietnam
had been active since 1961. The missions involved sabotage and intelligence gathering.
In 1963, several Norwegian ships were purchased and sent to South Vietnam
along with three skippers recruited by Norwegian intelligence officer Alf Martens Meyers.
The ships were crewed by South Vietnamese personnel and received orders from Admiral
Ulysses S. Grant Sharp Jr., head of the United States Indo-Pacific Command.
A complaint was filed by the city of Hanoi to the International Control Commission
regarding the Geneva Accords, but the US denied being involved.
It would be until four years later that McNamara admitted their involvement.
Back in 1964, American naval vessels under the oversight of the US Department of Defense were
sent to support South Vietnam under the DESOTO program of electronic warfare support measures.
The ships were to observe and intercept communications from the North,
while the Vietnamese navy was to execute an attack on radar stations,
bridges, and other targets along Northern coasts.
On the night of July 30, the destroyer USS Maddox was in the area when the Southern
ships attacked the facilities on Hon Me and Hon Ngu in the Gulf of Tonkin. The ship would then
perform patrols along the coast to gather intelligence, and by August 1, the crew
noticed that they were being tracked by North Vietnamese patrol boats and opted to retreat.
Still, the following day, Maddox continued her patrols and suddenly faced three North
Vietnamese torpedo boats approaching her. The crew fired three warning shots,
and the boats then retaliated with torpedoes and machine gunfire.
Maddox asked for reinforcements from a nearby carrier, USS Ticonderoga,
and air support quickly arrived. During the ensuing battle,
one US aircraft and three North Vietnamese ships were severely damaged, but Maddox remained intact.
The Americans believed that their intelligence-gathering mission was being targeted,
and a second destroyer, USS Turner Joy, was sent to reinforce Maddox. It was clear that the North
Vietnamese thought that Maddox was part of the American covert actions against their country.
Two days later, the Americans allegedly intercepted messages
that led them to believe the destroyers were being targeted,
but the communications probably referred to a rescue operation for the damaged ships.
That night, the two destroyers reported spotting several unidentified vessels
approaching them from different directions and immediately asked for air support. Commander
James Stockdale soon came to their aid but found no torpedo boats in the area.
Captain John Herrick from USS Maddox later sent a message regarding the event:
(QUOTE) “Review of action makes many reported contacts and torpedoes fired appear doubtful.
Freak weather effects on radar and overeager sonarmen may have
accounted for many reports. … Suggest complete evaluation before any further action taken.”
A Desire for War
President Johnson voiced the country’s concerns the night of the second incident: (QUOTE)
“In the larger sense, this new act of aggression, aimed directly at our own forces, again brings
home to all of us in the United States the importance of the struggle for peace and
security in southeast Asia. Aggression by terror against the peaceful villagers of South Viet-Nam
has now been joined by open aggression on the high seas against the United States of America.
The determination of all Americans to carry out our full commitment to the people
and to the government of South Viet-Nam will be redoubled by this outrage.
Yet our response, for the present, will be limited and fitting. We Americans know,
although others appear to forget, the risks of spreading conflict. We still seek no wider war.”
During his heartfelt speech, the President did not mention
the American secret missions that had been carried out for years in Southeast Asia,
withholding pivotal information that could’ve changed the course of history.
In contrast, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was immediately put into motion. The US Congress
supported it unanimously, and almost the entire House of Representatives voted in its favor.
The resolution granted President Johnson the authority to support any Southeast Asian country
that was considered endangered by communist aggression, bestowing him with limitless power
to wage war without official declarations. The US Congress had yielded its constitutional authority
to the President, an action that would thereafter be regarded as a Blank Check.
The Ambassador of the United States in the United Nations, Adlai E. Stevenson,
expressed: (QUOTE) “In Southeast Asia we want nothing more and nothing less than the assured
and guaranteed independence of the peoples of that area. We are in Southeast Asia to help our
friends preserve their own opportunity to be free of imported terror, of alien assassination managed
by the North Vietnam communists based in Hanoi and backed by the Chinese communists from Peking.
There is a very easy way to restore order in Southeast Asia. Stop the export of revolution
that has taken place in that area. When the peace agreements reached long ago are made
effective peace will return to Southeast Asia and military power can be withdrawn.”
Loose Ends
The Vietnam War would go on for another 11 years of brutal combat and thousands of casualties.
Still, the War Powers Resolution approved in 1973 stripped the President’s power to
commit to an armed conflict without the support of the US Congress. The
agreement was previously vetoed by President Nixon
but was finally overridden by two-thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives alike.
The resolution indicated that the President had to notify Congress of any military action
48 hours in advance. Furthermore, they now had the authority to withdraw troops after
60 days of any engagement and bring them home within 30 days.
The incident on August 4, 1964,
became the boiling point that President Johnson used to justify the US involvement in the war.
Still, a 2005 declassified National Security Agency historical study concluded that USS
Maddox had engaged the North Vietnamese on August 2, but no actual incident happened on the 4th.
Moreover, there is still debate around whether Maddox was in international
waters as the Americans claimed or if she had trespassed into Vietnamese territory,
violating the sovereignty of the crippled nation.
Decades later, McNamara met General Vo Nguyen Giap of the Vietnam People’s Army
and asked him what had happened that night, to which he replied: (QUOTE) ”Absolutely nothing.”
Thanks for watching our video!
If you enjoyed it, please give it a thumbs up and leave a comment below. And don’t forget to
subscribe to all our Dark Documentaries channels for more historical anecdotes.