﻿Russia recently lost the biggest tank battle of the entire war in Ukraine. Could
it mean the beginning of Putin’s defeat? This bloody battle over the small coal-mining
town of Vuhledar was part of the still ongoing struggle over the larger Donbas region. Vuhledar
lies about 40 miles south-east of the city of Donetsk, near the pre-invasion line which divided
Ukraine from the self-declared ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’. And since the start of the year,
Vuhledar has become a killing field for Russian armor, with the largest tank battle of the entire
war taking place there over the span of three weeks. In that time alone, Russia lost over
130 tanks and armored vehicles, forcing Putin to rely on mass infantry assaults to try and
retake the position. This was a serious blow, especially since tank warfare has been heavily
mythologized in Russia since World War II, and has also become symbolic of the broader conflict
in Ukraine. And the battle of Vuhledar showed yet again that the Russian military has some massive
issues that won’t be fixed any time soon. Vuhledar. Even the name itself’s got a kind of
“Lord of the Rings” dark and creepy ring to it. And with good reason. Here’s why.
While Vuhledar had been the site of small clashes and shelling since the start of the invasion, the
main battle for the town began on January 24th, 2023. That night, Russia began launching assaults
on Ukrainian positions, which would quickly turn into a devastating three-week siege demonstrating
Russian failures. At that point, Ukraine was still waiting for sophisticated Western tanks —like the
US Abrams and German Leopard II— to arrive. Russia’s replacement armor showed up earlier,
but during its first deployment in Vuhledar, it got absolutely decimated. Without superior
firepower this time around, Ukrainians were forced to rely once again on strategy and
tactics. Much of the three weeks took on the same pattern: pitched tank battles along dirt roads
and treelines, with Russians trying to thrust forward in columns, and Ukrainians firing on them
from hidden defensive positions. If this sounds familiar, it might be because Russia took the same
terrible approach when trying to take Kyiv last year, costing them hundreds of tanks. Clearly,
Russian commanders didn’t learn much from that catastrophe, and made exactly the
same mistake this time around: advancing their unprotected tank columns into ambushes.
So how did this latest embarrassment for Putin play out?
Because the terrain around Vuhledar is hard to defend —consisting mostly of flat, open plains
and light woods— it is hardly ideal for stopping a major assault. But Ukrainians used the terrain to
their advantage, and applied doctrines of combined arms warfare, which Russian war-planners clearly
haven’t picked up on. The key to Ukraine’s victory in the battle of Vuhledar was in forcing Russia
to fight on their terms. This meant limiting the battlefield, and forcing Russian troops to
attack where Ukraine wanted them to. To do so, the Ukrainian military placed hundreds of anti-tank
and anti-personnel mines in the fields outside of Vuhledar. Due to the flat landscape and lack of
cover, any Russian minesweepers were immediately targeted with artillery fire. But Ukrainian troops
didn’t just put mines everywhere: instead, they left clear corridors between the mined fields,
only large enough for two or three Russian tanks at a time to roll through. If the tanks moved at
all from the cleared path, they risked having their treads blown off, leaving them totally
exposed to artillery strikes. But rather than try an alternate approach to get around the mines,
Russian commanders made one of the most basic mistakes in all of warfare: attacking exactly
where their enemies wanted them to. When Russian commanders ordered their tanks into battle along
these unmined paths outside Vuhledar, it left them incredibly vulnerable to the same ambushes
Ukrainians have employed since the start of the invasion. Hiding in covered positions near
the tank columns, Ukrainian hunter-killer teams set up anti-tank missiles on both sides of the
kill-zone. Without triggering the anti-tank mines, these teams were able to cross the
minefields and dig themselves into strategic positions, often hiding in bushes or abandoned
buildings. From there they could fire and retreat with little fear of being hit by tank fire.
The main tools Ukraine employed for this stage of the ambush were the domestically-produced
Stugna-P, and the American-made Javelin, both deadly anti-tank missiles, or ATGMs.
Sometimes called the “Skif”, the Stugna-P is a less advanced system, but can still pack a
serious punch against unlucky tanks. The Stugna is somewhat clunky, weighing about 60 pounds,
and relies on manual guidance, requiring its operator to maintain line of sight on the
target while the missile is in flight. But even with these limitations, the Stugna has shown it
can be deadly, with a range of up to three miles and tandem high-explosive anti-tank or
high-explosive fragmentary warheads, capable of penetrating modern composite tank armor.
The Javelin has proved to be even more successful at obliterating Russian tanks. Manufactured by
American defense giants Raytheon and Lockheed Martin, the Javelin has an effective range of
more than 8,000 feet, and employs a “fire and forget” targeting system, allowing its operator
to flee to safety after firing. Once in flight, the Javelin’s missile locks on to the infrared
signature of its target, and flies in one of two flight modes: top-attack or direct-attack. While
its direct-attack mode is similar to the Stugna, the Javelin’s top-attack mode has proven to be
the most deadly against Russian tanks. In this configuration, the missile travels in a high arc,
coming down on top of the least-protected section of the tank, just above its barrel.
Like the Stugna, the Javelin also features a tandem warhead charge, using a smaller initial
blast to penetrate hundreds of millimeters of armor, while the second charge creates a cone
of super plastically-deformed metal which can shred the inside of a tank like paper.
Both these ATGM systems were put to good use outside of Vuhledar. Among those responsible
was Lt. Vladislav Bayak, the deputy commander of Ukraine’s 1st Mechanized Battalion of the 72nd
brigade, which inflicted much of the damage on Russian armor. Working out of a bunker in
Vuhledar, Lt. Bayak used a drone to spot the first column of 15 Russian tanks and armored
personnel vehicles. “We were ready,” he said. “We knew something like this would happen.”
The Russian officers, meanwhile, clearly did not. Lieutenant Bayak waited until the tanks
were strung out between the mined fields, before ordering a lightning ambush with the command “To
battle!”. Stugna and Javelin operators hiding in the treelines along the fields opened fire,
as did hidden artillery positions further from the road, using American M777 and French Caesar
howitzers. Each team was assigned a different section of the Russian column to fire on,
focusing on the front and back vehicles first to create a bottleneck.
The result was devastating: tanks in the column attempted to turn and escape the ambush,
only to blow up on the mine-laden shoulder of the road. In turn, each destroyed vehicle
made it harder for the rest of the column to escape, with blown-up vehicles forming
their own roadblock. At that point, Ukrainian artillery would open fire on the trapped tanks,
killing the Russians who tried to flee from their trapped vehicles. It ended in obliteration. For
three weeks this pattern repeated itself, with Russia losing more and more tanks and, incredibly,
refusing to change tactics. At one point, Russian tanks became so stuck that Ukrainians
were even able to call in a strike by a HIMARS rocket system, usually only effective against
stationary targets like ammunition depots. Ukraine also made excellent use of its own older
tanks as well. Because they couldn’t out-gun the Russian armor head-on, Ukrainians dug their tanks
into hidden defensive positions. Some were concealed with bushes and camouflage netting,
while others were actually buried in the soil, leaving only their turrets. While not effective
against top-attack munitions, these dug-in defensive positions dramatically increased
the survivability of Ukraine’s tanks from head-on fire. And because Ukrainians knew exactly where
the Russian tank columns would advance, they were able to range the entire approach for
their hidden tanks and artillery. This allowed them to make strikes onto pre-determined firing
points with high levels of accuracy, and not waste their limited ammunition.
During each ambush, Ukrainian tank crews also used a range of extremely clever tactics to
problem solve and avoid having their positions detected. The tanks couldn’t wait with their
engines turned on without giving themselves away through thermal signature or engine noise,
but needed to stay warm to be quickly fired up for combat. So Ukrainians placed kerosene-burning
heaters next to their engines to keep the tanks ready to go on a moment’s notice. Similarly,
their hidden positions meant that many Ukrainian tank crews did not have a line of sight to their
targets, so they improvised by using drone operators to sight in their attacks. This
also added an extra level of confusion for the already bewildered Russian forces, as their front
lines were pummeled with unseen tank fire. Their own tanks couldn’t locate where to return fire,
leaving them essentially blind and helpless. If the Russian columns managed to escape the mines,
ATGMs, artillery, and hidden tank positions, Ukraine just used drones to shift their firing
positions to fleeing troops and vehicles. And for any tanks that actually managed to retreat back
through the kill-zone, Ukraine had yet another deadly surprise waiting. In one of its recent
shipments of military aid, the United States supplied Ukraine with up to 10,000 specially
modified 155-millimeter artillery shells, each filled with 9 individual anti-tank mines and a
magnetic detonator. Known as Remote Anti-Armor Mine Systems, or RAAMS, these terrifying weapons
were used to mop up any surviving Russian tanks. When a fleeing column would exit the
rear of the kill-zone, another group of hidden Ukrainian gunners opened fire on their rear,
once again trapping them with a rain of anti-tank mines. By employing this strategy again and
again against Russians who refused to try other approaches, you can see how Ukrainian defenders
destroyed over 100 tanks and armored vehicles in a matter of weeks around Vuhledar.
After the first few successful ambushes, it also became clear to Ukrainian commanders that the
Russians are running out of experienced tank crews and commanders alike. One Russian tank
commander captured outside of Vuhledar turned out to be a medic, who had been given a brief crash
course and then sent to the front lines. Because successfully operating even an older tank takes
several months of specialized training, there was little chance that the former medic would do
anything but get himself killed or captured. And this wasn’t a one-off, but a repeating pattern,
with almost every Russian officer captured near Vuhledar having little to no experience in battle.
And incredibly, the tank crews these officers were commanding appeared to be even greener.
Most were made up of recent conscripts, who had, at best, a passing familiarity with whatever
vehicle they were operating. This astonishing lack of qualified personnel, while far from surprising,
is yet another sign that the Russian war effort is falling apart. Russia lost nearly all of its
experienced tank crews during the spring of 2022, during the disastrous assault on Kyiv. The limited
number who survived those early ambushes were sent back to the east of the country as Putin
limited his war effort. But those survivors were once again decimated during the wildly successful
Ukrainian counter-offensive last fall. During that period, the most elite of Russia’s remaining tank
units, the 1st Guards Tank Army, was nearly destroyed outside the northern city of Lyman.
This was the best trained and equipped Russian tank force operating in Ukraine, and was supposed
to easily hold captured territory. Considering that even this elite unit was not up to the task,
it’s no surprise that the green Russian troops sent to Vuhledar have fared so badly.
This is a sharp contrast with Ukrainian forces, many of whom were green and terrified when they
were drafted or volunteered to defend their country last February. Even though many of
those defending Vuhledar were relatively recent recruits, they learned on the go and didn’t make
the same mistake twice. Most of Ukraine’s most experienced tank crews are currently elsewhere
in Eastern Europe, learning to operate the advanced Leopard II and M1 Abrams tanks.
Yet even the relatively untested troops defending Vuhledar were able to pull off another staggering
victory. This is a pretty clear indication that the war has decisively turned in Ukraine’s favor,
both in terms of equipment and personnel. It’s also yet another reminder of just how poor Russian
military doctrine and planning is turning out to be, as neither field officers nor top military
brass seem able to learn from past mistakes. Part of this difficulty likely comes from the very
structure of the Russian military, which is made up of multiple, independently commanded
parts. This lack of a unified command structure has plagued Russia for years,
and appears to be at least part of the reason why new conscripts are not warned against walking into
obvious ambushes. Similarly, the seasoned troops which should theoretically be spearheading such
an assault appear to be in much worse shape than expected. A recent intelligence report
from the UK found that Russia sent another elite unit, the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade,
into the fighting around Vuhledar. This force is supposed to be among the deadliest in Russia,
and was utilized in the largest battles last year. But the 155th suffered so many losses,
that even before Vuhledar it was on its third personnel restaffing since the start of the
war. As a result, this supposedly first-class fighting force is now staffed mostly by fresh
recruits. Adding to the dysfunction is the fact that the 155th was apparently not being sent
into combat together, but instead broken up into smaller units and integrated with other commands.
Rather than the desired effect of boosting other units’ battle-readiness, the decision simply made
the 155th entirely ineffective. It certainly doesn’t help that Russia is rapidly running
out of precision-guided munitions and other war supplies. As a result, Russian forces were unable
to eliminate the Ukrainian artillery and ATGM positions before their assault on Vuhledar,
assuming that they could force their way into the town regardless.
Another reason behind Russia’s repeated failures in Vuhledar and elsewhere relates to its heavy use
of private military contractors, or PMCs. The most notorious of these is the Wagner Group,
headed by Putin confidant Yevgeny Prigozhin. Putin’s reliance on Wagner and other groups, as
well as the rampant corruption in Russia, has led to a scenario where each is directly competing for
the spoils of war. Vuhledar is near two massive coal mines, one of the main reasons why Russia
has spent so much time and blood trying to take the town. But since its resources would likely be
given by only one PMC, there is a strong incentive to fight over spoils. So at Vuhledar, the official
Russian military, the Wagner Group, and the “Patriot” PMC controlled directly by Defense
Minister Seregi Shoigu have all been competing to make the town their own. As a consequence,
none of these groups shared information over the potential ambushes, each hoping that the other
would take most of the casualties, leaving them free to take over and plunder the town.
Controlling the nearly 70 million tons of coal underneath Vuhledar would make either Prigozhin
or Shoigu far wealthier than they are currently, giving them a billion dollar reason not to
cooperate. Of course, this dynamic isn’t great for an effective fighting force, and has left Russia
at a significant information disadvantage. There’s another political dimension to Russia’s
failures in Vuhledar as well. It’s clear to pretty much everyone but the Russians that the smart move
would have been to move elsewhere and avoid the potential of mines and ambushes. Yet Russian
commanders have insisted on bizarre pitched assaults– possibly because of Putin’s desperate
need for a political win. Anywhere Russian forces have been ground to a halt, the political
importance of not appearing to lose a battle has come to outweigh the strategic importance of
withdrawing or maneuvering around static defenses. Doing so would be yet another signal of weakness,
especially to Putin’s most hardline supporters of the invasion. But even so, after the staggering
loss at Vuhledar, cracks are starting to show. Russian military bloggers, a vocally pro-war
group, have fiercely criticized the endless failed tank assaults. Grey Zone, a Telegram
channel close to the Wagner Group, posted in early March that “relatives of the dead are inclined
almost to murder and blood revenge against the general” who was in charge at Vuhledar.
And while the Ukrainian armed forces can be glad of Russia’s staggering incompetence,
we should never forget the terrible price paid by places like Vuhledar. By the end of the Russian
assault in February, the town’s Deputy Mayor stated that Vuhledar “was destroyed,” “with
100% of the buildings damaged.” Of the town’s original population of 15,000,
less than 500 remain, mostly squatting in ruins and collecting rain water to drink. While there
is no doubt that the battle was a tactical victory for Ukraine, it will also take many, many years
before anything can be rebuilt. In any case, it is more than clear that the war’s trajectory has
changed in Ukraine’s favor, and that Russia cannot suffer too many more defeats like this one.
But what do you think— was Vuhledar a turning point in the war? And will Russia’s repeated
failures eventually doom Putin’s ambitions? Let us know what you think in the comments below,
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