Since the end of the Second World War, Arab armies have consistently punched
below their weight. They've lost virtually every major
conflict, even when traditional factors suggested that they should have won.
When they have won, their accomplishments have typically been very modest, despite
massive advantages in numbers, technology, surprise, and firepower.
The question is: why?
One of the earliest explanations people came up with for poor Arab military
performance was to blame the Russians. The idea here was that the Soviet way of
war was simply inferior to Western methods. But there are several problems
with this explanation. For one, most Arab armies didn't use Soviet doctrine, and
plenty of other armies that did historically performed much better than the Arabs
Another long-standing idea is that the problem was the economic
underdevelopment of Arab nations. There's no question that the poor rates of literacy
and relative lack of familiarity with machinery in most Arab societies in the
20th century did hinder Arab armed forces. In particular, the consistent
problems that Arab military personnel have had employing and maintaining their
weapons — especially their more advanced weapons — has been a product of this underdevelopment.
But you can still win without advanced weapons. There are
plenty of examples of exceptionally poor and underdeveloped countries that still
managed to perform much better in modern combat than have Arab militaries.
Another aspect of Arab society that does explain part of the problems of Arab
war-making is the constant conflicts between the autocratic governments and
their military leadership. At times, Arab kings and dictators have gotten too
involved in military affairs, while at other times, Arab generals have gotten
too involved in politics. When you look at the historical performance of Arab
militaries, as well as that of other heavily politicized armies, there's no
question that politicization has had an impact, particularly in the strategic
leadership and organization of their armed forces. But politicization and
underdevelopment still don't explain the greatest problems that have plagued
every Arab military since 1948:
the poor performance of their tactical commanders.
In every war, against every foe, in every type of military operation, and no matter
how hard their generals tried to improve them, Arab NCO's and junior officers
showed little to no ability to innovate, take initiative, act aggressively, react
to the chaos of battle, or take advantage of fleeting opportunities. To explain
this most vexing of Arab military problems, we have to look at how Arab
culture orders its hierarchies and organizations.
The dominant Arab culture,
and the Arab educational system that flows from it, inculcates behaviors and
ways of thinking that work for most Arab organizations in most circumstances, but
aren't optimal from modern combat. This isn't a knock against Arab culture. Every
society has its own way of organizing its hierarchies, and every society's
hierarchies function differently. That doesn't mean that one culture is "better"
than another. Post-war Arab culture developed in response to its geographic,
demographic, and historical circumstances.
But warfare is a competitive activity,
and what matters is which side's hierarchies function better given the
demands of warfare at any given time. Over the past century, the most effective
way to make war has been with a very flexible, bottom-up command structure. The
problem that the arabs have faced is that their culture emphasizes a rigid,
top-down hierarchy, which is the worst way of organizing for modern war.
Because the weaknesses of Arab military stem from their societies, it's been difficult
for allies like the United States to change how they fight simply by giving
them the same training we give to American soldiers and airmen.
For more than 70 years, Arab armies have been crippled by this severe mismatch between
the demands of modern war and the skills favored by their society.
There are, of course, exceptions. Cultural outliers can make effective fighters. That's why
non-state actors like Hezbollah and ISIS have fared relatively better than
traditional Arab armies in recent wars. And they operate in an unorthodox,
"cellular" command structure that requires highly independent tactical commanders.
A good example of what the U.S. can do is reflected in how we helped Iraq to
defeat ISIS. The Americans help the Iraqis identify
soldiers and officers who are more able to function independently, train them to
emphasize those skills, and then made that force the tip of the spear, backed
by heavy coalition support. This model worked well for creating Iraq's
Counter Terrorism Service, and should be seen as a good model for moving forward in training Arab armies.
It will be hard given the severe mismatch between Arab
society and the demands of modern war making, but it's the only way we're going
to do better than we have so far.
To learn more about the problems of Arab military
effectiveness, check out the link to my book, Armies of Sand, in the description below.
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