On April 5, 1982, the Soviet army in Afghanistan launched an operation to destroy the mujahideen
base in the remote settlement of Rabati-Jali. Early in the morning, 79 helicopters delivered
more than 600 Soviet soldiers, who successfully launched the attack on the base. Since the
beginning of the Soviet invasion, this was their largest airmobile operation, and General
Tabunshchikov, who was watching the operation from the Antonov An-30 circling above, would have been
pleased with the spectacle, if not for one thing. The object that the Russians attacked was not the
base of the Afghan mujahideen. In fact, this object was not even located in Afghanistan.
The base that the Soviet troops destroyed turned out to be an ordinary asphalt factory in Iran.
With the invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, the Soviets found themselves in a somewhat unusual
combat situation. The 40th Army, which became the land forces arm of the Soviet occupational force
in Afghanistan, was a strong and well-trained army by Soviet standards. However, it quickly became
apparent that the Army was not prepared for the type of war it had to fight. Unlike the classic
warfare that the Soviet troops were primarily trained for, there was no clear front line in
Afghanistan. The Afghan mujahideen were perfectly aware that they had zero chance in direct
confrontations with the Soviets, so they relied heavily on guerrilla tactics: they disrupted
supply lines, conducted raids and ambushes, and then quickly withdrew to their hidden
bases. Such raids slowly drained the resources of the Soviets, and one of their responses was
an attempt to eliminate the problem at its root they decided to cut off the mujahideen's
access to weapons supplies by targeting their caravans, transit bases, and training camps.
One such base was located near the abandoned settlement of Rabati-Jali,
right at the junction of the Afghan, Iranian, and Pakistani borders. The first information
about the large base of mujahideen at Rabati-Jali was received by Soviet military intelligence in
early 1982. According to their agent s report, the base contained warehouses with weapons and
ammunition as well as a large amounts of drugs, which the mujahideen exchanged for weapons from
nearby Iran and Pakistan. The base was guarded by roughly sixty people; however, large groups
of mujahideen were regularly stationed at the base, undergoing military training or arriving
for new weapons and ammunition. Most interesting for Soviet intelligence, however, was information
about two dozen wooden crates containing long tubes. Based on the description, these could
possibly be Strela portable surface-to-air missiles, presumably delivered from Egypt.
The intelligence about the Rabati-Jali base was then sent to Moscow, to Marshal Sergey Sokolov,
who was in charge of Soviet ground forces during the war. In mid-March Moscow responded
with orders to prepare an operation to destroy the base at Rabati-Jali.
The operation to destroy the base at Rabati-Jali was given high importance and received a very
promising and set-for-success codename South . Leadership of the operation was assigned to no
less than General Vladimir Vinokurov, Deputy Commander of the 40th Army. Another fact that
showed the importance of the mission was that all the preparations were completed
in total secrecy and the operation was to be carried out using only the Soviet military,
without any involvement of the Afghan Army or Afghan Intelligence Agency KhAD.
According to the plan, the operation would start early in the morning of April 5,
1982, with an air strike by 12 Sukhoi Su-17 fighter-bombers to suppress the air defenses
of the base as well as the outside guard. Immediately after the air strike, helicopters
were to deliver assault regiments, whose task would be to capture all the dominant heights
around the base, launch the attack and eliminate the remains of the mujahideen soldiers inside,
destroy the drugs and weapons warehouses, and of course, seize the MANPADS. To complete all these
tasks the assault groups were given 6 hours, after which they would be evacuated by helicopter.
To execute this mission, Soviet command allocated 3 airborne assault regiments, 1 motorized rifle
company, and a company of Spetsnaz GRU. All in all, more than 600 personnel. No less impressive
was the aviation group, which consisted of the 280th Separate Helicopter Regiment commanded by
Colonel Valery Savchenko. In addition to 61 Mi-8 helicopters in various modifications, Savchenko
also received under his command 18 gigantic Mi-6 helicopters from the 335th Regiment.
It was decided that the Mi-24 attack helicopter would not be used in the operation due to its
limited combat range. The distance to the target was far, and the use of the Mi-24 would require
multiple refueling points, which would only magnify the already complicated matter of
refuelling. For the Mi-8 and Mi-6 helicopters, a transit point was created 47 km from the target,
with ground prepared for helicopter landing and refueling. A few days before the operation,
some of the Mi-6 helicopters delivered necessary materials, as well as huge
rubber-fabric containers filled with fuel. The preparations for the operation began on
March 30, 1982. All the equipment was carefully examined, and if necessary,
quickly repaired. The attack Mi-8s received extra armament and ammunition; on the contrary, the
troop-carrying Mi-8s were lightened by removing the defensive machine guns, which allowed them to
take onboard an extra trooper. It was also ordered that red stars and tail numbers on all helicopters
must be painted over, an order whose purpose still remains unclear today, since the Soviets were the
only power around that had such helicopters. All in all the aviation group consisted of 79
helicopters and 38 airplanes, which, in particular, included 8 MiG-23 fighters to
provide air cover, and an Antonov An-30 carrying General Tabunshchikov, who was to oversee the
operation from the air. Direct command of the operation was entrusted to the deputy
commander of the 40th Army s air force, Colonel Aprelkin, who, according to some accounts, was
promised the rank of general and the order Hero of the USSR if the operation was a success.
At dawn on April 4, the whole helicopter group headed to the transit refueling point. However,
the relocation didn t go smoothly due to a sandstorm in the area, which significantly
reduced visibility. For safety reasons the group had to break down into smaller divisions,
which significantly delayed the time to get to the refueling point. The last helicopters landed at
dusk. The group spent the night manually refueling the helicopters until the morning of April 5.
At 6 am, the Mi-9 command helicopter piloted by Captain Yuriy Serebryaniy, with Colonel Aprelkin
onboard, took off and set a course for the target. The rest of the helicopters were to follow at
specific time intervals. At the very same time, the Antonov An-30 with General Tabunshchikov
took off and headed to the target area. At 6:40 am, 2 Sukhoi Su-17s found the Rabati-Jali base
and marked it with 4 luminous parachute bombs, and in the next 15 minutes 12 Su-17s struck the
Rabati-Jali base with bombs and missiles. And it is then that a chain of unforeseen events
occurred that, combined with some ridiculous mistakes, made Operation South go south.
What happened was that the luminous parachute bombs were dropped roughly 400 meters from the
target, which wasn t a big deal for the Su-17 pilots who were familiar with the area. However,
by the time the air strike was completed and the helicopters were approaching the area, the desert
wind had carried the parachute bombs way further from the target, right into Iranian territory.
The leading command helicopter with Colonel Aprelkin saw the luminous bombs, and then
headed towards those bombs, leading with them the entire helicopter group. After a short time,
Captain Serebryaniy noted that it looked like they had crossed the border of Afghanistan,
but Colonel Aprelkin insisted on continuing the flight. The captain tried to convince the colonel
that they were already in Iran, but the colonel gave a direct order and even marked on the map
with his finger the place he thought they were. Meanwhile, the helicopter piloted by Major Nikolay
Babenko reported that they had discovered an asphalt road which wasn t indicated on their
maps. There was a bus peacefully driving down the road whose passengers were not reacting to the
overflying helicopters in any way. But strangest of all were the wooden poles along the road,
which told the pilots there was no way they were in Afghanistan. Wood was extremely scarce in the
Afghan desert and worth its weight in gold. If this was Afghanistan, those poles would have
been chopped down long ago. But the moment the pilots were coming to this realisation,
the group saw a compound ahead of them which matched the description of their target. There
were warehouses in the center with guard towers along the sides. And Colonel Aprelkin made
the decision to execute the assault operation. Strangely, the absence of any signs of destruction
from the preceding air strike somehow didn t confuse Colonel Aprelkin. The landing started at
7:03 and lasted for 17 minutes. More than fifty Mi-8s landed and stretched across the desert
in a line several kilometers wide. Heavy Mi-6s landed nearby and started the refueling process,
while assault groups attacked the base with machine guns and mortar fire,
gradually destroying the buildings and equipment of the base. For a moment it may have seemed a
perfectly planned and executed operation if not for one thing the object under attack was
not the mujahideen base at Rabati-Jali but an ordinary asphalt factory in the Iranian city of
Harmak. It was pure luck that at the time the factory was still closed and had no workers on
site. And the only victims of the mighty Soviet military became 2 unlucky security guards.
Meanwhile, 1st Lieutenant Ryaboshapko from the An-30 with General Tabunshchikov
onboard had sorted out the situation and immediately contacted the helicopter group:
You are 12 kilometers away from the target, in the territory of Iran. Urgently evacuate
the troops and leave the area." The helicopters received the message
but suddenly heard a loud roar of engines. At first, they thought this was the MiG-23 from
their air cover having fun. But these were Iranian F-4 Phantoms. The Iranians passed over the landed
helicopter group on their first approach; however, then they turned around and fired two Sidewinder
missiles. Neither of them hit the helicopters, with one hitting the ground and exploding,
while the second one fell flat and simply broke, becoming a trophy for the Soviet soldiers.
At this time, a second pair of Phantoms approached the area and started shooting
the helicopters with their guns. The Soviet MiGs meanwhile reported that they had missile lock
on the Phantoms but were under strict orders not to engage in the fight by General Tabunshchikov,
who had rightfully judged that Iranian F-4s shot down over Iran would definitely lead
to a huge international scandal. Meanwhile, the Iranians regrouped and
continuously watered the helicopters with their guns. Two helicopters were destroyed,
while several others received various damage. Fortunately there were no human casualties,
except that one of the helicopter pilots, 1st Lieutenant Troudov, was slightly wounded.
Not long afterwards an Iranian motorized battalion arrived and pulled up to the Soviet helicopter
landing zone. However, by that time most of the Soviet assault troops had already been evacuated
from the area, and the rest of them had to quickly leave Iranian territory at gunpoint.
While most of the Soviet troops were evacuated from Iranian territory on the helicopters,
some of the regiments had to leave on their own feet. Roughly 3 hours after
the landing in Iran they crossed the border, and then 2 hours later they joined the rest
of the troops near the Rabati-Jali base. Yeah, they still had to complete their mission.
At 12:30 pm the assault group completed reconnaissance of the base and contacted
the air strike group. At 2:30 pm the Su-17s conducted a second air strike on
the mujahideen base. And at 3 pm the assault teams launched their attack on the base. By
7 pm it was all over, with the Rabati-Jali base being completely destroyed. However,
with the second attack there was no longer an element of surprise; the mujahideen managed to
safely move out most of the drugs and weapons. The MANPADS were not found at the base either.
By dark Operation South had ended; however, things were still going south. One of the helicopters,
while taking off, became disoriented in the blowing sand and dust, turned on its side
and collapsed. Only thanks to the flight mechanic, who managed to quickly open the aft hatch, did the
crew and soldiers manage to escape the helicopter before it exploded. But that was not the final
loss. It turned out that with all this running between Iran and Afghanistan there might not
be enough fuel for the return flight. So Colonel Aprelkin called for a couple Mi-6 fuel tankers to
urgently fly from Kandahar. One of those tankers, while on the way to the refueling point, ran into
an ambush and was shot down from the ground. The crew managed to land the damaged helicopter and
were soon rescued; however, they had to destroy their Mi-6 before leaving, adding yet another
loss to the toll of Operation South . Interestingly enough, by the time this happened
the Iranian Government had already issued a note of protest to the USSR. And the Soviet
Government made an official apology for the incident. Some accounts state that the Soviet
government also issued a lifetime pension to the families of the slain factory guards.
As for the Soviet army, Operation South serves as a perfect example that no matter how thoroughly
you plan the operation, there s always the possibility that a small accidental event will
ruin all your plans. Of course, on top of that was the fact that the Antonov An-30 could have more
accurately controlled and guided the helicopter group from above. It was also unforgivable that
the entire helicopter group had blindly followed the leading helicopter without conducting
navigation themselves and while ignoring the surrounding landmarks. But the main problem,
of course, was the blunt ignorance of Colonel Aprelkin, who simply ignored all warnings from
his subordinates, like Captain Serebryaniy for instance. It is believed that the helicopter s
flight recorder impartially recorded their dispute about their current location, which later saved
the captain during the investigation. All accounts of this 1982 incident state that Colonel Aprelkin
became the one and only culprit of this incident, which led to him losing his high command position
and being sent back to the USSR. Which at first made me think of how how normal it was. I mean,
the high-ranking Soviet officer made a mistake and had to suffer the consequences of his actions. The
real Soviet Army as it was supposed to be. But then I noted the photo that I have here,
depicting Aprelkin during one of the Panjshir offensives, which were some of the heaviest
battles for the Soviets in that war, and the picture is dated June 1982. Meaning it happened
after Operation South . A simple search shows that Aprelkin remained in his position in Afghanistan
up until 1983. Looks like the success of Operation South didn t affect his position at all. Moreover,
in the book The Scorched Sky of Afghanistan by Viktor Markovsky, I found yet another
interesting episode with Colonel Aprelkin. In July 1981, roughly 1 year before Operation South,
when supporting Soviet troops in a major operation, Aprelkin led a group of helicopters
tasked with delivering a group of engineers to mine the road from Pakistan to the Afghan town
of Jalalabad. They completed the task; however, on their way back they realised that they had
mistakenly crossed the Afghan border and mined the road in Pakistan. The group flew back to
remove their mines, but it was too late; they saw some trucks already burning on the Pakistani road.
Looks like Aprelkin managed to visit and leave his mark in all the countries neighboring Afghanistan.
Except maybe for China, but I have a feeling I just need to dig deeper into his career.
To Aprelkin s defence I may say that navigation in Afghanistan must have been
quite challenging due to the lack of landmarks. Funny thing, though, even with many landmarks,
navigation errors can still occur, like the 1967 incident in Germany when a Soviet Mig-21 pilot,
instead of landing at his home base, accidently landed on a NATO airfield. If you want to learn
more about this fascinating episode of the Cold War, check out my video, which is now available on
my streaming service Nebula. By the way, that's where you can find my other exclusive videos,
like the one about the mock fights of the captured F-5 fighter against the MiG-21 and 23,
which greatly shocked the Soviet Command; or the episode on the Soviets' crazy attempts to mount
huge cannons on small fighters, which became known as the "Recoilless madness of the '30s";
as well as other episodes on Soviet Aviation history. And more episodes are coming.
The reason for this growing number of my videos on Nebula is simple the strict advertiser-friendly
guidelines on YouTube in regards to historical content. Unfortunately, it s very often that my
videos get affected by those policies, and the most recent example is my previous video about
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since recently YouTube quit providing the reasons for their decisions. Of course, I may start to
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