Over the summer that has just ended, Sweden and Finland's path to NATO membership took
important steps forward.
On July 5 in Brussels, the Swedish and Finnish foreign ministers signed the Accession Protocol,
which must now be ratified by the national parliaments of the 30 NATO members.
In anticipation of signing to the protocol, Sweden, Finland and Turkey had earlier signed
another agreement, in Madrid, on June 29 by which Ankara lifted its veto on the two Scandinavian
countries' entry into NATO.
Turkish President Erdogan's reservations related mainly to two issues: Stockholm and Helsinki's
support for the Kurdish political-military movement of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK),
an entity deemed terrorist by Ankara and in theory also by the European Union; and the
sanctions imposed on Turkey from 2019 following its military intervention in Syria that effectively
put a freeze on weapons sales to Ankara.
Meanwhile, several NATO countries, including the U.S. and Italy, have ratified the accession
protocol, but some are still missing from the roll call.
These include Turkey itself because, despite the Madrid agreements, diplomacy has stalled
over the fate of some suspected terrorist political refugees between Sweden and Finland
whose extradition Turkey has requested, so far always denied.
At least as far as Sweden is concerned, many of the future developments, including continued
support for the PKK, will depend on the new government that was formed based on the results
of the September 11 polls, which saw an exploit by the far-right anti-immigration party.
But beyond Turkish resistance, the accession of the two countries to NATO still represents
an unusual step in the history of the Atlantic alliance and if completed could set a precedent
for similar future situations.
First, unlike the countries that joined the alliance in the 1990s and 2000s, our protagonists
had never been considered potential allies despite a long and strong partnership with
NATO behind them.
Think of the various military exercises in the Baltic sea around the Swedish islands,
the famous BALTOPS, which we have already mentioned in the video about Kaliningrad.
No one expected such a situation, let alone that the two Scandinavian countries would
so suddenly give up their traditional neutrality.
Besides all, Sweden and Finland are still two politically and institutionally stable
countries, two established and solid democracies that haven't gone through recent internal
conflicts or political transition processes, unlike all those Eastern European countries
that have joined the Alliance in recent decades.
Not to mention the efficient state of their armed forces, organized and technologically
advanced, ready to integrate with NATO defense systems.
This particularity would demonstrate the pure strategic purpose behind the two countries'
willingness to join NATO.
Their entry therefore is not a move designed to secure their own domestic political structure,
or to frame themselves in a broader international arena, but only the result of a defensive
strategy against neighboring Russia.
It should also be considered that neither of the two countries belonged to the Soviet
bloc: although significant in several respects, their accession represents no reversal of
the front, no break with the past.
But, precisely, a NATO enlargement in the direction of Scandinavia would certainly mark
a change from the strategies adopted so far.
An expansionism no longer directed eastward toward the former Warsaw Pact territories,
but northward, more and more toward the Arctic, which stands to be one of the crucial geopolitical
scenarios for the near future.
Please write below in the comments if you would like a video on the geopolitical relevance
of the Arctic.
The Baltic Sea becomes a "NATO sea," and considering that from now on all the Swedish islands covering
the waters in front of the Kaliningrad region will to all intents and purposes be Allied
territories, the Russian fleet's room for maneuver will be greatly reduced.
But who will ever be the biggest beneficiaries of this new NATO expansion?
Well obviously Poland and the three Baltic republics, which have always been fearful
of possible Russian actions on the Baltic.
As many have noted it's possible that Russian retaliation will occur not so much on the
land border with Finland, hostile territory for an invasion with armored vehicles and
infantry, but precisely by sea or from Belarus to the three Baltic republics.
Especially the Finnish one, moreover, is a respectable army that can make a decisive
contribution to the alliance.
Both because Finland is one of the few countries to have maintained compulsory conscription,
ensuring an ever-ready and trained reserve, and because of the recent purchase of sixty
four F-35 multi-role fighter jets.
No less important is the presence in Helsinki of the European Center of Excellence for Countering
Hybrid Threats, a research center wanted by NATO and the EU that specializes in countering
hybrid threats, from cyber attacks to disinformation.
All these peculiarities would make the accession process easier and shorter for Sweden and
Finland, which certainly won't have to wait the 10 years or so that countries like Montenegro
and North Macedonia have had to wait.
But so with the Baltic in hand and two more friendly pawns on the chessboard, can Europe
say it's safe and secure?
Mmmh not yet.
It's clear that finding the right military arrangement of deterrence and self-defense
considering the territorial extent of the two new entries will take several years.
Excessive militarization of the region, however, could be a gamble with unpredictable consequences,
and in addition, a new responsibility falls on Sweden and Finland as defenders of a border
that is no longer just national but of the entire alliance.
After all, one doesn't join NATO just to benefit from the clauses of the famous Article 5.
Even if the maybe unjustified fear of possible Russian offensive action underlies the historic
decision to renounce traditional neutrality, Sweden and Finland will have to fulfill their
military obligations and spending like everyone else.
Enlargement has confirmed the importance of an alliance until a few years earlier questioned
by many, from Trump to Macron, but it risks getting stuck in the contradiction of its
decision-making mechanisms.
Indeed, NATO decisions, such as the entry of new member countries, are made by unanimity,
so increasing the number of "parties" makes this requirement more difficult to achieve.
It's one thing to get the twelve founding members to agree; it's another to find an
agreement among what with Sweden and Finland would be as many as thirtytwo different voices.
Voices that are more sensitive to certain issues than others when it comes to defense.
The difficult balance between Article 5 on mutual defense and the open door policy set
by Article 10 would find confirmation in the very case of Sweden and Finland, motivated
to protect themselves from their Russian neighbor but geographically and politically distant
and insensitive to other borders.
On balance, the entry of the two Scandinavian countries into NATO would represent a military
enhancement with important geopolitical consequences.
First and foremost, the shift of the Alliance's center of gravity to the northeast could sanction
a final move away from cooperation policies related to the southern and Mediterranean
fronts, leaving an equally hot sector uncovered.
It is no coincidence that the new Strategic Concept approved at the Madrid summit didn't
convince many experts, down to Mediterranean countries such as Spain.
Clearly, the recent events in Ukraine have forced the NATO agenda to have a strongly
east-oriented policy, and it couldn’t have been otherwise, but the omen advanced by several
sides, such as by Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez himself, is clear and worrying: the
dangers move all-around, so watch out for the south as well.
In particular, what worries the Madrid government is irregular immigration from Morocco to the
Melilla exclave, which is just one of many impacts of the more complex and vast problem
of Western Sahara, claimed by Morocco with the approval of Spain itself.
Maybe a video about it will come later.
And we can’t ignore the instabilities in Libya and Sahel, the gradual French retreat
from Mali, and Russian interference in authoritarian governments in the region.
Add to this the primary role that African gas and raw material deposits will play in
the immediate future, not to mention investments by a giant like China, which also appears
in the new Strategic Concept along with Russia in the guise of a global security threat.
Beyond the Spanish demands, however, out of the Madrid summit came a picture of NATO strongly
united in its intention to strengthen itself in the east, increasing its military presence
on its borders with Russia by as many as two hundred and sixty thousand troops, from forty
thousand to three hundred thousand.
At least for the time being, the allies have also agreed on the need for the increase in
military spending, which will no longer be able to consider the famous 2 percent of national
GDP as a cap but as a starting point.
So while Sweden and Finland are a historical exception to NATO's enlargement policies,
it shouldn't be forgotten that their entry has never been considered before and that
the decision is only the result of the two national governments.
NATO's attentions, however, had already for several years been directed precisely eastward
not only toward Ukraine, whose membership talks were interrupted by the 2014 crisis,
but toward countries such as Georgia and Moldova, which are also crossed by sensitive territorial
issues.
With the two new Scandinavian allies, NATO can certainly count on a strong decisive presence
for the fate of the Baltic Sea, but Russian reactions are still unpredictable and the
deterrent effect that Sweden and Finland hope to achieve could generate opposite consequences.
Then the question to ask is if it was actually so necessary and vital for the two Scandinavian
countries to break traditional neutrality.
Finland seems to be the more motivated and determined of the two, with Sweden still having
to deal with a public opinion and some political forces strengthened after the recent elections
that are still opposed to joining NATO.
The fact is that, despite the discordant positions, a general increase in the popularity of the
NATO institution seems to be hovering in the air.
And with it, the feeling that only NATO has the strength to safeguard Europe from a wide
variety of global threats ends up convincing even the most skeptical about the need to
return to a net bipolar model.
But will NATO experience a new season of enlargement?
Certainly partnerships with external actors will be strengthened, but the example of Sweden
and Finland may have sparked a broader movement and convinced other countries to "get in the
game" and align themselves with a side.
Which doesn't necessarily have to match the Atlantic one.
Well, we have also finished our story today.
Thank you all for your attention and see you in the next video.
Bye!