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The task of assaulting a Ukrainian trenchline or reinforced city block
is a daunting one. In even the best case scenario casualties are to be expected.
With open fields covering much of the Donbas landscape, defenders have relatively clear
fields of fire, and Russian movements can be clearly observed and targeted by
artillery. Often the only respite are strips of woodland, referred to as “forest protection
zones” by the Russians, that can provide cover and concealment to attacking forces.
But these areas are heavily defended. As a rule they often have 2 to 3 trench lines,
each with at least 2 fortified fighting positions with heavy weapons. In addition to artillery,
positioned 8 to 10 kilometers from the frontline, defenders make wide use of tanks,
mortars, direct-fire guns, and ATGMs on the line of contact.
This is the challenge detailed in this captured Russian manual
on Conducting Combat Operations in Cities and Forests as Part of an Assault Unit.
Mobilization has bolstered Russian forces in Eastern Ukraine and the withdrawal from Kherson
effectively shortened the frontline, which helped stabilize Russia’s lines. But at the same time,
attrition and the relative lower quality of the replacements means this larger force is
lacking in offensive potential. So while they’re in a stronger position to hold
than in the autumn of 2022, their ability to make gains is limited.
To overcome this challenge, Russia began forming assault detachments in late 2022.
These are smaller, more specialized formations organized to assault fortified positions and
city blocks ahead of main forces. Although they have the trappings of an infantry battalion,
they’re generally very small, with more anti-structure weapons, and—I am assuming—a
concentration of soldiers who are actually willing to carry on frontal attacks against a determined
enemy. They’re essentially uni-taskers and not general-purpose like a battalion tactical group.
Some are temporary, and some are more semi-permanent formations.
Back when this concept was brought to everyone’s attention by Tatarigami,
I saw some call it innovative. But in reality, while evidence of some adaptation, the tactics are
old as dirt. Assault detachments as a doctrine are almost verbatim as old as the Soviet Union itself.
Perhaps most famously embodied by this Soviet soldier in body armor. But we’ll get to him later.
This video is looking at Russian assault detachments, the tactics
recommended in the recent manual and other pre-war publications, and their historical beginnings.
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But back to the video.
By definition, assault detachments are task organized units designed to destroy fortified
enemy positions. This usually manifests in assaulting trench lines and field fortifications
ahead of main forces to enable a breakthrough, or assaulting reinforced buildings in urban areas.
In theory, Assault Detachments are intended to be roughly equivalent
to a battalion tactical group. Doctrinally they’re meant to
be reinforced infantry battalions. But applied in Ukraine, they’re much smaller.
They generally consist of a headquarters; two to three assault companies; a tank platoon;
reconnaissance group; mobile electronic warfare group; flamethrower group with twelve RPO-A
thermobaric rocket launchers; a UAV group; air defense group with two 23mm anti-aircraft cannons
and three MANPADS; an artillery group which in the VDV-centric case consists of 6x Nona-S
self-propelled mortars and 6x D-30 towed howitzers; a fire support platoon with 2
AGS-17 grenade launchers, Kord heavy machine guns, anti-tank missiles, and sniper teams;
an engineering assault group; armored recovery vehicle; and medical evacuation group.
Note the lack of organic sustainment, meaning this type of unit is likely dependent on the
next higher headquarters for supply. Although the type of operations it’s
meant for are short in duration, so maybe they don’t see it as necessary.
The assault companies are the actual units that close with the enemy trenches and are
expected to be reinforced. The tanks, recon, artillery, engineering assets,
fire support, and ambulances can be attached to companies as necessary,
and reserves are maintained to make up for losses or reinforce success.
These companies in turn consist of two assault platoons; an armored group with 4 infantry
fighting vehicles and a tank; artillery support platoon with 2x mortars and 1 D-30
122mm howitzer; identical fire support platoon;
medevac section; and a reserve squad with at least one machine gun team.
As per the manual, the mortars can be split up to directly support the platoons,
but the company commander retains control of the howitzer. The fire
support platoon meanwhile can also be split up for platoon attacks.
The assault platoons themselves are essentially squad sized, composed of four three-man
teams called Troikas. It’s advised that when maneuvering, these troikas should form a diamond.
The platoon is led by the Head Patrol, which consists of a Sapper, Machine Gunner,
and Assistant Machine Gunner. Troika 1 on the right has a Spotter, RPG and Assistant RPG.
Troika 2 on the left has the Senior Rifleman, Medic, and another Sapper. And the HQ to the
rear has the Platoon Commander, UAV operator, and radio operator. This likely varies in practice.
These platoons can be reinforced depending on mission needs. Examples given in the manual
include a 3-man machine gun team from the company’s reserve squad,
fire support assets, the armored group, a mortar, flamethrower squad, and medevac.
At first this “platoon” seems bizarre. It’s basically the equivalent of a Marine Corps squad,
which is led by a Sergeant rather than an officer.
There are a couple likely explanations. First, assaulting a well-defended and
fortified trenchline is a very difficult task. Lacking a well-developed NCO corps,
it makes sense why Russia has an officer directly leading 3 fireteams. The U.S. did similar things
during World War II, when officers took direct command of squad-sized patrols.
Second, even though the actual assault element is small, the platoon commander is still controlling
a lot of assets. They have their own three fireteams, their drone operator, a mortar,
various fire support weapons with different capabilities, and an armored group providing
fire support that might be physically separated. It’s a lot of stuff to handle.
And lastly, there is a manpower issue. Maybe not in general,
with all the mobilized personnel. But in terms of the amount of men who are motivated and skilled
enough to fill this very demanding role. The Russians have variably relied on the VDV,
Naval Infantry and Wagner as shock troops capable of going on the offensive successfully,
but they have undoubtedly degraded in quality due to attrition and replacements.
But as for how the assault platoons are used,
we return to the scenario from the beginning of the video.
After the objective is determined, the assault units are given their task. They conduct a
detailed reconnaissance of the area, aided by organic quadcopters to reduce the danger of
a leader’s recon. Things to look out for are the avenues of approach, enemy positions, structures,
and terrain features. Of particular note are concealed ravines that the enemy can use to
bring up reserves. Ideally, a foot reconnaissance is conducted the day before the offensive as well.
Targets are identified for pre-planned artillery fire, both on the frontline and in depth.
Sectors of fire are determined for the armored group acting
as direct fire support from the treeline. In the cases provided,
BMDs or BMP infantry fighting vehicles make up the bulk of the fire support.
As an aside, in a repeat of the Soviet-Afghan War, some VDV units have been re-equipped with
BMP-2s as well, replacing their small and fragile airborne BMDs.
The offensive kicks off with a preparatory artillery barrage. According to Tatarigami,
a Ukrainian officer on Twitter who brought attention to this manual, this barrage can last
for multiple days. During this period, preferably at night, the assault force moves into position.
Artillery preparation lasts until the quote “guaranteed fire defeat of the enemy”. This
is basically the calculated amount of shells necessary to adequately suppress, neutralize
or destroy an enemy unit. But the slide rules are not necessarily reflective of reality. This fire,
especially against pre-planned targets in-depth, is typically unobserved, uncorrected fire.
Ideally the assault commander gives the command to shift artillery fire from the first to
second line of defenses within 1 minute of the actual attack. At that point, lighter support
weapons (like AGS-17 and RPGs) as well as armored vehicles take over in suppressing enemy defenses.
In addition to softening up the next belt of positions, this fire support
is intended to isolate the objective from enemy reserves being brought up to reinforce.
Throughout the attack, the manual stresses that the assault force must
stay within the treeline. Clearings and the edge of the forest must be avoided.
Smoke should also be used on a wide front and not at the precise point of
the attack, as that telegraphs where the Ukrainians should drop their artillery.
The attack itself is fairly straightforward, if costly. Seizing trenches with small arms, hand
grenades, and thermobaric rocket launchers several times until they reach their stop position.
Once the last line is reached, a pre-planned artillery barrage commences in front of the
newly captured trenches, lasting up to 60 to 90 minutes. This is to protect the
likely weakened assault force while it digs in. It’s forbidden for the assault unit to
occupy the old Ukrainian trenches because they could be booby trapped and pre-sighted
for artillery fire. 1 to 2 man foxholes dispersed in the treeline are recommended.
The fire wall is intended to prevent the enemy’s reserves from conducting
a successful counterattack. After that period, artillery transitions to observed harassing fire.
Ideally, within 30 to 40 minutes of the objective being captured,
ammunition and water is brought to the assault unit, and casualties are evacuated on the
outgoing vehicles. In general the assault unit should not evacuate their own casualties. They
should be focused on winning the fight and leave casualties to the evacuation units.
This may seem inhumane, but this is a sentiment shared by western militaries. Winning the
firefight generally takes precedence over stopping to treat a casualty.
The only mention of units other than the assault unit is a reserve that is introduced
at the tipping point to achieve success, or to replace losses. There is no mention
of follow-on actions. This could just be because that’s not the job of the assault unit. But then
there isn’t a mention of a forward passage of lines where a general-purpose follow-on force
pours through the gap created by the assaulters. Nor is there a substantive mention of any sort
of deep coordination with outside units as there might for the first echelon of a larger attack.
In isolation, it feels more like this unit is intended to make incremental gains,
taking one trench system at a time without enabling a more decisive offensive.
The task is dangerous, but the tactics described in the manual aren’t complex.
And we’re seeing them in reality falling short of implementing a reasonable breaching doctrine.
When I show how these assault detachments are supposed to attack a trench, you’ll see they
theoretically apply what Americans would call SOSRA. Suppress the position, obscure with smoke,
secure reduction areas to isolate the breach, reduce obstacles if necessary, and assault.
In practice, we have video evidence of Russian forces at numerous points failing or neglecting
basically the first four steps and going straight into the assault with predictable consequences.
Although there have been successes as well. The level of training in these sorts of missions
and unit cohesion seems to vary wildly between assault units. High losses are
expected with this sort of thing, but this may explain many instances of bad tactics.
But with this in mind, are assault detachments as a concept new? Not at all.
Soviet Assault Engineer Brigades of World War II were raised for basically the same purpose as the
Red Army transitioned to the offensive against Germany’s echeloned field fortifications. Their
job was to penetrate the frontline trench system ahead of the main body of infantry
and tanks. They would also be employed to seize strongpoints that the main force bypassed to keep
up their momentum. This included fortifications in the enemy’s depth, but more famously cities.
Assault Engineer Brigades, which were in the strategic reserve during the war,
had their own assault battalions. But assault detachments could be formed by reinforcing
rifle battalions with tanks, engineers, and fire support to secure urban objectives. They
were made up of platoon to company-sized assault groups with several subgroups for specific tasks.
These included an obstacle clearance subgroup for clearing lanes to the objective. A fire
support subgroup for suppressing enemy forces on objective and preventing outside
reserves for counterattacking. A smoke/flame demolition subgroup for providing smoke cover
and destroying buildings with flamethrowers. An assault subgroup, for actually attacking the
objective. And a consolidation subgroup, to follow the assault, mop-up and repel counterattacks.
In the 2010s, doctrine was virtually identical with minor changes. Assault detachments were
still reinforced battalions. Assault groups doctrinally consisted of the capture subgroup,
which was a motor rifle squad or platoon without its vehicles but reinforced by flamethrowers. A
control and fire support group including infantry fighting vehicles, tanks, guns, mortars, grenade
launcher, anti-tank, and flamethrower units. And an obstacle clearance subgroup with engineers.
We see all these pieces in assault detachments as applied to Eastern Ukraine, but in a more limited
way without the benefit of a main body that is capable of exploiting the success. Although the
scale of the whole conflict is large, the scale of the individual offensives are very
small which has led to a slow and incremental approach spearheaded by units like these.
Thanks to Surfshark for helping fund this video, even though this
topic is controversial. Check the link in the description to get a great deal on their VPN.
And if you enjoyed this video, check out our report on Ukraine’s pre-war mechanized
infantry organization. We’ll see you over there.