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What is the cost of lies?
The real danger is that if we hear enough lies,
then we no longer recognize the truth at all.
In 1986, a devastating accident at the nuclear power plant in Chernobyl awakened the world
to an unprecedented danger that briefly threatened the existence of an entire continent.
The recent HBO series recounting the story effectively and accurately communicates
the struggle and consequences of dealing with this disaster,
one that was all the more terrifying because it wasn’t caused by forces of nature,
it was man-made, it was our own doing.
What you might not know is that the incident also propelled into in fame
the work of German sociologist Ulrich Beck, who, earlier in the same year,
finished the first manuscript for a grand social theory called 'Risk Society'
that would become a bestseller in the months following Chernobyl.
The theory poses that we have entered a new stage of modernity
that is increasingly occupied with debating, preventing and managing risks that we ourselves have produced;
that are the direct result of our technological progress.
These risks are unlike any we have faced before, both in scale and in complexity.
And because they are inherently connected to many of the essential aspects of modernity,
they have infected our society with a fundamental feeling of vulnerability.
This is what theory of world risk society maintains:
modern societies are shaped by new kinds of risks and manufactured uncertainties.
Their foundations are shaken by global anticipation of global catastrophe.
Looking at HBO’s Chernobyl through the lens of Beck’s work reveals it is not just a retelling of a past event,
or a history lesson about a failed political regime.
It is a series that is very much about the present,
about the risks that are increasingly permeating our modern society,
affecting our culture, our politics, and our spirit.
So today, let’s examine the story of Chernobyl; the story of how the world became a Risk Society.
Moments after the incident, we immediately see one of the defining characteristics of modern risks;
which is that the danger is pretty much impossible to perceive using our own senses.
We are therefore dependent on technology, in this case; dosimeters,
to measure the amount of danger we’re in.
What does the dosimeter say?
3.6 roentgen, but that’s as high as the meter… - 3.6, not great, not terrible.
This reliance on external risk assessors, of course,
puts us in a much more vulnerable position as the series repeatedly shows us.
It’s also the maximum reading on low-limit dosimeters, they gave us the number they had.
I think the true number is much, much higher.
In his book World Risk Society,
Beck explains how this expropriation of the senses also means the loss of common sense,
and writes that;
Human life is thereby jeopardized to its very core
and individuals are robbed of their power of judgement.
I don’t think you should go, it could be dangerous.
What you mean dangerous?
It’s a fire, it’s over there, we’re over here.
This becomes most clear when we meet the characters who most embody pragmatic wisdom;
the miners, the nurses, the soldiers
and all those who’s knowledge is gained through hardship and sheer experience.
While being undeniably skilled when it comes to practical matters,
and sensing bureaucratic nonsense and lies,
If these worked, you’d be wearing them.
in the face of modern risks such as radiation,
these characters now increasingly find themselves operating in the dark,
unable to rely on the same intuition that would have given them the advantage in any other situation.
After all that I have seen, so I should leave now?
Because of something I cannot see at all?
No.
But herein lies another defining characteristic of modern risks; they are not like any other situation.
In fact; they literally are unlike anything we’ve ever encountered.
You are dealing with something that has never occurred on this planet before.
Modern risks can generally be defined as high consequence risks,
which not only refers to the enormous scale and potentially huge and irreversible effects they might have,
often crossing national borders and in some cases even having global consequences.
A nuclear plant in Sweden has detected radiation, and identified it as a byproduct of our fuel.
The whole world knows.
But it also refers to their complex nature and uncertain probabilities
that make it extremely difficult to draw boundaries in time and space
and determine the causal relations that are at play,
calculate the effects and estimate the exact number of victims.
As Beck pointed out; even years after the incident at Chernobyl,
some of its victims hadn’t been born yet.
This also becomes evident in the widely disparate reports on the amount of casualties.
While the official Soviet count is 31 deaths,
other reports have numbers ranging from 4.000 to 93.000,
which more than anything suggests that we have no idea how many were really affected by the disaster.
Naturally, the growing prominence of high consequence risks in modern society have had
significant social and political consequences.
Beck initially spoke about the democratizing effect of modern risks;
meaning that dangers such as radiation affect everyone alike, without discrimination;
the rich and the poor, the powerful and the powerless.
And while this is true to a certain degree,
he later acknowledged that even with grand scale incidents such as Chernobyl,
it’s still the ordinary citizens and people on the lower ends of the social hierarchy
who often remain the least informed, and end up suffering the most.
A more disruptive consequence of modern risks involves our formal institutions.
Due to the complex and often highly technical character of modern risks,
society and politics rely heavily on experts and scientists
to analyze and communicate the exact nature of the danger.
How does a nuclear reactor work?
What?
It’s a simple question.
As Chernobyl demonstrates, politicians making decisions regarding modern risks
are only as effective, as they are informed.
Look, that’s graphite on the roof.
The whole building’s been blown open.
Why did I see graphite on the roof?
Graphite is only found in the core where it’s used as a neutron flux moderator.
But there are inherent differences between science and politics;
one searches for truth, the other for power;
one is interested in causes, the other in solutions;
one strives for thoroughness; the other for efficiency;
one measures quality based on validity, the other on public acceptance.
As such; the relation between the two is not without friction.
There has been an accident at Chernobyl but I’ve been assured there’s no problem.
I’m telling you that there is.
I prefer my opinion to yours.
In a risk society however, these institutions face even greater challenges as modern risks
often exceed the capacities of both science and politics to analyze and manage them.
For scientists and experts, the complexity and non-linear causalities of modern risks
mean more uncertain probabilities, making them harder to observe, and even harder to predict.
Do you think the fuel will actually melt thought the concrete pad?
I don’t know, 40% chance maybe?
I said 50.
Either way, the numbers mean the same thing: maybe.
This also complicates the work of governments and political institutions
that generally ask for the exact opposite,
This would go much easier if you’d talk to me about the things you do understand
and not about the things you do not understand.
which is somewhat understandable considering the fact that high cost preventative measures
towards intangible and uncertain risks tend to be either too unpopular, or too unrealistic
for politicians to propose,
especially when such measures demand changes that contradict the spirit of modernity,
or to put it more simply; that seem needlessly expensive.
It’s cheaper.
The work of politicians is also much more difficult because modern risks often exceed national borders,
meaning that managing them also becomes a diplomatic problem complicated
by all kinds of politically sensitive relations.
If the Americans had that kind of technology do you really think they’d give it to us?
And even if they would, the central committee would never stoop to ask.
And so when a catastrophe like Chernobyl does happen, to the general public,
this not only awakens the realization that political institutions were grossly unprepared,
it also reveals their incapacity to effectively handle the aftermath,
which at this point is inevitably defined by reckless responses.
We seal off the city.
No one leaves.
The most significant consequence of all this for both the world of science and of politics,
is a growing loss of legitimacy as people are losing faith in the very institutions
that are supposed to provide them with certainty and security.
Our power comes from the perception of our power.
Do you understand the damage this has done?
Do you understand what’s at stake?
In their efforts to reclaim this lost legitimacy,
the most important question that appears to need answering is the question of accountability.
In these stories, it doesn’t matter who the heroes are.
All we want to know is: who is to blame?
The easiest way out of this is to blame individual scapegoats,
and ensure the public that it was just a few bad apples,
but these overly symbolic punitive measures don’t really address the structural flaws in the system,
and will more likely make these institutions look even worse in the eyes of the countless people
that just experienced mass evacuation, sickness and death.
You mean to suggest the Soviet state is somehow responsible for what happened I must warn you
you are threading on dangerous ground.
Now we can understand why Gorbachev claimed that the accident at Chernobyl was perhaps
the real cause of the collapse of the Soviet Union.
In her study ‘Life Exposed: Biological Citizens after Chernobyl’,
anthropologist Adriana Petryna found that the catastrophe
deepened the antagonisms between Russia and Ukraine,
and made possible, or at least favored, the Ukrainian nation-building that would play
an important part in the ultimate collapse of the Soviet Union.
On this topic, Beck also explained how the uncertainties and political ineffectiveness
in the aftermath of Chernobyl led to new solidarities and socio-political boundary lines;
“In this way, the post-Chernobyl disaster became the key to moral, economic and political events
which made deep inroads into social existence and identity and state institutions in Ukraine
and enabled it to transform itself and sharpen its political profile.”
By now, you can probably imagine how Chernobyl relates to the present;
to the new risks that have been emerging as a direct result
of the technological progress of our modern society,
and that are increasingly dominating our public discourse.
Issues like climate change, genetic modification, oil spills, antibiotic-resistant bacteria,
pollution, chemical hazards, habitat destruction, loss of biodiversity, the extinction of species,
are all showing signs of at least some of the characteristics of modern risks,
and are all changing society as we know it.
It is however important to emphasize that the emergence of these risks doesn’t mean
the world is necessarily more dangerous, it just means we are dealing with more unknowns.
Risk does not mean catastrophe.
Risk means the anticipation of catastrophe.
And this is an important difference.
It’s especially an important difference in a time where we anticipate new kinds of catastrophes
beyond our means of control.
It means that while some modern risks might pose serious threats,
others might not be so dangerous at all,
and yet again,
some might be still impactful in unexpected ways that are as of yet completely unimaginable.
What matters is that we have invited a fundamental sense of uncertainty into the complex,
yet necessary elements of our modern society, that is undoubtedly affecting its foundations,
and raising essential questions as to who decides what risks are acceptable?
Who is responsible when things go wrong?
Because when everyone is cause and effect, when everyone is responsible, no one is.
Of course no one can blame me for this. How can I be responsible? I was sleeping.
It is for this reason that Beck speaks of a state of organized irresponsibility,
a state where we unreflectively progress into an unknown future,
where no one is personally accountable,
where no one assumes responsibility.
Why worry about something that isn’t going to happen?
And the irony is that under the conditions of the risk society,
this is a reasonable state of affairs.
No one is responsible for the truth of modern risks, because in a risk society,
the truth is too complex for anyone to grasp it in meaningful terms,
let alone to act on it with definitive means.
You think the right question will get you the truth?
There is no truth
In the absence of truth, what we’re left with then is merely a collection of guesses and estimations,
of fears and desires, ideologies and narratives,
all of which are, in essence, lies.
Lies aggravated by the growing intricacies and uncertainties of modern risks,
and by the growing incapacity of our protective institutions to analyze and manage them.
What else is left but to abandon even the hope of truth, and content ourselves instead with stories.
And so, when Legasov speaks of the cost of lies,
I think we can extend its meaning beyond Chernobyl and nuclear catastrophes.
There is a banality to it all.
A loss of a basic feeling of security, a feeling of truth.
It reveals what Beck calls the existential meaning of non-knowledge;
the unknown from which new threats and conditions of life are emerging.
In more simple terms;
it reveals how we are increasingly surrendered to a reality that we don’t understand,
how we have become, as Beck puts it, the ‘living side effects’ of modernity,
forced to provide answers to questions we didn’t even know existed,
and compelled to find new ways to cope with uncertainty,
because as we’ve seen, while the truth may remain elusive,
its consequences certainly won’t.
The truth doesn't care about our needs or wants.
It will lie in wait for all time.
Where I once would fear the cost of truth, now I only ask;
what is the cost of lies?
Being a massive success with both audiences and critics,
Chernobyl is a testament to the power of great storytelling,
a reminder of just how effectively this art form can move us.
Finishing a story as excellent as Chernobyl always makes me excited for more,
and for that, I’m really glad I have MUBI.
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