Noremac Cameron has said -
Hello TIK, I am A proud new patron of your amazing content and I have a question regarding
Infantry Equipment on the Soviet Axis front. So here is some context before my main question.
I have heard from multiple sources that during the later years (1944-1945) on the soviet
axis front that soviet troops had a huge advantage when it came to infantry equipment, Mainly
small arms. Their PPSH 41's and PPS 43's would mow German troops armed mainly with kar98
(Bolt action rifles) and maybe the occasional MP-40 SMG. Is this really true? It seems like
the German army would of realized that including more semi automatic and SMG's into their divisions
would of helped equalize close up infantry combat. And while the Germans did produce
the Stg 44 these sources didn't mention them or if they did they said the weapon wasn't
present enough on the front line to make any difference. Are these claims that the Stg
44 was not present enough to counter the soviet SMG's true as well? (Keep Up the good work
TIK!)
An interesting question, and here’s a list of sources I’ve used to answer it (which
I’ll list in the description). You’ll also find an other link in the description
as well, because last week I narrated a video about Operation Winter Storm (the Stalingrad
relief attempt) for Historian Anton Joly on his channel. Unlike this video, it was full
of primary source documents, so make sure you check it out if you missed it because,
in the process of making that video, both of us realised some very interesting elements
about that period that we’d both missed previously in our studies of Stalingrad, and
we’ll be discussing it in the future. Link in the description, and at the end of the
video.
So, did Soviet troops have a huge advantage when it came to infantry equipment, and did
they mow down the Germans with huge numbers of submachine guns?
Well, it is true that Soviet infantry were armed with a lot of submachine guns in the
late war years. Comparing Soviet rifles to submachine gun production, 34% of production
during the war years went to submachine guns, whereas the Germans had just 11% of their
production geared towards them. Now, it’s worth noting here that Soviet submachine gun
production started off very low, and then quickly ramped up as the war progressed. So
it was more than 34% in the late war years, and lower in the early ones. And it is true
that whole units in the Red Army were armed with nothing but submachine guns.
“At least in theory, the NKO equipped one rifle (submachine gun) company per rifle regiment
with the PPSh, and, in addition, created a machine-gun platoon in the 1st, 4th, and 7th
Companies in each Red Army rifle battalion.”
The German riflemen were also at a firepower disadvantage. The rate of fire for a trained
rifleman with a Kar 98k was 15 rounds per minute, including the reloading of the rifle
with their 5-round clips. The rate of fire for a PPSh-41 submachine gun was 900 rounds
per minute, although in practice they only carried 150 to 200 rounds, but even so there
was a clear advantage in terms of the number of bullets in the air. A ten man squad armed
with bold-action rifles had a practical combined firepower of 150 rounds per minute at best.
Armed with PPSh-41 submachine guns, and that firepower could increase to as much as 1,500
rounds per minute.
Worse, when comparing the raw number of submachine guns being produced by both sides, it does
appear that the Germans were in trouble. By the end of 1943, the Soviets had produced
3,619,700 submachine guns. That’s actually more than twice as many MP 40s and MP 38’s
that the Germans produced throughout the entire war! In fact, by the end of 1943, the Germans
had only produced 827,722 MP 40s and MP 38s. The Germans only managed to produce 1,047,600
MP 40s, compared to 6,173,900 PPSh-41s, 1,500,000 Thompson submachine guns from the USA, and
a whopping four million Sten guns from Great Britain. So yes, they were trailing behind
in terms of submachine gun production.
“All [of the Soviets] were equipped with semiautomatic rifles or short-barreled submachine
guns that were capable of firing seventy-two rounds from drum magazines. I took one of
the submachine guns and several drum magazines from one of the prisoners for my own use,
as I no longer placed much faith in the slow-firing 98k carbine for close combat. I felt more
confident equipped with the high-capacity automatic weapon, and it was to remain with
me for many months.”
But what’s interesting is this: MP 40 production actually peaked in 1941, and then remained
about level for the rest of the war. Yes, when production of rifles was increasing as
the war went on, as well as tanks and other equipment, the number of submachine guns that
the Germans were producing had actually levelled off. That’s a little bit strange. If submachine
guns offered an advantage, like we’re meant to believe, then surely the Germans would
have ramped up production of the submachine gun that they actually had. And yet they didn’t.
“Inaccurate beyond any distance greater than about 50 feet [15 meters], the fire of
the MP-40 resembled that of a shotgun more than a rifle. Though it was the standard weapon
for a forward observer, I would have preferred to retain my Mauser.”
This account is interesting because the effective range of the MP 40 was meant to be 200 meters,
however it’s clear that the value of a product - like a submachine gun - is subjective - meaning,
the user decides it’s worth. This user clearly wanted something that could hit a target at
longer distances, which a Kar 98k definitely could.
“Although some might complain of the weight of the Mauser rifle, or the cleaning required
to keep it functional and rust-free in grim conditions, few questioned its accuracy or
reliability. Indeed, the rifle was generally more accurate than the men who used it. One
of the reasons the semi-automatic rifles never fully replaced the Kar 98k as sniper rifles
was that despite the best efforts of their designers, the older rifle was still a more
inherently accurate weapon.”
So, while at first glance, it does appear that a German rifleman would be overwhelmed
by the sheer volume of Soviet submachine guns, it does seem that there’s more to this story
than the raw numbers alone. It’s true that a submachine gun could fire off a lot of rounds
very quickly, but what was their effective range? it was less than 200 meters. And if
you’re engaging someone on the sparse Russian steppe, or if you’re on the defensive, you’re
going to be firing at distances longer than that. A Kar 98k could hit a target three or
more times further than that (if it had a scope, a kilometer wasn’t impossible). So,
if you imagine a bunch of Soviets armed with submachine guns, versus a bunch of Germans
with rifles, the Germans with rifles can pick off the Soviets long before they get into
effective firing range.
But if the Soviets armed with submachine guns did get into range, then they had the clear
advantage. Such as at Stalingrad, where Chuikov told his men to keep close to the enemy - at
a range of less than 50 meters. Not only would this mitigate the enemy’s artillery and
firepower [air] power, since the Germans risked hitting their own troops at such close ranges, but
it would allow the rapid fire of their submachine guns to be far more effective than the slow
reloading rifles. This is, in fact, why the Soviet ‘storm groups’ in that battle were
so effective, because they built those close-combat groups around the submachine gun. And, when
fighting in villages and towns on their way to Berlin, the Soviets also relied upon infantry
with submachine guns, grenades, and molotov cocktails, for much the same reason.
The point is, a submachine gun was very effective at ranges less than 200 meters - preferably
half that distance. Whilst, a rifle was very good at long distance shooting - 300 to above
600 meters. So, it really did depend on the terrain and the circumstances. For Blitzkrieg
(or Bewegungskrieg) type warfare, where you’re avoiding built-up areas, the rifles are probably
the way to go. When you’re fighting room by room in an urban area, then submachine
guns would be the weapon of choice.
However, it is a bit more complicated than this. No side went to war with just rifles
and submachine guns. German squads in WW2 were built around the light or medium machine
gun, not the rifle or the submachine gun. A typical ten man squad was armed with a three
man machine gun team (MG 34 or MG 42), six riflemen, and the NCO with his submachine
gun (MP 38 or MP 40).
“The machine gun provided most of the squad’s firepower, while the riflemen acted as ammunition-carriers
and provided local security for the machine-gun team.”
Notice, in this set-up, that everyone is secondary to the rapid-firing machine gun. The machine-gun
is the central piece of the puzzle here. Later in the war, the number of men in a squad decreased
to nine, with a rifleman being lost, and one of the remaining riflemen replaced his rifle
for a submachine gun - increasing the firepower of the squad quite significantly. But even
in this scenario, the machine gun was the main weapon that the rest of the squad gravitated
around.
And this makes sense. Statistics from Allied casualties show that 60 per cent were from
mortars and artillery, most of the rest were machine-guns, and perhaps 10 to 20 per cent
were from rifles. (And that’s despite the fact that the majority of soldiers were armed
with them.) So the Germans knew that, for a typical squad, the machine gun was the most
important element. Coupled with the fact that studies by both the Allies and the Axis, in
both world wars, and between the wars, concluded that most combat would take place at ranges
less than 400 meters - because beyond that, it was difficult to see the target, let alone
hit them - and it might start to make sense why the Germans weren’t at as significant
disadvantage with their rifles.
Rifles and machine guns would fire away at an enemy 400 or more meters away - well out
of range of the submachine guns - and offered very effective suppression fire at that distance.
Given the fact that the Germans had the clear advantage when it came to their machine guns
- the MG 42 fired a ridiculous 1,200 rounds per minute - the Soviets would be at a severe
disadvantage unless they could get within 200 meters or less to start using their submachine
guns. Considering the amount of bullets flying around from that MG 42, it’s not hard to
imagine Soviet soldiers hugging the ground, rather than risk charging through that level
of firepower.
Of course, if they did get within 200 meters, then the Germans were the ones in trouble -
“...combined with the Soviet tactics of getting and staying close to the enemy, German
infantry were often incapable of matching the levels of small-arms firepower produced
by their opponents, and tactical sophistication was often drowned in a hail of 7.62mm rounds.”
As you mentioned in the original question, the Germans also produced the StG ‘Sturmgewehr’
44 assault rifle, which was a leap forward in terms of technology, since it combined
the submachine gun’s rate of fire with an intermediate cartridge, allowing them to engage
enemies in the medium 600 meter range or less. What you didn’t mention is that the Germans
also produced several semi-automatic rifles, like the Gew 41 and 43, the FG 42, and the
Volksgewehr. Yes, these weren’t great weapons (especially the Volksgewehr), but combined
with the StG 44, the number of these weapons was somewhere in the region of all the MP
40s ever produced. And these did increase the firepower of the German infantry, although
again their numbers were still too low overall to change the strategic picture. The Germans
also captured a lot of Soviet and Allied submachine guns and semi-automatic rifles, and made use
of them. In fact, they captured so many PPSh-41s that they actually had specific designations
for them when they used them, such as the MP 717(r)’s. So, the Germans did have more
firepower than at first glance.
Therefore, to answer your question fully, I don’t think the German squads were ‘push-overs’
in the late war, even if they were still relying upon the Kar 98k rifle. Sure, in the city-battles,
like Stalingrad in the mid-war, or Berlin in the late war, as well as in the towns and
villages across Europe, yes they were at a significant disadvantage to the Soviet submachine
gun menace. But in the open countryside - and especially on the steppes of Russia - they
probably had the advantage, thanks largely to their impressive machine guns, around which
they built their squads. We also have to factor in artillery and mortars, direct fire guns
like the PaKs, and tanks and aircraft, and so on. Obviously we’re talking about the
late war at this point, so some of these weren’t around much, but they would certainly add
to the long-distance suppressive fire power of the German infantry.
And I think this is why we might have accounts from German authors saying they ‘mowed down
the Red Army hordes’ - because a MG 42 gunner, supported by riflemen, might have done just
that at a comfortable distance. But then, if just a handful of surviving Soviet submachine
gunners got into the German trenches, they would slaughter the Germans in return - which
then explains why the Soviet accounts talk about killing loads of Germans. Both sides
claimed to have killed ‘hordes’ of their enemy, and this submachine gun vs rifles and
machine gun range distances, might explain that.
It also might explain why the Soviets were at a disadvantage in the early part of the
war. In the 1941 and 1942 period, they had a lack of submachine guns, a lack of machine
guns, a lack of mortars and artillery. So it’s not hard to imagine the German machine
guns and rifles, coupled with tanks and Stukas, having a massive firepower advantage during
this period. And you don’t have to hit someone to take them out. If you’ve got a rifle
and a grenade, and you’re half a mile away from the enemy, who’s hitting you with machine
gun fire, and rifle fire, and Stukas and tanks, are you seriously going to keep fighting?
The easiest option would be to run away. Or if that’s not possible, surrender. And we
see just that in the early war period.
In the book, Croatian Legion by Jason D. Mark there’s an instance where a StuG batterie
from the 197th Sturmgeschütz Battalion assisted the Croatians in one of their attacks in 1941.
After firing at a distance upon the enemy with machine guns and StuGs, the Croatians
charged and engaged the Soviet riflemen at close range. One Croatian threw a grenade
into a Soviet trench, and accepted the surrender of the soldiers in that portion of the trench.
He then picked up the same grenade - yes, he hadn’t pulled the trigger on it - and
threw it into the next part of the trench. And did the same. And then again. And again.
And he admitted to the Germans that he’d been using the same grenade over and over
for weeks. And I think, since the Soviet conscripts were getting hit by tanks (or assault guns)
and machine guns and so on at a distance, they’re suppressed, and have hardly any
equipment to fight back with, so they were eager not to die in what was clearly a hopeless
situation. And so they surrendered.
It’s only as the Soviet industry started pumping out mortars, artillery, and submachine
guns - from the mid to late 1942 period onwards - that we start to see the Red Army be able
to go toe-to-toe with the Germans. And the lack of firepower might explain a lot of this.
It would also explain why the Soviets decided to charge the German lines - because they
needed to get close to have any chance versus the German long-range weaponry.
But, what do you think? Let me know in the comments below. Thanks for watching, and supporting,
bye for now.