Back in July 2020, we released a video on the Philippine resistance against Japan
in the Second World War. That video was more of an overview;
we didn't really go into the logistics of the Philippine resistance movement,
which—with more than 7,000 islands composing the Philippine archipelago—was a bit of a nightmare.
In this video, we're going to explore said logistics with the aid of a report prepared by
the staff of American General Douglas MacArthur and released to the public after his death.
Launching the invasion from Taiwan, the Japanese hit the beaches of the Philippines on the 9th of
December 1941. Defending the archipelago were some 150,000 American and Filipino troops under
the United States Army Forces in the Far East (or USAFFE), the US Navy, and the Philippine Army.
Douglas MacArthur was in charge of them all, and he ultimately failed to stave off the Japanese
advance. After escaping to Australia—having been ordered to by President Roosevelt—MacArthur swore
he would come back. In the general's words, "I came out of Bataan and I shall return."
And he did, eventually. But a whole lot happened in the Philippines in the meantime.
The Japanese occupation was, as you might expect, brutal. After some 76,000 malnourished American
and Filipino defenders surrendered in Bataan in April 1942, the Japanese subjected them
to the infamous Bataan Death March, in which as many as 10,000 of them died. From 1941 to 1945,
the Japanese raided and looted, raped local women and took them as sex slaves, conducted
sadistic medical experiments on prisoners, and straight-up butchered people in atrocities such as
the Manila massacre, in which some 100,000 civilians’ lives were taken from them.
With the American and Filipino forces dead, imprisoned, or scattered, the people took matters
into their own hands, rising up against the Japanese in loose vigilante groups.
As stated in MacArthur's report, "The small vigilante groups that were formed
soon banded together for greater strength and mutual protection[,
and they] later combined forces with the unsurrendered soldiers of the United States
and Philippine forces and provided the nucleus for the guerrilla resistance movement."
Coordinating their efforts wasn't easy, though. As per MacArthur's report, "The islands' topography
was a tremendous handicap to any effective unification of strength. Isolated from each other
and from the outside world, the guerrillas at first dissipated their efforts in unco-ordinated
raids against the enemy. These minor operations were generally fruitless and often did more
harm than good since they brought swift and severe retaliatory measures by the Japanese."
Still, the Allies came to comprehend the fighting spirit of the Filipino guerrillas
and would not let it go to waste. MacArthur's report divided the progression of the resistance
movement into three distinct phases, punctuated by the general's return in 1944.
In Phase One, the joint American, Australian,
British, and Dutch Allied Intelligence Bureau (or AIB) sat back, took a deep breath,
and tried to figure out exactly what it had to work with, and how to go about it.
As we said, there are over 7,000 Philippine islands. The guerrillas were isolated physically
and also in terms of radio communication. Just one radio station remained in operation after May
1942. This was located in Luzon and manned by the Philippine Army officer Guillermo Nakar.
In August, the Japanese found Nakar and killed him, severing all communication with the outside
world. If it wasn't for American officers Captains William Osborne and Damon Gause,
who escaped over the sea to Australia, MacArthur would have been left totally in the dark.
Learning that the Filipinos were standing up to their oppressors, the AIB set about
installing an intelligence network so it could better understand the situation and coordinate
future activities. According to MacArthur's report, "Solutions were worked out for the best
methods of dispatching supplies and funds to the Philippines; areas of responsibility were defined;
and plans were made for communication channels to forward information to Australia."
Then the field operatives went in.
On the 27th of December, Filipino Captain Jesus Villamor, along with five men,
departed Australia on the submarine Gudgeon. A month later, they made radio contact from the
Philippines. At around the same time, two men under the command of the unsurrendered American
Colonel Wendell Fertig reached Australia and further enlightened the Allies of the situation
in the Philippines. Fertig, who had become a guerrilla leader on the island of Mindanao,
recommended that the Allies make a guerrilla base there, so they sent in American Commander
Charles Parsons to check it out. After he'd met with Fertig, Parsons continued throughout the
Philippines to gather intel. In June 1943, Philippine Army Major Emigdio Cruz Arrived
in Australia from the US and then went on a clandestine mission in the Philippines at the
behest of the exiled President of the Philippines, Manuel Quezon. If the Japanese had caught Cruz,
they would have tortured him to death, and still, he travelled throughout the Philippines in various
guises, gaining vital intel and ultimately receiving a Medal of Valor for his bravery.
Thanks to men such as these, the intelligence network had a strong foundation, and MacArthur
and the AIB had taken some major steps in support of the Philippine resistance movement. Of note,
they had established basic radio communications and were ready to further improve their systems,
they had transported military supplies and personnel to the islands via the US Navy, and they
had grouped the Philippines' various guerrilla organisations into three main categories [Text:
Often there were disagreements and conflicts between guerrilla organisations, which certainly
didn't make things any easier.]. This was how said categories were defined in MacArthur's report:
"(a) those built around a nucleus of unsurrendered United States and Philippine Army troops; (b)
those of purely local origin, under the leadership of prominent civic personages or former
Constabulary; (c) those, like the Hukbalahaps, which were an outgrowth of pre-war semi-political
organizations. There were also a few roving bands of the outlaw variety which were motivated more by
the lucrative prospects of brigandage." Now Phase Two could begin.
By mid-1943, two major guerrilla leaders with whom MacArthur and the AIB worked were
the aforementioned Fertig, who operated out of Mindanao, and Macario Peralta, a Filipino
lieutenant colonel who operated out of Panay. Phase Two was all about supporting these men (and
earning the loyalty of and supporting many other guerrilla leaders) so that they could consolidate
resistance efforts in the southern islands and then in Luzon, where the Japanese were strongest.
MacArthur wouldn't risk too direct of an approach, however. As per the report:
"MacArthur directed that his agents follow a policy of careful instruction without
direct command interference which might incur resentment. [Guerrilla groups were
cautioned to refrain from open warfare against Japanese troops. The collection, co-ordination,
and transmission of useful intelligence were stressed as the most important contributions the
guerrillas could make until the actual [Allied] invasion of the islands [began]. Before that time,
all military operations were to be limited to strategic harassment, sabotage, and ambush."
Throughout the latter half of 1943 and all of 1944, the resistance movement
grew in all ways. The civil government and the locals coordinated with
and made voluntary contributions to the guerrillas (who created their own
currency and postal system), agricultural production and distribution were ramped up,
and the communications network swelled, with radio stations installed throughout most of the
southern Philippines by the end of 1943. Cargo submarine landings increased throughout 1944,
too, with the US Navy unloading more and more military personnel and supplies.
All of this was in preparation for MacArthur's liberation of the Philippines,
which he launched in October 1944.
In Phase Three, quote, "the guerrillas emerged from their hideouts to take their places in battle
beside the advancing American divisions." Now they could engage in open war.
On the 20th, MacArthur marched onto a beach in Leyte, where the US Sixth Army,
aided by some 3,200 guerrillas under Filipino Colonel Rupert Kangleon, went toe to toe with the
Japanese Fourteenth Area Army, claiming victory in late December. According to the report, this
was where "the Filipino guerrilla and the American soldier first joined forces in battle." The report
continued, "[Kangeleon's forces] dynamited key bridges to block Japanese displacement toward the
target area; harassed enemy patrols; and sabotaged supply and ammunition depots. The guerrillas also
performed valuable service in maintaining public order and in keeping the roads and highways
free of congestion. After the American beachheads were established, the Leyte guerrilla groups were
attached directly to the Sixth Army to assist in scouting, intelligence, and combat operations."
By then, Fertig had some 38,000 guerrillas under his command on Mindanao.
Working from the island's interior to its coast, these men undertook a number
of offensives against the Japanese, capturing many of their bases—including the airfields at Dipolog,
Labo, Lala, and Barob—before MacArthur's forces had a chance to. MacArthur's report
also commented on the importance of Fertig's radio and intelligence network:"[It] consisted
of some seventy transmitter stations and an excellent and extensive coast-watcher system
[that] helped considerably in the planning of [further] operations against the Japanese."
Something similar happened with Peralta's guerrillas on Panay. According to the report,
"When the U. S. 40th Division went ashore on Panay in March 1945, Colonel Peralta's
forces made a large contribution toward eliminating the Japanese.
Even before the landings, his guerrillas had cleared the enemy from the outlying districts
and had won possession of nine airstrips in the northern and southern parts of the island."
As for the northern island of Luzon, due to the high Japanese presence there,
the guerrillas were still scattered by the time of the liberation; most guerrilla leaders weren't
even aware that MacArthur was coming back until about a month before he set foot on that beach.
Resistance fighters under American Major Bernard Anderson occupied a swathe of southern Luzon.
When the US Sixth Army landed on the island, some of Anderson's best men were attached to the Sixth,
composing what was known as the Anderson Battalion.
According to the report, "This unit performed efficiently and valiantly throughout central
and eastern Luzon and built a battle record of 3,000 Japanese killed and 1,000 captured."
Japanese Colonel Kobayashi later paid tribute to Anderson,
stating, "We attempted to extirpate the guerrilla movement in Luzon. Unfortunately for us, however,
Colonel Anderson was too good a leader and the American guerrillas continued to function."
In central Luzon, guerrilla units fought under Major Robert Lapham. Among other things,
Lapham and his men helped rescue some 500 Allied prisoners from the infamous Cabanatuan POW camp.
As stated in the report, "The guerrillas acted as the eyes of the raiding force to guide it through
the brush and as its ears to be on the alert for any surprise flanking movement by the enemy."
As for northern Luzon, many guerrillas answered to American Major Russell Volckmann, who had built up
a force of some 10,000 men by late 1944 as well as an effective intelligence network of his own,
though he wasn't able to get through to MacArthur until September 1944. Still,
his guerrillas fought valiantly. To quote the report, "Colonel Volckmann's units
fought effectively with I Corps against General Yamashita's beleaguered forces in the high
mountains around Kiangan and in the plains of the Cagayan Valley. Supported by planes of the Fifth
Air Force, these guerrillas were able to clear the enemy entirely from Ilocos Norte Province."
As many as 260,000 guerrillas from 277 different guerrilla units fought the Japanese during the
war. Combined, they played a major role in the Allied liberation of their islands,
an operation that came to a close in mid-August 1945.
Famously, MacArthur said, "Give me ten thousand Filipinos and I shall conquer the world!"
But what do you think? Were you aware of how difficult it was to coordinate all of
these guerrilla groups? Did you know that the Allies supplied them through cargo submarines?
Do you know anything about the Philippine resistance movement and its logistics that
we didn't cover in this video? Please feel free to share your thoughts in the comments section below.